Looking Back, December 2024
By Mark Albertson

Putting the House in Order
Part II: The Israeli Model

Lieutenant General Hamilton H. Howze, in his book, A Cavalryman’s Story, chapter 22, