Story by Capt. Lydia LaRue

ANSBACH, Germany – The 12th Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) has reflagged its attack battalion from 1st Battalion, 3rd Aviation Regiment (Attack), to 2nd Battalion, 159th Aviation Regiment (Attack), effective immediately, Oct. 14, 2025.

The activation of the “Gunslingers” Battalion is largely a change in name-only for the 12th CAB, part of the wider Army Aviation Transformation Initiative (AATI). This action returns the 1-3 Attack Battalion lineage to the 3rd Combat Aviation Brigade at Fort Stewart, Georgia, while re-activating a historic unit name for the U.S. Army’s attack presence in Europe.

“We are redesignating back to 2-159th, and my team is excited to resume the heritage of this storied unit,” said Lt. Col. Comador M. Ferguson III, commander of the 2-159th Attack Battalion. “We will continue to fly and fight the world’s most technically advanced Apache with a laser-like focus on addressing potential near-peer threats, while continuously showcasing our expertise in hard-hitting, gritty lethality.”

Crucially, no Soldiers or equipment will be leaving the 12th CAB. The personnel, helicopters, and mission readiness currently provided by the unit remain here in Germany, continuing their vital role in support of U.S. Army Europe and Africa (USAREUR-AF).

The return of the 2-159 name reestablishes a unit with a strong connection to Germany. The 2nd Battalion, 159th Aviation Regiment was originally constituted in 1968 and was reorganized and redesignated in August 2006 as the 2nd Battalion, 159th Aviation Regiment, stationed in Germany at Storck Barracks. In October 2015, as part of a restructuring initiative, it was reflagged as the 1st Battalion, 3rd Aviation Regiment at Katterbach, the name the battalion carried until this current transformation under the AATI.

“Katterbach has always been more than a duty station; it’s a home to generations of Soldiers, Families, and our German neighbors who have welcomed and supported us,” said Col. Adam R. Bock, commander of the 12th Combat Aviation Brigade. “As we reactivate the 2-159th Attack Battalion, let us also rededicate ourselves to the mission, to one another, and to the trust placed in us by our nation.”

Story by Capt. Lydia Laga

BOLESŁAWIEC, Poland – The 3rd Combat Aviation Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, assumed authority of U.S. Army aviation operations in Europe from the 1st Armored Division Combat Aviation Brigade during a transfer of authority ceremony held in Bolesławiec, Poland on October 28, 2025. This rotational handover underscores V Corps’ commitment to warfighting readiness, providing combat credible forces equipped with attack aviation as a cornerstone capability to remain lethal and agile in deterring potential adversaries.

“I think the one thing that 3rd CAB and 3rd Infantry Division brings to V Corps during this rotation is the absolute flexibility that this aviation brigade is capable of and has presented in many cases throughout its history. Absolute flexibility is our keystone as far the division and our aviation brigade is concerned,” said Col. Robert Harless, commander of 3rd Combat Aviation Brigade.

The transition marks the start of 3rd CAB’s rotation supporting Operation Atlantic Resolve and broader missions across the European theater. The brigade’s Soldiers, aircraft, and maintenance teams are now positioned across multiple sites to deliver critical aviation support. This includes reconnaissance, rapid troop movement, sustainment logistics, and fire support for U.S., NATO, and partner forces, enhancing interoperability, and enabling a unified response to transnational threats.

During its rotation, the 1st Armored Division Combat Aviation Brigade supported over 15 multinational training events, including the Polish Apache Initiative summit in January 2025 at Katterbach Army Airfield. This event, part of a three-phased approach to bolster attack aviation interoperability, brought together key leaders from the United States, Poland, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Australia.

Discussions focused on organizing training, fighting, and sustaining AH-64 Apache operations, refining joint tactics and improving coordination between Allied aviation and ground forces during large-scale joint operations across Europe. These efforts directly align with USAREUR-AF’s priorities of building readiness, driving experimentation, and accelerating integration of U.S. and NATO command and control.

As 3rd CAB assumes the mission, the brigade will continue building on those achievements, aligning operations with U.S. Army Europe and Africa’s priorities of readiness, experimentation, and transformation in contact (TiC). The brigade’s distributed presence will enable flexible, rapid responses to emerging requirements while supporting NATO regional defense plans and multinational exercises.

“I think this transfer of authority absolutely empowers every Soldier, within this combat aviation brigade, to represent first the United States of America, the support to the U.S. Constitution and lastly our alliances and partnerships with NATO we have throughout Europe, dating back to our World War I heritage as the 3rd Infantry Division,” Harless said.

Each rotational deployment contributes to the Army’s broader transformation agenda: evaluating network communications, adapting tactics to multi-domain environments, and modernizing aviation assets amid complex threats. For the 3rd CAB, this mission represents both continuity in sustaining deterrence and progress in shaping tomorrow’s aviation force.

Looking Back, November 2025
By Mark Albertson

Operation: DESERT SHIELD

* * * * *

The single biggest maneuver factor on the battlefield was the Apache.  If there was one leverage device that we used it was the Army general support aviation battalion.  In my judgment, for the number of soldiers involved, and the price involved, the biggest leverage we got out of the very few numbers of helicopters, the tiny number of helicopters, that we devoted to support logistics, and command and control in general:  the Signal battalion commander, the Maneuver Brigade commanders, the DISCOM commander, and the Division G3.  Had COL James King (DISCOM Commander) not had Army Aviation UH-60s, UH-1s and Chinooks, there would have been a far different outcome.  Many of us will never know the full story on that one.  It made the difference of getting POL to the right spot because we could move the key logistics around the battlefield.

Who won the battle?  Certainly, the artillery and the Apache.  It will be hard to remember that eleven years from now, when you are in charge of force development working 20 hours a day.  The artillery and the Apache are the hammers that make the endgame work.[1]

* * * * *

Economics of War

Colonel Tackaberry’s observation on the success of airmobility over Saddam’s host during Operation:  DESERT STORM must conform to the preparatory process.  For victory is not possible without same.  And to understand that victory, we must return to that series of events that led up to STORM.

August 1, 1990, Saddam Hussein sent his army crashing into Kuwait.  One week later, he had annexed same.[2]  Yet Efraim Karsh provides the rationale for Saddam’s actions:

“Though the Iraqi regime went out of its way to portray the end of the war as a shining victory (that is, the Iran-Iraq War), the truth was that Iraq, no less than Iran, emerged from the eight-year conflict a crippled nation.  At least 200,000 Iraqis had lost their lives, while about 400,000 had been wounded and some 70,000 taken prisoner; an exorbitant price for a nation of 17 million people.  In 1980 Iraq could boast of a $35 billion foreign currency reserve; eight years later it had accumulated a foreign debt of some $80 billion—roughly twice the size of its Gross National Product.  This debt was extremely onerous, since repayment arrears and the consequent reluctance of foreign companies and governments to extend further credits meant that the reconstruction of Iraq from the destruction wrought by the war would have to be shelved.

“Economic estimates put the cost of reconstruction at $230 billion. . .    As things were a year after the termination of hostilities, Iraq’s oil revenues of $13 billion did not suffice even to cover ongoing expenditures:  With civilian imports approximating to $12 billion ($3 billion for foodstuffs), military imports exceeding $5 billion, debt payments totaling some $5 billion; and, transfers by foreign workers topping $1 billion, the regime needed an extra $10 billion per annum to balance its current deficit, before it could even think of reconstruction; and this without taking into account the substantial domestic economic costs, such as the $2.5-$7.9 billion defense expenditure.”[3]

The harsh economic realities unfolding underscored the political corner Saddam had painted himself into.  He needed cash and, in one quick hurry.  In February 1990, in Amman, Jordan, Saddam petitioned King Hussein and President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt to notify the Gulf States that Iraq wanted a postponement on the loans by its “principals” during the war with Iran.  And in addition, Baghdad wanted another $30 billion to boot.

Bottom line was that Iraq was over its head with $80 billion in red ink.  Kuwait chose not to overlook $65 billion in economic assistance to Iraq in its war against its Persian neighbor.  Baghdad countered that Iraq’s invasion of Iran was in Kuwait’s and Saudi Arabia’s benefit, since Saddam was carrying the Arab standard against the detested Shia Fundamentalist regime in Tehran.  This, in addition to Iraq’s complaints that Kuwait was reaping undeserved oil profits from the Rumaila oil field, located as it was in territory under dispute by both Iraq and Kuwait.  Baghdad, too, was hardly happy with the price of oil being depressed owing to the oil glut, blaming Kuwait for overproduction.[4]

“To pay off his country’s debts, Saddam Hussein needed oil prices to remain in the range of $25 a barrel (at the height of the Iran-Iraq War, prices had reached as high as $35 a barrel).  He watched in despair as the international price slumped to $14 by July 1990.  The Gulf, at peace once again, was now able to export all the oil the world needed.  To make matters worse, some Gulf States were producing well beyond their OPEC quotas.  Kuwait was one of the worst offenders.  Kuwait had its own reasons for breaking ranks with OPEC over production quotas.  Earlier in the 1980s, the Kuwaiti government had diversified its economy by investing in Western refineries and opening thousands of gasoline stations across Europe under the new brand name ‘Q-8,’ a homonym for ‘Kuwait.’  Kuwait’s crude oil exports increasingly went to its own facilities in the West.  The more crude oil the Kuwaitis sold to their refineries, the higher their profits in Europe.  These refining and marketing outlets generated higher profit margins than the export of crude and insulated Kuwait from variations in the price of crude oil.  Kuwait was more interested in generating maximum output than seeking the highest price per barrel by hewing to OPEC’s guidelines.”[5]

But what does the above economic explanation have to do with Army Aviation?  Simple, war is economics, as stated by none other than Adolf Hitler.  Economic primacy is the major factor for the preservation of the modern American military.  Paramount, if you will, of the preservation of American interests; which underscores the striving of fashioning an American military able to respond at a moment’s notice.  Same has been reinforced on the pages of Army Aviation magazine, the publisher of this work.  Yet . . .

“. . . As a strategic force, the Army must be prepared for instantaneous transition from peace to war.  Our Army is trained and ready to make that transition should we ever be called upon to do so.”[6]

That “instantaneous transition” as alluded to by General Vuono has already been showcased with the invasion of Grenada.  What will transpire in the liberation of Kuwait would provide a window, though, into Army Aviation’s role to be played in the AirLand battle concept.  What far-sighted individuals such as Generals William DePuy and Donn Starry were attempting to forge in the wake of the calamitous result of Vietnam, came to fruition during Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

* * * * *

From Staunch to Storm

The preparatory phase of Desert Shield/Storm was the Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988.  This conflict was an overt threat to Western energy interests, since more than fifty percent of the globe’s marketable and tradeable crude flowed from the area in contention  The basic preference of the West in this conflict can be seen within the analysis of Anthony Cordesman in 1987:

“The West will not benefit from U.S. efforts directly supporting Iraq with weapons or other major assistance.  This is a role that France and other European nations can perform.  U.S. support of Iraq should be indirect, and linked to efforts to open lines of communication to Iran and to strengthen the southern Gulf States.  In practice, this means using every political means to limit arms shipments to Iran, providing quiet intelligence support and providing political support for every serious peace initiative.

“The U.S. will, however, need to revitalize and sustain ‘Operation:  STAUNCH,’ the U.S. effort to halt the flow of arms to Iran that began in 1983.  It will need to continue to provide Iraq with agricultural credits, and be ready to support emergency aid by the EXIN (Export- Import) Bank and collective action by the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and World Bank.  The U.S. should continue to share intelligence with Iraq of a kind it has provided since mid-1984 and to make every effort to reduce the risk of a successful Iranian offensive or surprise attack.

“In contrast, Europe needs to halt its arms shipments to Iran as much as possible and to concentrate on building up economic ties.  It needs to be ready to extend and renegotiate loans, and help ensure Iraq can keep fighting.  France plays a particularly critical role.  Its arms supplies to Iraq are vital not only to preventing an Iranian victory, but to reducing Iraqi dependence on the USSR.”[7]

But the Iran-Iraq War proved a decisive factor in the destabilization of the most strategic area of the globe.  Saddam Hussein, seeking to position Iraq as the new major Arab power in lieu of Egypt, which no longer was, expected quick victory in severing the Iranian province Khuzestan, known to Arabs as “Arabistan,” which would most certainly solidify Saddam’s effort at domination of the Arab world, let alone, perhaps, OPEC.  For 70 to 80 percent of Iran’s oil reserves are in Khuzestan.  Not only would Saddam be able to improve his standing and political advantage among Arab councils, but would cause irreparable damage to the Shia standard bearer, Iran.

Both Iraq and Iran emerged from the resulting protracted conflict crippled.  The Iraqis, as mentioned previously, incurred upwards of 200,000 dead and another 400,000 wounded, with an additional 70,000 taken prisoner.  Heavy losses for a nation of only 17 million.  But a proper understanding of the opponent the Iraqis were engaged with for eight years is called for:

The Shia Fundamentalist regime in Iran had purged some 12,000 officers from the hated Shah’s regime that had been recently toppled.  The Khomeini government created its own militia, the Pasdaran or Revolutionary Guard, a political military formation organized to act as a prophylactic to potential counterrevolution.  Hence the aforementioned purge.[8]

On March 20, 1982, another military formation was formed in Iran:  Basij e-Mustazafin or Mobilization of the Deprived, featured the mobilization of the young, those ages 12-18, organized into what were literally, in many instances, suicide squads.

Many of these recruits came “mainly from rural areas or from the most devout Shi’ite families, these poorly trained and ill-equipped youths, some as young as 12, were little more than cannon fodder or human minesweepers sent in advance of Iran’s other military forces to clear fields, desert scrubland and marshes.  With their red and yellow headbands proclaiming Allah’s or Khomeini’s greatness, a piece of white cloth pinned to their uniforms as a symbol of a shroud, each one carrying his death with him, and a plastic key around their necks, issued personally by Khomeini as a symbol of their assured entry into paradise upon martyrdom, they charged towards Iraqi positions in total disregard of the danger to their lives, and to the shocked disbelief of their enemies.

“They came on in their hundreds, often walking straight across the minefields, triggering them with their feet as they are supposed to do. . . “  See page 62, “Iran’s Boy Soldiers,” The Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988, by Efraim Karsh.[9]

Such an opponent was pulling out all the stops to throw out the invader.  And, was emblematic of the brutality of this conflict.  A conflict which, together with the rise of the Shia fundamentalist regime in Tehran, would help to harden the lines of division between Shias and Sunnis and lend to what will become the faceoff between the Shia standard bearer Iran versus the Wahhabi agenda in Riyadh.

The year following the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the Soviets would evacuate Afghanistan, presaging the decline and collapse of not only the Soviet Union but also its vassal states in Eastern and Central Europe.  The bipolar balance of power that had replaced the end of European domination of global affairs as of 1945, had given way to a unipolar world as the United States became the sole superpower.  Yet the peace dividend that many expected has proven to be an illusion, one typical of the human condition.  For China was coming on as a competitive power; as was India, Japan was still in the game.  The European Union was trying to find itself in an uncertain New World Order, as was a struggling Russia.

Yet the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan and the ensuing Carter Administration assistance of the Mujahideen, carried forward by the Reagan Administration, opened a new conflict, that of the Jihadis.  If they could throw an infidel power out of Afghanistan, then what could they do in the Middle East, after centuries of tiresome Western meddling and incursions.

* * * * *

Shield to Storm

“At about 2 a.m. (Baghdad time) on August 2, 1990, three Iraqi Republican Guard divisions invaded Kuwait.  One proceeded down a coast road to Kuwait City, a second seized the inland oil fields, and the third proceeded to the Saudi Arabian border.  Kuwaiti A-4 aircraft and Chieftain tanks fought for three days until their fuel and ammunition were exhausted.  The small Kuwaiti Navy also made a valiant showing, with the last two fast attack craft escaping while firing at pursuing Iraqi tanks.

“Iraqi forces quickly captured Kuwait City and the Emir’s palace, while the Kuwaiti ruler, Sheik Taber al-Ahmed al-Sabah, fled to Saudi Arabia and established a government-in-exile.  On August 3^rd, the remainder of Kuwait was captured and by the 4^th, Iraqi forces were massed along the Kuwaiti-Saudi border for a possible invasion of Saudi Arabia.  If Iraq occupied Saudi Arabia, it would not only establish itself as the secular leader of the Arab world, but would also control forty-five percent of the world’s oil.”[10]

If Saddam had banked on the Soviet Union acting as a counterweight to the U.S. and NATO taking action to prevent his Anschluss with Kuwait, he most certainly had miscalculated.  For the Soviet monolith was well along that progression of collapse; in addition to the unfolding demise of the Warsaw Pact, which demonstrated unequivocally what that “military alliance” really was, an empire.[11]  Perhaps, too, the Iraqi dictator had thought that America had not recovered from the Vietnam debacle.

Following Saddam’s steamrollering of Kuwait, the United States and its NATO allies poured military personnel and equipment into Saudi Arabia.  But due to the efforts of James Baker, forces other than that of the United States and NATO formed a broad-based coalition.[12]

“President George Bush, Sr., ordered American military forces to Saudi Arabia on August 7, 1990.  By August 11, 13 Army helicopters had arrived in country.  By the time the ground war began on 24 February 1991, XVIII Airborne Corps had 920 aircraft in Saudi Arabia, VII Corps had deployed 808, and Echelon Above Corps (EAC) and Army Special Forces had 160 for a theater total of 1,888 Army aircraft.  During the period of August 1990 through March 1991, 2,010 Army aircraft flew 182,960 hours as part of the Army team.  Ten aviation brigades directly participated in combat operations and other aviation forces provided essential combat support and combat services support to the theater.”[13]

Yet according to Major General Donald R. Williamson, “Operation Desert Shield found the U.S. Army Aviation Systems Command (AVSCOM) operating on an underfunded spares budget supporting an over-programmed flying hour program.”[14] Production, though, was expanded and accelerated.  Additional stocks, transport of supplies, maintenance of aircraft and equipment to accommodate not only a noticeable increase in flying time, but the expected wear and tear with operations in a challenging environment.

“This stepped up activity included over $300 million in new procurement, 2,000 spares programs accelerated, and 600 depot programs surged.  This magnified response by both AVSCOM and industry was only hampered by lead times for raw materials and in some instances, forgings and castings.”[15]

In face of the wear and tear in the desert, Colonel Thomas W. Garrett, Commander, Aviation Brigade, 101^st Airborne Division (Air Assault), from Fort Campbell, Kentucky, explained some of the conditions faced even in the assembly areas:

“Even at semi improved areas, the sand and dust quickly began to exact a heavy maintenance toll.  Blade erosion, engine problems, and avionics trouble were the most worrisome.  Our newest aircraft have faired the best.  AH-64, OH-58D and newer UH-60s (in order) have held up well.  Dust control has become a major concern.  Low cost, widely available, and easily applied dust control measures are urgently needed.

“Desert night flying has proved to be the toughest of challenges.  We are adjusting tactics and techniques to allow us to continue to accomplish our mission, but we had to learn the hard way.  Heads up displays for goggles, continued goggle refinement in the areas of acuity and field-of-view, forward looking radar altimeters, and aural altitude warning would greatly enhance our ability to conduct safer night desert operations.  A system like the USAF’s ‘Harvest Bare’ needs to be reviewed by Army Aviation.  Crew rest, especially for night crews, is next to impossible.  A portable base like ‘Harvest Bare’ would be a present from Heaven for many an aviation brigade here in Saudi Arabia.

“Accurate navigation in a featureless desert, day or night, has been challenging.  Old maps coupled with shifting dunes and lake beds make even Doppler update waypoints suspect (if you’re lucky enough to have Doppler), allowing for drift errors to build.  We must press on with GPS hand-held commercial LORANS, which have been a life saver.”[16]

Perhaps it was Major General Rudolph Ostovich, III, then Chief, Aviation Branch, Commanding General and Commandant, U.S. Army Aviation Logistics School, who observed that with the coming end of the Cold War, the Army was to be reduced, from 28 divisions to 22, resulting, then, in fewer forward deployed forces.  “The forces stationed in CONUS will provide both reinforcing combat power for forward deployed forces as well as a contingency capability to respond quickly and decisively in support of our national security interests.  Our contingency forces will include heavy, light, and special operations units and there will be a premium on deployable weapons systems that are both versatile and lethal.  Army Aviation stands at the forefront of these initiatives.  Pound for pound, we are the most deployable, versatile, and lethal of today’s Army forces.”[17]

He continues his analysis, thus:  “In response to the challenges in our future, CG, TRADOC initiated Studies and General Officer workshops to redefine our doctrine and identify alternative balance force structures.  Through these concept development vehicles, we examined an emerging doctrine tagged AirLand Battle-Future.  The concept is founded on a precept that future battlefields will be nonlinear.  By this, we mean that no longer will we have the forces to line up hub to hub or rotor to rotor and stretch from coast to coast.  We accept the fact that there may be large gaps between formations.  We will no longer concentrate our effort to seize and hold terrain.”[18]  Rather we will focus our destructive power on the enemy force.  We will employ state-of-the art intelligence gathering sensors and air cavalry to find and fix the enemy.  Attack helicopters, Close Air Support/Battlefield Air Interdiction, and long-range artillery fires will shape the battlefield for decisive destruction of the enemy through high speed and dynamic maneuver.  Depth and rapid concentration of overwhelming destructive power are the essence of aviation’s contribution to our future as a fighting doctrine.”[19]

* * * * *

Endnotes

[1]  See pages 28 and 29, “24^th Aviation Brigade in Desert Storm,” Part I, Army Aviation, June 30, 1991, by Colonel Burt S. Tackaberry.

[2]  See page 152, Chapter 8, “Bush, Clinton, and the Triumph of Wilsonianism,” The Folly of Empire, by John B. Judis.

[3]  See page 89, “A Costly Exercise in Futility,” The Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988, by Efraim Karsh.

[4]  See page 17, Part 1, “The Prelude,” Military Lessons of the Gulf War, by Bruce W. Watson; Bruce George, Labor MP; Peter Tsouras and B.L. Cyr.

[5]  See page 442, Chapter 14, “After the Cold War,” The Arabs, A History, by Eugene Rogan.

[6]  See page 4, “Training and Readiness,” Army Aviation, May 1, 1989, by General Carl E. Vuono.

[7]  See page 158, Chapter Eight, “The Impact on Western Policy,” The Iran-Iraq War and Western Security, 1984-87, by Anthony H. Cordesman.

[8]  In Egypt, beginning in 2011, the uprising against Hosni Mubarak, eventually resulted in the Muslim Brotherhood attaining power, though only briefly.  The Egyptian armed forces reclaimed power, unseating the Brotherhood.  Understood among the Egyptian Officer Class was the brutal purging of the Shah’s officer class by the Shia fundamentalists in Iran.  History, here, In Egypt, was not to be repeated.

[9]  Throughout history, nations or empires attempting to deal with manpower shortages, or generate manpower superiority in the face of material disadvantages or seek to galvanize patriotism or, seek to create a more disciplined environment, utilized aspects of the above to create a military advantage.  For instance, Stalin’s infamous Order No. 227, July 28, 1942, “Not a Step Back,” which was to stiffen the spine of Soviet soldiery.  No commander had the right to retreat without specifically being ordered to do so.

Known as penal battalions or Shtrafbats, such troops were cannon fodder, as they ran through minefields or assaulted enemy positions prior to regular line troops.  Soldiers consigned to such units were considered to have exhibited the less than required intestinal fortitude against the “fascist invader.”

Blocking detachments, formations of NKVD (forerunner of the KGB) lay in wait behind the lines to enforce the compliance of those who retreated.  Though it was possible to be reassigned to a regular unit when a candidate had demonstrated that he was ready for such a hoped for transfer.

Upwards of 442,700 Soviet soldiers served in the penal battalions.  This, in addition to the fact, that Stalin had some 158,000 shot for cowardice or incompetence.  This included 248 generals and admirals, so Stalin did have a more “liberal” view on maintaining discipline.   Indeed, Stalin is reputed to have replied, to a question as to the Shtrafbats, that “. . . it took a brave man to be a coward in the Red Army.”

Germany, too, 1944-1945, resorted to young teens when hard up for men.  February 1945, Hitler ordered the induction of 6,000 boys, ages 15 to 16, to “beef up the rear defense line.”  See page 236, Chapter 9, “The Final Sacrifice,” Hitler’s Children, by Gerhard Rempel.  There was also the Werewolves, German youth organized to conduct behind the lines disruption and sabotage, as well as carryout assassinations of enemy soldiers, agents and German “collaborators.”  Indeed, on March 25, 1945, the American-installed mayor of Aachen, Franz Oppenhoff, was liquidated by a local Werewolf commando squad.  Such squads of Hitler Youth were active to well into 1946.  See pages 182-184, Chapter 10, “The End of the Hitler Youth,” Hitler Youth, by Brenda Ralph Lewis.

[10]  See page 15, Part I:  “The Prelude,” 1:  “The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait,” Military Lessons of the Gulf War, by Bruce W. Watson; Bruce George, MP; Peter Tsouras and B.L. Cyr.

[11]  Adolf Hitler returned home, to Austria, March 12, 1938; to which he even brought a large circle of friends for the happy occasion, that being the success of the German Army.  Known as Operation:  OTTO, the absorption of Austria into the German Reich, is known to history as the Anschluss or annexation, which was in violation of the Versailles Treaty, Section VI, Article 80.  To Saddam and other Iraqis, Kuwait was known as the 19^th province.

[12]  Such contributors as:

Afghanistan:  300 Mujahideen troops (under Joint Forces Command).

Bahrain:  3,500 troops (under Joint Forces Command).

Bangladesh:  2,500 troops (under CENTCOM administrative command).

Czechoslovakia:  350 men, chemical troops and 170 to Saudi Arabia (under administrative command).

Egypt:  40,000 troops, 400 tanks, 600 APCs and 300 artillery pieces.

Kuwait:  7,000 troops (under administrative command).

Morocco:  2,000 troops (under CENTCOM administrative command).

Niger:  400 troops (under CENTCOM administrative command).

Oman:  2,500 troops and 24 tanks (under Joint Forces Command).

Pakistan:  10,000 troops (under Joint Forces Command).

Qatar:  4,000 troops (under Joint Forces Command).

Saudi Arabia:  95,000 troops, 550 tanks (under Joint Forces Command).

Senegal:  500 troops (under ENTCOM administrative command).

Syria:  20,000 troops (under Joint Forces Command).

United Arab Emirates:  4,000 troops (under Joint Forces Command).  See page 240, E., Ground Forces, Military Lessons of the Gulf War, by Bruce W. Watson; Bruce George, MP; Peter Tsouras and B.L. Cyr.

[13]  See pages 44, 45 and 54, by Major General Robert S. Frix and Major Ronald A. Carter, “Third Army View of Desert Shield/Storm,” Army Aviation, Vol. 52, No. 12, December 31, 2003.

[14]  See page 14, “AVSCOM:  A Desert Shield Overview,” Army Aviation, Vol. 40, Nos. 3 & 4, March-April 1991, by Major General Donald R. Williamson.

[15]  See page 14, Major General Donald R. Williamson.

[16]  See page 23, “DESERT SHIELD:  The Challenges,” Army Aviation, Vol. 39, No. 11, November 30, 1990, by Colonel Thomas W. Garrett.

[17]  See page 12, “Contingency Warfare:  Our Strong Suit,” Army Aviation, Vol. 39, No. 10, October 31, 1990, by Major General Rudolph Ostovich, III.

[18]  Major General Ostovich, with his wonderfully orchestrated effort of how America must prosecute its military requirements in the post-Soviet era, is also fortifying a reality that has existed since November 25-26, 1950, when 300,000 Chinese troops entered the Korean War, forcing a ceasefire on July 27, 1953, thereby insuring the survival of the North Korean regime; but which also put the finishing touches on Levee en Masse.  A period when Army doctrine saw to the destruction of the enemy forces so as to bring the opposing power to the conference table for the declaration of terms.  Such was highly successful in 1865, 1918 and 1945.

Of course, beginning with the Bomb, Levee en Masse, conscripting entire populations and economies for war came to a screeching halt, especially in the West, where many populations in the developed world most likely would not show up (just after 9/11 in the United States being an example) for a war.  The Great War, 1914-1922; 1931-1945, is largely responsible for this after the horrible harvest of humanity, upwards of some 75,000,000 souls, mostly on the European continent.

General Ostovich notes the necessity of destroying the enemy force, in particular since American troops will most likely field the smaller team.  The example here is Genghis Khan’s Mongol Army:  Mobility was the key to success, of what was arguably the most victorious army in the history of Man.  For upon the defeat of an opponent, his host was pursued and hounded until eradicated; in addition to a finishing stroke applied to the leader himself.  Certainly saves the distribution of forces to occupy a territory for the purposes of policing it for cleaning out pockets of resistance.

[19]  During Operation BARBAROSSA, Hitler’s overriding concern was the destruction of Stalin’s Red Army, in lieu of taking and holding territory.  The Fuhrer understood Napoleon’s failure to hold Moscow in 1812.  But this was the Soviet Union of 1941, not France of 1940.  The mammoth size of the Soviet colossus helped the Soviet Army survive the Nazi onslaught, as did Russia’s most faithful allies, General Winter and General Mud.  A grander analysis, though, is beyond the scope of this work; despite which the point as noted should be readily understood and well taken.

* * * * *

Bibliography

Cordesman, Anthony H., The Iran-Iraq War and Western Security, 1984-1987, Jane’s Publishing, Company, Ltd., London, 1987.

Friedman, Norman, Desert Victory:  The War for Kuwait, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 1991.

Fris, Major General Robert S. and Carter, Major Ronald A., “Third Army View of DESERT SHIELD/STORM,” Army Aviation, Vol. 52, No. 12, Army Aviation Publications, Inc., Monroe, Ct., December 31, 2003.

Garrett, Colonel Thomas W., “DESERT SHIELD:  The Challenges,” Army Aviation, Vol. 39, No. 11, Army Aviation Publications, Inc., Westport, Ct., November 30, 1990.

Judis, John B., The Folly of Empire, A Lisa Drew Book/Scribner, New York, NY., 2004.

Karsh, Efraim, The Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988, Essential Histories, Osprey Publishing, Oxford, UK, 2002.

Lewis, Brenda Ralph, Hitler Youth:  The Hitler Jugend in War and Peace, 1933-1945, MBI Publishing, Company, Osceola, Wisconsin, copyright Amber Books, Ltd., 2000.

Ostovich, Major General Rudolph, III, “Contingency Warfare:  Our Strong Suit,” Army Aviation, Vol. 39, No. 10, Army Aviation Publications, Inc., Westport, Ct., October 31, 1990.

Rempel, Gerhard, Hitler’s Children:  The Hitler Youth and the SS, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill and London, 1989.

Rogan, Eugene, The Arabs:  A History, Basic Books, New York, NY., 2009.

Tackaberry. Colonel Burt S., “Part I:  24^th Aviation Brigade in DESERT STORM,” Army Aviation, Vol. 40. No. 6, Army Aviation Publications, Inc., Westport, Ct., June 30, 1991.

Vuono, General Carl E., “Training and Readiness:  Challenges for Army Aviation,” Army Aviation, Vol. 38, No. 5, Army Aviation Publications, Inc., Westport, Ct., May 31, 1989.

Watson, Bruce W.; George, Bruce, MP; Tsouras, Peter and Cyr, B.L., Military Lessons of the Gulf War, Greenhill Books, Presidio Press, Novato, California, 1991.

Williamson, Major General Donald R., “AVSCOM:  A Desert Shield Overview,” Army Aviation, Vol. 40, Nos 3 & 4, Army Aviation Publications, Inc., Westport, Ct., March-April 1991.

The decision authorizes the procurement of Block II aircraft in FY25 and FY26. Combined with previously approved Congressionally directed procurements, the Army will field CH-47F Block II helicopters to two Combat Aviation Brigades, modernizing the Army’s heavy-lift fleet for future large-scale combat operations.

The CH-47F Block II upgrades existing CH-47F Block I aircraft through a recapitalization process. The Block II significantly improves the CH-47F fleet, giving commanders increased payloads, extended range, and improved sustainability to create the standoff areas demanded by contested logistics environments. With an increased maximum gross weight of 54,000 pounds, the aircraft permits operational commanders to move more materiel, Soldiers, and fuel, farther and faster.

“With the Block II Chinook’s increased gross weight and increased torque available, we can carry more,” said Chief Warrant Officer 2 Jordan Brooks, Golf Company, 6-101 GSAB’s maintenance test pilot. “Imagining just a single serial of Block II Chinooks versus Block I Chinooks, (Block II Chinooks) can carry more Soldiers and equipment, and carry them further.” For example, missions that currently require two sorties with Block I can be completed with a single Block II sortie, reducing crew exposure and accelerating operational tempo.

The Block II Common Avionics Architecture System (CAAS) uses a Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA), ensuring that the platform can adapt to technological advances. This architecture allows the integration of degraded visual environment (DVE) sensors and the introduction of semi-autonomous flight capabilities with the potential for full autonomy in the future.

The commonality with the special operations MH-47G variant lets the Army and SOCOM leverage and build on each other’s modernization efforts and further enhances efficiency. By sharing major components, the Army reduces both production costs and long-term sustainment expenses, while simplifying logistics support for units in the field.

International interest in the CH-47F BLK II aircraft continues to grow. One partner nation has committed to 60 aircraft and several other partner nations have expressed interest in acquiring Block II to strengthen their own heavy-lift capabilities. This global demand underscores the platform’s reputation as a proven workhorse with cutting-edge upgrades tailored for 21st-century warfare.

“Block II is about more than incremental improvement—it’s about ensuring the Army and the Joint Force retain a heavy-lift advantage in contested environments,” said COL Jennie Conlon, the PM of Cargo Helicopters. “With added payload, range, and digital growth capacity, the Chinook will continue to deliver for Soldiers and evolve to remain ahead of future battlefield environments.”

As the Army prepares for the future fight, the CH-47F Block II represents both continuity and transformation: retaining the trusted reliability of the Chinook while enabling the modernization required to compete and win against peer adversaries.

 

Story by Spc. Kameron Spencer

In the rolling hills of Sarajevo, where NATO missions converge to ensure stability and security, two specialized U.S. Army teams came together with one mission in mind: to care for soldiers and strengthen multinational readiness. Task Force Medical and Task Force Aviation not only provided essential healthcare to American troops stationed at Camp Butmir but also reinforced medical evacuation capabilities through training and partnership with regional allies.

For years, U.S. personnel at Camp Butmir faced a two-day journey to Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo, to receive medical services. This deployment changed that. Task Force Medical, coordinated by Lt. Col. Bernard, Staff Sgt. LeBlanc, and 1st Sgt. Piazza brought medical personnel directly to Camp Butmir. In just two trips, the team treated nearly 20 patients, ranging from routine dental care to chronic pain management.

“The primary goal was to enhance medical readiness,” said Piazza. “Soldiers shouldn’t have to wait days to receive care. By bringing providers forward, we can meet their needs where they are.”

Logistics played a critical role in these missions, with coordination covering personnel, housing, and transportation. Lessons learned included the efficiency of air travel compared to ground transportation, as well as documentation requirements for badging and housing. Building on these experiences, planning is already underway for future missions that will expand available services, such as optometry, to further support soldiers at Camp Butmir.

Running in parallel with the medical outreach was the work of the Task Force Aviation MEDEVAC team. Under the leadership of 2nd Lt. Dustin Haubner, the aeromedical evacuation officer, the team transported providers and equipment between Camp Bondsteel and Camp Butmir while also integrating with Bosnian forces and conducting joint training with NATO partners, particularly Romanian MEDEVAC units.

“Our role wasn’t just transport,” said Haubner. “We worked with Bosnian and Romanian forces to share knowledge, demonstrate hoist operations, and build a foundation for future joint missions.”

One mission highlight was a live hoist demonstration, designed to showcase U.S. capabilities and strengthen interoperability. Training modules included both introductory and advanced sessions, focusing on aircrew familiarization and medical equipment. These exchanges gave Romanian and Bosnian partners direct exposure to U.S. MEDEVAC standards and opened the door for more complex, hands-on training in the future.

The planning required coordination across Task Force Medical, Task Force Aviation, and Camp Butmir leadership. Factors such as cross-border diplomatic clearances, hospital landing procedures, and communication protocols were all carefully considered to ensure safe and effective operations.

Together, Task Force Medical and Task Force Aviation delivered direct medical services to 18 U.S. soldiers at Camp Butmir, reduced the strain of long-distance travel for medical care, and established a framework for sustained healthcare rotations. At the same time, they advanced NATO interoperability, improved MEDEVAC readiness, and built relationships with Romanian and Bosnian partners.

“The most valuable outcome was building relationships face to face with our NATO counterparts,” said Haubner.

“Understanding each other’s capabilities ensures that when a real-world mission happens, we’re ready.”

Looking ahead, these missions in Bosnia are not one-off events but steppingstones toward long-term sustainment. Future rotations will expand medical support to include additional specialties, while the aviation MEDEVAC team continues refining coordination with multinational forces.

“Our goal is long-term sustainment,” said Piazza. “Medical support at Camp Butmir is now a proven asset, and we want to ensure continuity for the units that come after us.”

By combining medical outreach with MEDEVAC training, Task Force Medical and Task Force Aviation not only delivered care where it was needed most but also strengthened NATO’s ability to respond together. These missions brought healthcare closer to soldiers, reduced barriers to treatment, and forged bonds with NATO partners that will extend far beyond the flight line.

 

Story by Maj. Robert Taylor

The Idaho Army National Guard’s State Aviation Group conducted a dozen successful search and rescue missions throughout 2025.

“Our Citizen-Soldiers stand ready to move out at moment’s notice when partner agencies request help, especially when our fellow Idahoans’ welfare hangs in the balance,” said Idaho Army National Guard commander Brig. Gen. Cole Packwood. “I’m very proud of all the Soldiers involved in both of these operations and am truly impressed by the exceptional skills and teamwork it takes to execute missions like these so flawlessly.”

As of October 3, Idaho’s citizen-Soldiers assisted civilian authorities with 12 search and rescues.

In February, a UH-60 Black Hawk crew worked with the Idaho Mountain Search and Rescue Unit and the Owyhee County Sheriff’s Office to locate four family members who became stuck in the snow on a hunting trip.

In May, the Idaho Army National Guard and the Boise Fire Department teamed up to rescue two rafters on the Owyhee River in Malheur County, Oregon. One rafter was trapped overnight on a boulder after the raft capsized. The Idaho Army National Guard and Boise Fire Department conduct swift water rescue training together twice a year.

Later in May, the Idaho Army National Guard assisted with the rescue of two stranded hikers near Lowman in Boise County.

Soldiers assisted the Custer County Sheriff’s Office with three search and rescue missions in just 11 days in June and July in remote mountainous locations. On July 7, a HH-60M Black Hawk crew used a hoist to rescue an injured hiker at 10,100 feet, one of the state’s highest recorded rescues. The Idaho Army National Guard’s helicopters’ large engines and hoist capabilities offer local search and rescue agencies assets not otherwise available in southern Idaho.

Soldiers assisted with three search and rescue missions in August. On one mission, the Idaho National Guard worked with Air St. Luke’s aircrew to rescue an injured hiker and his dog on Trinity Mountain.

The Idaho Army National Guard also conducted a pair of rescues in September in Boise and Custer counties. In October, a HH-60 Black Hawk crew assisted with the rescue of an injured 55-year-old hunter in a remote location in Idaho County.

Looking Back, September 2025
By Mark Albertson

Part II:  Army Aviation and its, Magna Carta

December 1961, the 8^th Transportation Company (Light Helicopter) and the 57^th Transportation Company (Light Helicopter) had arrived in Vietnam.  These were followed in January by the 93^rd Transportation Company (Light Helicopter).  Two developments were  evident here:  America’s commitment to Saigon; and, the Airmobility Concept was on trial.  Only the troops to be shuttled were not going to be American, but instead, those of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam.  Meanwhile events in the United States proceeded apace . . .

. . . with American helicopters and Army aviators deployed, testing a concept without an  accepted doctrine, official Washington, it seemed, was willing to accommodate the Army.

At the same time, the Air Force was certainly not ignored by the change in regimes in the White House.  1961 saw an expansion in strategic airlift capability, including an increase in the fleet of C-130s.  Cargo versions of the KC-135 tanker, effecting the development of the C-141 cargo transport showed Air Force involvement in Flexible Response.[1]  Be that as it may, the Army was wasting no time acting on its Magna Carta.

Also in 1961, Clifton von Kann, recently named Director of Army Aviation, scheduled a briefing with Secretary McNamara on Army Aviation and the importance of tactical aerial assets for the Ground Forces.  “McNamara indicated that the briefing helped him to see Army Aviation in a new light and he requested additional paperwork.”[2]

A mover and shaker behind the scenes was Robert R. Williams, a West Point grad and a member of the Class Before One and, the first Master Aviator.  Williams had been, for all intents and purposes, a political insurgent for the founding principle of Army Aviation, the Air Observation Post.

Following the defeat of the Axis Powers, Williams was sent by the Army Air Forces to Europe, so as to canvass Air Force officers and Ground Forces commanders with regards to the Army Ground Forces retaining their organic aerial assets.  “General Hoyt S. Vandenburg for example, felt that such an arrangement would permit the Army to convert its aircraft into close support fighter-bombers and airlift aircraft; others, such as Lauris Nordstad, felt that the atomic bomb had rendered the Army essentially irrelevant.”[3]

Williams, too, was on the McNamara staff and, from the inside, helped to channel the office of the Secretary of Defense towards nodding favorably in the direction of Army Aviation.  This resulted in a pair of missives penned by the Secretary of Defense on April 19, 1962:

1)  “Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army:  Subject:  Army Aviation.”  And . . .

2)  . . . “Memorandum for Mr. Stahr.”

Both directives compelled the Secretary of the Army, Mr. Elvis J. Stahr, to proceed in the fashion outlined above.  The latter ordered the Army to take advantage of recent developments in technological advances in aviation to effect improvement in aerial tactical mobility, noting it as a “’bold new look’ at land warfare mobility,” while the former was a more general directive requiring the Army to effect positive changes in tactical mobility.[4]

This culminated, of course, in the Tactical Mobility Requirements Board, created by the United States Continental Army Command, May 3, 1962.  Total staff amounted to 199 officers, 41 enlisted and 53 civilians.[5]

Lieutenant General Hamilton H. Howze, commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, was pegged to chair what would popularly be known as the Howze Board.

Per the directive of General Herbert Powell, of the Continental Army Command, the final draft of the board’s findings was to be submitted to the Secretary of Defense by August 20 to accommodate Mr. McNamara’s deadline of September 1.  A caveat here, though, was the voluminous nature of the report, which Howze questioned.  The Department of the Army asserted that it should be able to fit neatly into an Army footlocker.  And, of course, 300 copies were required.  To fulfill such a paper chase, the printers at the Adjunct General Department stated that to produce 300 copies of the report that could fit into an Army footlocker demanded that it have the report no later than August 1, so as to accommodate the August 20 deadline.  So the window of constraint was quite obvious here.[6]

The Board consisted of a review committee, composed of 17 officers and five civilians; together with an advisory panel with two members and a secretariat.  Board secretary to General Howze was Colonel John Norton.  Within the body of the memorandum addressed personally to Secretary of the Army Stahr, were individuals named by Secretary of Defense McNamara, who would be on the review committee chaired by General Howze and/or the secretariat:  Besides Howze, Brigadier General Delk M. Oden, Brigadier General Walter B. Richardson, Colonel Robert R. Williams, the aforementioned Colonel John Norton, Colonel A.J. Rankin, Mr. Frank A. Parker, Dr. Edwin W. Paxson and Mr. Edward H. Heineman.[7]  In addition, the commanding general of The Infantry Center, the special assistant to the Chief of Staff for Special Warfare and Brigadier Edward L. Rowney of the 82^nd Airborne Division, were attached to the review committee.  The Board would be settled at Fort Bragg in a school facility set aside as the headquarters.

Much of the work associated with the Tactical Mobility Requirements Board was done by seven working committees, from May 5 to June 21, 1962, and were as follows:  Operations Research; Field Tests; Tactical Mobility; Firepower; Logistics Operations and Logistics Support; Reconnaissance; Security and Target Acquisition; and, Programs, Policy and Budget.  On the heels of which were eight working groups, June 22 through July:  Logistics Forces; Combat Force; Counterinsurgency; Strategic Area; Operations Research; Long Range; Field Tests; concluding with, Programs, Policy and Budget.

General Howze was not only President of the Board, but Chairman of the Steering and Review Committee as well.  In addition to General Howze, seven other officers and six top level civilians originally composed the Steering Review Committee.  These included Major General Ben Harrell, Major General William B. Rosson, Brigadier General John J. Lane, Brigadier General Delk M. Oden, Brigadier General Robert R. Williams, Colonel William M. Lynn, Jr., Dr. Jacob A. Stockfisch, Dr. Edwin W. Paxson, Eugene Vidal, Fred Wolcott, Frank A, Parker and Edward H. Heineman.  Mr. Parker, General Rowney and Colonel Lynn also served as chiefs of working committees.  Other senior board members (eventually added to the Steering and Review Committees) were named working committee chiefs—Major General Clifton von Kann, Major General Norman H. Vissering, Brigadier General Frederic W. Boye, Jr., and Brigadier General Walter B. Richardson.[8]

“The Air Force sent down a brigadier general to act as a monitor.  He was privileged to see all the tests and exercises and could review anyone he chose, but we did not invite him to sit with the steering committee, and all the subcommittees were privileged to exclude him.  This, in retrospect, seems regrettable, but in some sensitive areas, frank debate would have alarmed the Air Force and that admirable establishment really needed no additional agitation.”[9]

Perhaps in an effort, though, to foster better service relations, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Roswell L. Gilpatric, on May 8, 1962, that in the support of Army efforts wanted to make sure that air transport was available when requested by the Board.    Such as a squadron of C-130s “which would provide the Air Force an opportunity to sell its services and capabilities.”[10]

Howze further explains in his book that in preparation Army Intelligence was petitioned for the latest intelligence on doctrine and capabilities of the Warsaw Pact as well as the People’s Republic of China.  Weapons experts, designers and scientists were vetted for weapons types expected for the period 1963-1975, including opinion from the newly minted Combat Developments Command.  Robert R. Williams was sent with a team to Southeast Asia to assess the potential of Army Aviation in such an environment; and Army logistics experts, in accordance with civilian equivalents from a dozen aircraft companies to advise on the current capability of the Army aircraft support system and its potential.[11]    

Howze, added, that some 400 letters were posted to officers, those on active duty as well as those who had retired, for their expertise.  Another 300 letters or more were forwarded to airframe, engine, armaments and electronic firms for their input, creating in essence, a reference source of unquestioned value, as well as being a sales pitch for companies to consider Army Aviation as a viable market.[12]

“Two agencies under contract with the Army, Research Analysis Corporation (R.A.C.) and Technical Operations Incorporation (C.O.R.G.), did studies and analysis for use as requested.  Rand Corporation and Stanford Research provided several analysts and scientists for consultation and evaluation of committees at work.”[13]

Computer simulations, together with actual field work, saw Airmobility challenged through four battle models:  A Warsaw Pact attack on Western Europe; versus Chinese Communist Forces in Asia (obviously the stalemate of the Korean War was still fresh in the minds of the planners); and, the blunting of threats to Africa as well as Central and South America.  And, of course, the Army’s choice of vehicle to carry forward Airmobility . . . the helicopter.

The Howze Board released its finding on August 20, 1962.  From the viewpoint of history, a fascinating perspective arises:  The Army’s attempt to base Airmobility on the helicopter during the 1960s was not too unlike the transition in mobility from the horse to the truck and tanks, during the 1920s and 1930s.  However an important factor to appreciate here was that the United States was not the only power wrestling with mobility during that period leading up to the continuation of the 1914 conflict, sharing the stage with Germany, Britain and the Soviet Union. . .   And the living embodiment of the criteria set forth by the Howze Board . . . the 11^th Air Assault Division (Test).

* * * * *

11^th Air Assault Division (Test)

The resolution of the Tactical Mobility Requirements Board set the stage for that next step in the quest to implement Airmobility.  Lieutenant General Hamilton H. Howze urged the conversion of the 82^nd Airborne into the air assault division as projected by his committee.  He was overruled by Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, who instead authorized an expansion of Army personnel for fiscal year 1964, from 960,000 to 975,000.

McNamara’s authorization would enable the new unit to be organized from scratch.  And on January 7, 1963, orders were issued to commence the operation.  The 11^th Air Assault Division (Test) was activated at Fort Bragg, North Carolina on February 15, 1963.  In command was Brigadier General Harry W.O. Kinnard.[14]

11^th Air Assault Division (Test) had its roots in the 11^th Airborne Division.  The “Angels” were activated on February 25, 1943, seeing action in the Philippines at Leyte and Luzon.

With the cessation of hostilities, the 11^th Airborne landed in Japan as part of the postwar Army occupation of the Japanese home islands.[15]  The “Angels” were deactivated on June 30, 1958; reactivated briefly on February 1, 1963, then re-designated 11^th Air Assault Division (Test) on the 15^th.

Among those units attached to the 11^th A.A.D early on were those from the 187^th Infantry Regiment;[16] as well as the 227^th Assault Helicopter Battalion.[17]  In addition to the activation of the 11^th A.A.D, a logistics support unit was organized in the name of the 10^th Air Transport Brigade.[18]

Training focused on air assault; drilling infantrymen on the new concepts of joining combat and engaging the enemy.  Provisional supply bases of fuel and stores were made available and organized to keep pace with helicopter units on a fluid battlefield.

Hence the concept of F.A.R.P. or the Forward Arming and Re-Fueling Point.[19]

Another innovation was artillery fire support for landing zones.  This included rocket-firing helicopters to support attacks by air assault troops; bolstered, in part, by experience gleaned from Army Aviation support of Army of Republic of Vietnam (A.R.V.N.) units in Southeast Asia.[20]

In September 1963, Air Assault I exercises at Fort Stewart in Georgia, saw the Airmobility Concept put through its paces on the battalion level of operations.  The following year, October 1964, Air Assault II was conducted and by comparison, an exercise on a far grander scale.

Air Assault II sprawled across two states, the Carolinas, taking in some 4,000,000 acres.  35,000 troops were committed, with the 11^th A.A.D. squaring off against the 82^nd Airborne Division; the latter engaged in the role of an enemy conventional force as well as that of insurgent opposition.

The first of the four weeks slated for the exercise was conducted during a hurricane, “Isabel.”  Flying conditions were abysmal; a swirling vortex of wind, rain and fog, leaving many aviators peering through windscreens opaque as a bucket of mud.

Yet 120 helicopters managed to shuttle an infantry brigade 100 miles through the ire of Mother Nature.

General Kinnard summed it up thus:  Beyond what I believe to be its capabilities to perform roles normal to other divisions, I am even more impressed by what I feel is its ability to  perform in unique ways beyond the abilities of other divisions.

For example, in a low-scale war, I believe it can exert control over a much wider area and with much more speed and flexibility and much less concern for the problems of interdicted ground communications or of difficult terrain.

In higher scales of war, I see this division an unparalleled reserve or screening force capable of operating over very large frontages.

By properly picking times, places and methods, I believe it can also operate with devastating effect against the rear of the enemy.

Faced with the threat or use of nuclear weapons, I believe it can widely disperse, and yet, when required, quickly mass, even over irradiated ground, blown down forests or rubled cities, strike an enemy, then disperse again.[21]

Kinnard’s men will get a chance to showcase their training in Southeast Asia.  Up to 1965, airmobility consisted, for the most part, of Army aviators ferrying South Vietnamese troops into action against the Viet Cong.

But Hanoi was raising the ante.  With the Gulf of Tonkin incident, it was certain as sunrise that the first string American air assault troops would be coming off the bench to spell A.R.V.N.’s second eleven.

On July 1, 1965, 11^th Air Assault Division (Test) was reflagged as the 1^st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and 27 days later, President Johnson ordered the airmobile division to Vietnam.[22]

In November, at Ia Drang, 1^st Cavalry air assault forces took their peacetime training into action against North Vietnamese Regulars, decisively defeating same in a game-changing exercise in mobility not seen since Hitler’s panzers had steamrollered Poland in 1939.

A point worthy of remark here is the freshness of American troops, most of whom went into action for the first time and versus a tough and wily opponent.  They came away with a victory, as opposed to similar initial efforts by American troops at such places as Bull Run, Kasserine and Osan with Task Force Smith.

Despite the fact there was still much to learn, the transition of peacetime development to wartime employment of airmobility seemed to be on its way.

The advent of the 11^th Air Assault Division (Test) was an important step in the evolution of airmobility.  But more than that, it was the attestation of a factor that was not only a prerequisite, but without which the efforts of folks such as Howze, Williams, Kinnard, Seneff and others would have come to naught.  And then there was that ingredient that made this stew palatable, that everyone was basically on the same page—from Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to Secretary of the Army Elvis Stahr, to General Hamilton Howze to General Harry Kinnard and so on down the food chain.  Minus this continuity, victory at Ia Drang would not have been possible.

* * * * *

Appendix[23]

Memorandum from Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara:

The Secretary of Defense

Washington

April 19, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT:  Army Aviation (U)

This is in response to your two November 1, 1961, memoranda which discussed Army Aviation and presented the Army’s proposed procurement program.

These studies greatly enhanced my understanding of what the Army is seeking to achieve through its organic aviation.  However, the quantitative procurement programs fall considerably short of providing, in the near future, modern aircraft to fill the stated requirements.  While it appears to me that the Army can and should turn increasingly to aviation to improve its tactical mobility, your memoranda do not give a clear picture regarding either the optimum mix of aircraft types or the absolute total numbers that will be required.

Attached is an analysis of your studies made by my office. I would like your comments on this analysis with particular emphasis on the proposed increased buy of Army aircraft for 1964 and on the position that your predicted requirements in this area through 1970 are too low.  These comments should be submitted by 15 May 1962.

Furthermore, I would like the army to completely re-examine its quantitative and qualitative requirements for aviation.  This re-examination should consist of an extensive program of analyses, exercises and field tests to evaluate revolutionary new concepts of tactical mobility and to recommend action to give the Army the maximum attainable mobility in the combat area.  It appears to me that air vehicles, operating in the environment of the ground soldier but freed from the restrictions imposed by the earth’s surface, may offer the opportunity to acquire quantum increases in mobility, provided technology, doctrine, and organization potentials can be fully exploited.  I believe further that these mobility increases can be acquired without increased funding by reducing less effective surface transportation systems concurrently.  The Army’s re-examination should therefore give special attention to the following:

(1)  To what extent can aviation be substituted for conventional military surface systems of vehicles, roads, bridging, engineer troops, theater supply and hospital complexes, etc?

(2)  Should newer concepts of VTOL or STOL fixed-wing-aircraft be substituted for helicopters, as a means of avoiding some of the high procurement and operating costs of helicopters?

(3)  May we use heavy tactical lift. Combined with new techniques in air dropping and possibly better airlift construction and repair capability, to provide part of the logistic support for ground operations?  There should be considered the possibility that Air Force lift may be available, after the first thirty or so days of a strategic lift, to augment Army tactical lift capabilities.

(4)  What qualitative requirements can be defined for immediately developable V/STOL air vehicles optimized for such purposes as surveillance, target acquisition, weapons platforms, command posts, communications centers, or troop and cargo carriers of significantly heavier loads?

(5)  What organizations and operational concepts are required to exploit the potential increases in mobility?  Consideration should be given to completely airmobile infantry, anti-tank, reconnaissance, and artillery units.

(6)  What other concepts and ideas, as well as major limitations, bear on this subject?  We should seriously consider fresh, new concepts, and give unorthodox ideas a hearing.

The results of the study should be presented in terms of cost-effectiveness and transport-effectiveness factors.  The study should involve the full use of field tests and exercises to test new concepts of mobility.

In addition, the use of operations analysts in planning, observing, recording data, and analyzing results for the field test program appears to me to be essential to the effective accomplishment of the entire re-examination.

As a first step in your re-examination of Army aviation requirements, I would like by 15 May 1962 an outline of how you plan to conduct the re-examination program.  The re-examination should be completed and your recommendations submitted by 1 September 1962.

/s/ Robert S. McNamara”

* * * * *

The Secretary of Defense

Washington

April 19, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. STAHR:

I have not been satisfied with Army program submissions for tactical mobility.  I do not believe the Army has fully explored the opportunities offered by aeronautical technology for making a revolutionary break with traditional surface mobility means.  Air vehicles operating close to, but above, the ground appear to me to offer the possibility of a quantum increase in effectiveness.  I think that every possibility in this area should be exploited.

We have found that air transportation is cheaper than rail or ship transportation even in peacetime.  The urgency of war time operations makes air transportation even more important.  By exploiting aeronautical potential, we should be able to achieve a major increase in effectiveness while spending on airmobility systems no more than we have been spending on spheres oriented for ground transportation.

I therefore believe that the Army’s re-examination of its aviation requirements should be a bold “new look” at land warfare mobility.  It should be conducted in an atmosphere divorced from traditional viewpoints and past policies.  The only objective the actual task force should be given is that of acquiring the maximum attainable mobility within alternative funding levels and technology.  This necessitates a readiness to substitute airmobility systems for transitional ground systems wherever analysis shows the substitution to improve our capabilities or effectiveness.  It also requires that bold, new ideas which the task force may recommend be protected from veto or dilution by conservative staff review.

In order to ensure the success of the re-examination I am requesting in my official memorandum, I urge you to give its implementation your close personal attention.  More specifically, I suggest that you establish a managing group of selected individuals to direct the review and keep you advised of its progress.  If you choose to appoint such a committee, I suggest the following individuals be considered as appropriate for service thereon:  Lt. Gen. Hamilton H. Howze, Brig. Gen. Delk M. Oden, Brig. Gen. Walter B. Richardson, Col. Robert R. Williams, Col. John Norton, Col. A.J. Rankin, Mr. Frank A. Parker, Dr. Edwin W. Paxson and Mr. Edward H. Heinemann.

Existing Army activities such as Fort Rucker, STAG (Strategic and Tactics Analysis Group, Washington, D.C.), and C.D.E.C. (Combat Operations Development Experimental Center, Ft. Ord), and, C.O.R.G. (Combat Operations Research Group, Ft. Monroe), combined with the troops units and military study headquarters of CONARC, and in cooperation with Air Force troop carrier elements, appear to provide the required capabilities to conduct the analyses, field tests and exercises, provided their efforts are properly directed.

The studies already made by the Army of airmobile divisions and their subordinate airmobile units, of airmobile reconnaissance regiments, and of aerial artillery indicate the type of doctrinal concepts which could be evolved, although there has been no action to carry these concepts into effect.  Parallel studies are also needed to provide air vehicles of improved capabilities and to eliminate ground-surface equipment and forces whose duplicate but less effective capabilities can no longer be justified economically.  Improved V/STOL air vehicles, and as short range prime movers of heavy loads up to 40 or 50 tons.

I shall be disappointed if the Army’s re-examination merely produces logistics-oriented recommendations to procure more of the same, rather than a plan for implementing fresh and perhaps unorthodox concepts which will give us a significant increase in mobility.

/s/ Robert S. McNamara

     

Endnotes

[1]  See page 12, “The 1962 Howze Board and Army Combat Developments,” by J.A. Stockfisch.

[2]  See page 110, Chapter 5, “The Dynamics of Insurgency,” The Army Gets an Air Force, by Frederic A. Bergerson.

[3]  See pages 99 and 100, Frederic A. Bergerson.

[4]  To read both memorandums by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, see pages 39-42, “The Howze Board and Army Combat Developments,” by J.A. Stockfisch.  Or, the reader may shortcut his or her search time by referring to the Appendix at the conclusion of this article.

[5]  See page 15, J.A. Stockfisch.

[6]  See page 237, 19, “The Howze Board,” A Cavalryman’s Story, by Hamilton H. Howze.

[7]  See paragraph 4, page 1, “Memorandum for Mr. Stahr,” April 19, 1962.

[8]  See page 21, Chapter 1, “The Growth of the Airmobile Concept, “ Vietnam Studies:  Airmobility 1961-1971, by Lieutenant General John J. Tolson.

[9]  See page 239, Hamilton H. Howze.

[10]  See page 21, Lieutenant General John J. Tolson.

[11]  See page 239, Hamilton H. Howze.

[12]  See page 240, Hamilton H. Howze.

[13]  See page 240, Hamilton H. Howze.

[14]  General Kinnard was among those of the 101^st Airborne Division who were encircled by General Baron Hasso  von Manteuffel’s Fifth Panzer Army at Bastogne.  He is popularly known to have urged General Anthony McAuliffe to respond to German entreaties for surrender with the most eloquent yet steadfast rejection of “Nuts!”  See page 193, Part Three, 2, “Nuts!” Battle:  The Story of the Bulge, by John Toland.

[15]  See page 551, U.S. Army in World War II, Special Studies:  “30 August:  JAPAN—Occupation of Japan in force is begun by U.S. forces, 11^th AB Dn is flown to Atsugi Airfield and 4^th Marines, 6th Mar Div lands at Yokosuka Naval Base.”

[16] The “Rakkasans” were attached to the 11^th Airborne Division in World War II, and, were the first Allied troops to set foot in Japan on August 30, 1945.

[17] According to Major Thomas I. McMurray and Major Larry E. Scoggins in the “History of the 227^th for Year of 1965,” on February 11, 1963, the 31^st Transportation Company (Light Helicopter) was re-designated and activated as Company B, 227^th Assault Helicopter Battalion, and brought to the battalion its twenty-two CH-34 helicopters.”  See page 2, McMurray and Scoggins.  “On February 15, 1963, Company A, 227^th Assault Helicopter Battalion was activated as the second of the battalion’s units.  Company A was designated the aerial weapons armed escort company:  Their UH-1Bs and armaments systems arriving in late April 1963.”  See page 2, McMurray and Scoggins.

[18]  The 10^th Air Transport Brigade was not organic to the 11^th AAD; rather, a unit of logistics support.

[19]  See page 20, Forward Arming and Refueling Points for Mechanized Infantry and Armor Units, Chapter 2, “Review of Literature,” by Captain Jerrold M. Reeves, Jr., U.S.A.  “The Vietnam War and its heavy reliance on helicopters led to the F.A.R.E. (Forward Area Refueling Equipment) study and caused the research and development of Forward Area Refueling Equipment.  The F.A.R.E. not only provided the equipment for the Forward Area Refueling Point for helicopters, but also for ground equipment.”

 “The culmination for the original plan of action was the development of the Forward Arming and Refueling Point Doctrine explained in FM 1-104, Forward Arming and Refueling Points, published in 1985.”  See page 3, Captain Jerrold M. Reeves, Jr., U.S.A.

[20]  The use of rocket-firing UH-1s in support of air assault units at landing zones was much like the Luftwaffe’s employment of the Junkers Ju-87 dive bomber to support panzer units at the point of the Wehrmacht’s armored thrusts.

[21]  General Kinnard’s affirmation, then, coincides with the following practitioners of regular and irregular warfare:  “When the situation is serious, the guerrillas must move with the fluidity of water and the ease of blowing wind.  Their tactics must deceive, tempt and confuse the enemy.  They must lead the enemy to believe that they will attack him from the east and north, and they must then strike him from the west and south.  Guerrilla initiative is expressed in dispersion, concentration and the alert shifting of forces.”  See pages 103 and 104, On Guerrilla Warfare, by Mao Tse-tung, translated by Brigadier Samuel B. Griffith, U.S.M.C., (Ret.).   And . . .

. . . “Therefore, with the development of our forces, guerrilla warfare changed into a mobile warfare—a form of mobile warfare still strongly marked by guerrilla warfare—which would afterwards become the essential form of operations on the main front, the northern front.  In this process of development of guerrilla warfare and of accentuation of the mobile warfare, our people’s army consistently grew and passed from the stage of combats involving a section or company, to fairly large-scale campaigns bringing into action several divisions.”  See page 24, III. “The Fundamental Problems of Our War of Liberation,” People’s War, People’s Army, by Vo Nguyen Giap.

[22]  See page 16, Lieutenant General Harold G. Moore, (Ret.) and Joseph L. Galloway. We Were Soldiers once . . . And Young.

[23}  See pages 39-42, J.A. Stockfisch.

Bibliography

Adamczyk, Richard D. and MacGregor, Morris J., editors, United States Army in World War II, Reader’s Guide, CMH Pub 11-9, Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, D.C., 1992.

Bergerson, Frederic A., The Army Gets an Air Force:  Tactics of Insurgent Bureaucratic Politics, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Maryland, 1980.

Carland, John M., “How We Get There:  Air Assault and the Emergence of the 1^st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile), 1950-1965,” The Land Warfare Papers, No. 42, The Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the United States Army, Arlington, Virginia, May 2003.

Graves, Major Thomas C., United States Army, Transforming the Force:  The 11^th Air Assault Division (Test) from 1963-1965, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1999.

Howze, Hamilton H., A Cavalryman’s Story:  Memoirs of a Twentieth-Century General, Smithsonian Institute Press, Washington and London, 1996.

Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, Praeger Publishers, Inc., New York, NY., 1961.  Translated and Introduction by Brigadier General Samuel B Griffith, U.S.M.C., (Ret.).

McMurray, Major Thomas J. and Scoggins, Major Lary E., “Company A, 227^th Helicopter Battalion, 1^st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), from History of the 227^th Aviation Battalion, July 1, 1965-31 December 1965. a227ahb.org/History227th1965.html

Moore, Lieutenant General Harold G. and Galloway, Joseph L., We Were Soldiers Once . . . And Young:  Ia Drang—the Battle That Changed the War in Vietnam, The Random House Publishing Group, New York, 1992.

Olinger, Mark A., “Conceptual Underpinnings of the Air Assault Concept:  The Hogaboom, Rogers and Howze Boards,” The Land Warfare Papers, No. 60W, The Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the United States Army, Arlington, Virginia, December 2006.

Reeves, Captain Jerrold, Forward Arming and Refueling Points for Mechanized Infantry and Armor Units, AD-A272 826, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1993.

Stockfisch, J.A., “The 1962 Howze Board and Army Combat Developments,” RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California, 1994.

“The Airmobile Division,” D.A. Pam 360-216, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 30 November 1965.

Toland, John, Bulge:  The Story of the Bulge, Random House, Inc., New York, 1959.

Tolson, Lieutenant General John J., Vietnam Studies:  Airmobility 1961-1971, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1989.

Vo Nguyen Giap, People’s War, People’s Army:  The Viet Cong Insurrection Manual for Underdeveloped Countries, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, NY., 1962.

Weber, Colonel William (Ret.), “Unit History of the 187^th,” www.thedropzone.org/units/187history.html

Story by Lt. Col. Cain Claxton

POZNAN, Poland – V Corps and Poland’s 1st Aviation Brigade conducted their third Polish Apache Initiative Summit Aug. 27-29 at Poland’s Air Force Training Center near Ustka, Poland, and Drawsko Combat Training Center near Drawsko Pomorskie, Poland.

Since 2024, Poland and U.S. Army aviators have worked together to establish Poland’s Apache aviation program through a series of meetings called Polish Apache Initiative Summits. After Poland signed a procurement deal for 96 Apaches in 2024, the 12th Combat Aviation Brigade saw an opportunity to help Poland accelerate the integration of the new capability when the helicopters are delivered in 2028.

“The Polish Apache Initiative provides the Polish Army with training events and leader engagements that will successfully integrate the AH-64 Apache helicopter into their military structure,” said U.S. Army Maj. Matthew Conner, director of aviation at V Corps Forward headquarters at Camp Kosciusko, Poland.

The summit this week involved two live-fire exercises followed by discussion between members of the U.S. and Poland Apache aviation communities.

At Ustka Range, V Corp’s 12th Combat Aviation Brigade successfully fired two Spike missiles from a AH-64Ev6 Apache Guardian helicopter, marking the first time the missile system has been tested in Europe. Spike is a non-line of sight missile system capable of engaging targets over 30 kilometers away. It can be mounted on multiple ground, marine and aviation platforms.

Observers from several countries, including senior military representatives and defense officials, witnessed the successful operational integration firsthand. For Poland’s 1st Aviation Brigade, the demonstration highlighted what possibilities are in the future for its Apaches.

The SPIKE NLOS missile’s successful integration on the AH-64E Apache emphasizes the system’s capability to meet evolving mission needs, particularly in maritime and beyond-line-of-sight scenarios. The event underscored the growing strategic cooperation between the United States and Poland, further enhancing collective deterrence capabilities along NATO’s eastern flank.

This joint campaign not only demonstrates current operational effectiveness but also highlights the potential future direction for integration of SPIKE NLOS missiles onto Poland’s own AH-64E Apache fleet, enhancing national and regional defense capabilities.

Meanwhile, at Drawsko Combat Training Center, Poland’s 12th Mechanized Division integrated Apache air support from the U.S. Army’s 1st Armored Division Combat Aviation Brigade. The air-ground integration live-fire exercise demonstrated tactical capability and readiness between two NATO Allies, Conner said.

“The (air-ground integration live-fire exercise) provided a live-demonstration of the utilization of the AH-64D Apache helicopter supporting a ground unit in a defensive operation,” Conner said. “In addition to the AH-64D demonstration, a tactical forward arming and refueling point will also be implemented that will display expeditionary arming and refueling in a combined arms fight.”

Afterward, Polish and American Apache aviators met at DCTC and Utska ranges to discuss the live-fire exercises and other topics related to Poland’s Apache program.

Story by Leslie Herlick

FORT RUCKER, Ala. — In a bold move to modernize battlefield capabilities and close critical training gaps, the U.S. Army Aviation Center of Excellence (AVCOE) has launched its inaugural Unmanned Advanced Lethality Course (UALC) at Fort Rucker. Designed to rapidly train soldiers on the lethal employment of small UAS (SUAS), including First Person View (FPV) drone operations. The course lays the foundation for standardized UAS employment across warfighting functions, redefining how small UAS platforms are used in reconnaissance, fires, and maneuver operations.

Maj. Wolf Amacker, the chief of the AVCOE Directorate of Training and Doctrine UAS and Tactics Branch, is one of many personnel at AVCOE who played a key role in developing the course.

“This is the first time the Army has done this in a TRADOC setting, coordinating between three difference COEs,” Amacker said. “We’re helping to train the most people, the quickest, on FPV systems that are having a real impact on the battlefield.

Capt. Rachel Martin, the course director, was tasked with building the program from scratch just 90 days ago. With a background as an intelligence officer in an attack helicopter battalion and an air cavalry squadron, air cavalry troop commander, and Gray Eagle company commander during a 2023 deployment, Martin brought deep operational experience to the challenge.

The three-week course begins in the classroom, where students use commercial off-the-shelf drones and simulation software to develop FPV flight skills. After 20 to 25 hours of simulator time, identified as the proficiency threshold through interviews with allied forces, students transition to live flight exercises at the Military Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUT) site.

Instruction also includes fire support integration, with Fires Center personnel teaching students how to adjust fire using drone video feeds in the Call for Fire Trainer.

“An 11B [infantryman], 13F [fire support specialist] out there with a SUAS calling for fire and adjusting based on drone video is a relevant skill for the current and future battlefield,” Amacker said. “This may be the first time our students are introduced and trained to do that.”
This training not only enhances lethality but also demonstrates how small UAS platforms can support traditional fire missions in dynamic environments.

The course currently hosts 28 students from across the Army, including infantry soldiers, cavalry scouts, 15W and 15E aviation personnel, and warrant officers from the 150U career field. Participants were selected based on rank and certification as SUAS master trainers, and Transformation in Contact Units. Cadre from the 2-13th and 1-145th Aviation Regiments at Fort Rucker, along with additional aviation personnel, are supporting instruction.

Observers from the Maneuver and Fires Centers of Excellence are evaluating the course for potential adaptation, providing feedback and implementation. The goal is to empower operational units to create their own basic qualification programs while Fort Rucker evolves into the hub for advanced UAS training.

“Aviation becomes that central integrator,” Amacker said. “We’re helping all the warfighting functions and branches get into this space. Maneuver and Fires care about how SUAS helps them engage targets and keep their operators alive, while we also care about how sustainment and MI use small UAS to fulfill their responsibilities.”

The course is designed as both a resident program and eventually a mobile training package (MTP). The accompanying Training Support Package (TSP) will allow units a way to conduct basic FPV training independently, while Fort Rucker will host advanced iterations focused on munitions, diverse UAS platforms, and tactical employment.

“Right now, we’re doing basic things,” Amacker said, highlighting that this is the pilot course, emphasizing the tasks and academics being taught are what units out in the force are struggling with right now.

Students also learn to manufacture and repair drone components using 3D printing. Instruction covers resin, filament, and carbon fiber printers, CAD software, and STL files. The course aims to build a centralized repository of print files for students to take back to their units.

“Eventually, we want students to build and test their own FPV bodies,” Amacker said. “We’re teaching and learning from the force on what’s possible and how to sustain these systems in the field.

The long-term vision for the course aligns with Fort Rucker’s broader innovation goals. Martin hopes to integrate the program with the post’s emerging innovation lab, creating a collaborative hub for data sharing and tactical experimentation.

“This course is a catch-up,” Martin said. “We’re behind globally, and this is our aggressive attempt to close that gap.”

The course also collects performance data on five different drone systems, tracking variables such as crash rates, environmental resilience, and operational effectiveness. This data will inform future procurement and training decisions across the Army.

Designed to evolve with battlefield needs, the UALC will adapt its curriculum as new technologies and tactics emerge, ensuring soldiers remain at the forefront of unmanned systems employment.
“This is constantly changing,” Amacker said. “We’re building something that can grow with the force.”

Martin emphasized the challenges of launching a drone training program from scratch.

“Most of my peers, including myself until 90 days ago, didn’t know how to do this,” she said. “Now we know what it takes, how many people, how much equipment, how much money, and we are sharing this information already with our partners out in the force.”

The pilot iteration is already producing results. Soldiers are eager to learn, and many report a lack of resources and expertise at their home units. The hope is that graduates will return to their formations equipped to train others and establish sustainable programs.

Ultimately, the course aims to empower soldiers to return to their units as trainers and innovators. Many participants are self-taught hobbyists or informal experts. This program, however, provides structure, certification, and a pathway to build unit-level drone programs.

Future iterations will expand into advanced tactics, including one-way attacks using purpose-built FPV drones. By February, Martin envisions students employing low-cost systems to prosecute targets with precision, an ambitious leap toward integrating UAS as a lethal, scalable weapon system.

“We’re creating operators who are not only lethal but also survivable. sUAS operators are the most sought-after high pay-off target on the battlefield right now,” Martin said. “I am very aware that my team has been entrusted with developing solutions for a critical need in emerging Army tactics.”

SFC Jeremy Charm, a 15W UAS Operator with the AVCOE Directorate of Evaluations and Standardization and primary flight instructor for the UALC said, “Teaching our students to know under what circumstance to use these systems to achieve commander’s intent and how to tactically employ them and survive post engagement is our ultimate goal.”

As the Army continues to modernize its approach to warfare, the UAS Lethality Course at Fort Rucker stands as a bold step toward integrating unmanned systems across all domains, and empowering soldiers with the tools and training to dominate the modern battlefield.

Story by Cheryl Marino

As the battlefield evolves, so must the aircraft that support and protect Soldiers on the ground. The Army’s Future Long Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA) aims to do just that—ushering in a new era of speed, range and adaptability. Backed by cutting-edge digital engineering, FLRAA isn’t just a new rotorcraft, it’s a leap forward in how the Army plans, flies and fights in tomorrow’s conflicts.

“It’s a game-changing capability in terms of speed and range,” said Col. Jeffrey Poquette, FLRAA project manager at Program Executive Office (PEO) for Aviation. He characterized the next-generation tiltrotor assault aircraft (designed by Bell Textron) as “twice as far, twice as fast” at the annual Association of the U.S. Army Global Force Symposium, held in Huntsville, Alabama, in March 2025. The implementation of digital engineering will be “a digital engineering pathfinder for the Army,” serving as a model for how digital engineering can be adopted and implemented by the Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition enterprise to improve efficiency, reduce costs and accelerate the development and test of capabilities. The challenge, he said, is that this is new territory, but the level of insight that the government gets into the design is unprecedented and “what we get from that is ensuring that we build the right thing.”

Gone are the days of building something, setting it aside and forgetting it. Digital engineering allows the Army to leverage the power of technology to create a design digitally and determine the impact of changes to that design prior to bending metal.

“Digital engineering isn’t magic,” said Poquette. “It’s just a really deep look in a common environment where we have a single source of truth. We never don’t know what the design is today. I can take my phone out right now and look at the design and see where we are … that’s powerful.”

Poquette said when prototypes are built and tested, often things are found that have to be fixed. Some of those fixes could be big, some could be expensive, and they inevitably will extend the timeline of the acquisition because the test program gets much longer.

“I’m not even going to say that digital engineering is faster upfront. It’s an investment in time. It’s an investment in intellectual capital. But when we build the prototypes we’re going to be so confident that anything we need to fix should be small, should not be expensive, and that we can quickly fix those prototypes, continue on with the test program and get the capability into Soldiers’ hands as soon as possible,” Poquette stated. “Together [with industry] collaboratively, we’re going to build the aircraft that meets the Army’s requirements and is truly going to change the nature of the assault aviation platform.”

FLRAA COMES TO FRUITION
The science and technology (S&T) effort behind FLRAA began in 2013 as the Joint Multi-Role Tech Demonstrator program, which was aimed at proving out a platform that could fly twice as far, twice as fast and be sized appropriately for the Army. As the S&T effort transitioned to an acquisition program, the question became how to approach the program differently and succeed.

“We went and looked at published lessons learned from various programs, not just Army, but across the DOD. We identified a theme that [the] lack of upfront systems engineering attributed to increased cost and schedule on many programs,” explained Michelle Gilbert, technical management division chief at PEO for Aviation FLRAA Project Management Office (PMO). She and her team were then tasked with developing a strategy that would ensure rigorous upfront systems engineering while supporting an accelerated program schedule beyond historical timelines. “That’s what initiated the development of our digital engineering strategy. We found that if we did some upfront investment in digital engineering, it would give us some of the tools that we needed to help support those two objectives.”

Initially, a technology demonstrator (constructed as a proof of concept) was built to demonstrate “twice as far, twice as fast” capabilities, but it was not fully compliant with all requirements. The FLRAA program is currently executing a detailed design to ensure that the FLRAA system meets all requirements (survivability, sustainability, integrated mission systems, etc.).

As part of the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase, Gilbert said, Bell Textron will build six prototype aircraft, as well as two “limited user” test aircraft—the prototypes will be used to verify that the system meets performance and airworthiness requirements and to validate operational effectiveness, suitability, safety and survivability. There are also virtual prototypes, which are like aircraft simulators that accommodate a pilot and co-pilot, with surrounding screens that emulate the view and behavior of the system itself. These virtual prototypes are used to help inform the design as well as the development of operator tactics, training and procedures.

THE DAWN OF NEW DIGITAL
Digital engineering enhances FLRAA missions by enabling faster, smarter and safer operations. This includes the use of model-based systems engineering tools like Cameo—a collaborative environment for defining, tracking and visualizing all aspects of a system through models and diagrams. Additionally, 3D models support design, manufacturing and assembly processes, streamlining development from concept to execution.

Gilbert explained that FLRAA is using model-based systems engineering to create the digital models of the systems architecture and requirements, merging them into a digital twin that defines the system, demonstrates its behavior and predicts performance. “[This is] establishing a digital thread which captures the relationship between system and program data. The digital thread provides the PMO, stakeholders and Bell [Textron] with a better understanding of the system. We are also utilizing a collaborative digital environment to enable near real-time access to this data.”

The performance models are used to emulate and simulate the performance of the FLRAA aircraft to understand the behavior and tweak flight control laws (modifications to the flight control system’s algorithms, which govern how pilot inputs translate into aircraft control surface movements).

“We can also use it to help ensure that from a user interface standpoint everything is correct and suitable before we go and actually build the system, [and] we’re doing all of this digitally,” she explained. “We have a lot of digital models that represent our system that have allowed us to reduce the risk before we go and bend metal on our prototypes.”

The digital engineering strategy, Gilbert noted, is incremental. She and her team are currently focused on using digital engineering to design and document the system during development. As the program progresses, these efforts will expand into testing, eventually incorporating sensor data from the aircraft and linking it to various enterprise sustainment tools. For now, the priority remains on building a solid digital foundation before moving into test and evaluation.

“Using our digital environment to link test data together with the system design of the aircraft can help make the verification process more efficient. It can help correlate information together, where before there wasn’t a linkage between information, and provide easier access to all supporting program data,” Gilbert said. “For our stakeholders who are trying to qualify our system, that’s very helpful. And then our digital engineering efforts will expand beyond that to support sustainment. Conceptually, every single aircraft in the field could have its own digital representation.”

Gilbert noted that one outcome they’ve already encountered from using the digital tools is that it forces both Bell and the U.S. government “to have a deeper understanding of the system and how onboard systems interact with each other.”

Additionally, the digital tools have enabled the team to create linkages to all of the data. Before this, Gilbert explained, “we were dealing with siloed pieces of information, so you weren’t able to make those correlations. By utilizing these tools, we’re finding things like architecture concerns that we may not have found before, just because now it’s all connected and it’s easier for us to consume and assess if the design meets our objectives.”

Crews also benefit from immersive virtual training, accelerating readiness for unfamiliar or high-risk scenarios. This makes FLRAA more agile, reliable and adaptable to the demands of future battlefields.

“We have a virtual reality [VR] capability that’s here in our office and it’s updated regularly to reflect the system under design,” Gilbert said. “We have monitors set up; we have the VR headsets. It doesn’t take a lot of infrastructure and that capability is there for us to utilize whenever we want it. This is truly a revolutionary capability that informs engineers or logisticians and any stakeholders who need to understand the system better.”

During system design, acquisition engineers may not fully grasp design specifics, such as how the hydraulic system will fit into the system, Gilbert said. “It doesn’t exist yet in physical form, but we are able to go in, put on a virtual reality headset and they can see exactly where it is in the current design. Our engineers or maintainers can look at it and say, ‘I’m never going to be able to maintain that system with the way it is now.’ We’re able to catch things like that earlier and influence a design change.”

GETTING THE MOSA FOR YOUR MONEY
While digital engineering provides the tools to design, simulate and evolve systems faster, a Modular Open Systems Approach, or MOSA, ensures those systems are built in a way that allows rapid, flexible upgrades.

According to Gilbert, the MOSA is an approach to achieving certain objectives, not just through open standards but by following specific design processes to ensure the architecture supports those goals. She and her team developed an architecture framework to guide how the system should be built and analyzed to confirm it meets MOSA objectives. Examples are enabling third-party upgrades without full reliance on the prime contractor or rapidly fielding a capability update with minimal delay. The framework defines these expectations and the prime is required to comply.

“The other thing that we’re doing is we put in a requirement for an infrastructure on our aircraft that we call the digital backbone. The digital backbone is the onboard network that’s responsible for all data exchanges between different components. Any component integrated on the system must follow the defined open standards,” she said. “And what that does is it allows for easier integration by not having to update multiple systems on the aircraft when upgrading a capability.” This concept is similar to the MOSA plug-and-play concept.

MOSA offers a modular and scalable solution for aircraft upgrades, eliminating the integration complexities associated with legacy systems. This approach significantly reduces downtime and modification work by enabling the rapid installation and interchangeability of components.

“For FLRAA, we ensure we have robust processes and requirements in place to design and analyze our architecture and the onboard digital backbone. This, coupled with a robust intellectual property strategy that ensures the right level of data rights are acquired by the PMO, summarizes the FLRAA open systems approach,” she explained. “To ensure that, we do have an open architecture on our platform.”

This, she said, will make it easier and more affordable to upgrade and sustain, with the ability to do some of that sustainment on the government side or with third parties. Because of how the system is architected, there’s less reliance on the prime contractor, which can help with sustainment costs.

SOLDIER TESTING AND TIMELINES
Soldier testing and feedback are crucial when implementing new digital technology to ensure it meets real-world operational needs. Direct input from end users helps identify usability issues, improve functionality and ensure the technology enhances mission effectiveness and Soldier readiness.

For the FLRAA program, there are two ways of achieving Soldier feedback. One is through special user evaluations, or Soldier touch points, using mockups of the aircraft to ensure optimal seat configurations and whether users can egress and ingress from the aircraft safely, etc. A user evaluation in spring 2025 observed how Soldiers conduct mission planning on the system, which will impact the software requirements for mission planning.

Another Soldier touch point is through virtual prototype simulation.

“We’re using the virtual prototype to help us get user feedback that can either support changing the user interfaces, our flight control laws, etc.,” Gilbert said. “We’re planning on using the virtual prototypes as part of special user evaluations all the way through our development stage. This will support iterative user feedback through development until we have physical aircraft prototypes.”

CONCLUSION
The FLRAA program has come a long way since April 2024, when FLRAA took a hybrid approach with a preliminary design using a middle tier of acquisition pathway and developed virtual prototypes. In July 2024, at Milestone B, it transitioned to a major capability acquisition program and program of record.

“We’re going to be focused on the detailed design in the near term, but our acquisition strategy is such that we don’t wait to complete our detailed design before we begin building our prototypes. We deliberately did that when we set up our acquisition strategy so that once a subsystem reaches the appropriate level of maturity, it can immediately move into build and assembly,” Gilbert said. “Even though the design and supporting analysis may not be fully documented, we can begin building those subsystems with an informed level of risk. This helps support schedule objectives while maintaining rigor.”

Currently, the Army is scheduled to begin equipping the first Army unit in fiscal year 2030 and completing the first unit equipped in fiscal year 2031. “Our current focus is on getting the design right, which is crucial for successfully prototyping and future production,” Gilbert said. “We are building and testing prototypes to make a production decision by Milestone C, which is currently scheduled in 2028.”

“It [development] takes a few years, especially on an aviation platform because there’s a lot we have to do from an airworthiness perspective to ensure it’s safe,” Gilbert said. “We have a lot that we have to do before a Soldier can begin operating the system. That’s why using things like the virtual prototype and other things like mockups are so important to us—because it’s a way of getting them in early while we’re still proving out the airworthiness of the aircraft itself.”

For more information, go to https://www.army.mil/PEOAviation.

CHERYL MARINO provides contract support to the U.S. Army Acquisition Support Center at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, as a writer and editor for Army AL&T magazine and TMGL, LLC. Before USAASC, she served as a technical report editor at the Combat Capabilities Development Command Center at Picatinny Arsenal for five years. She holds a B.A. in communications from Seton Hall University and has more than 25 years of writing and editing experience in both the government and private sectors.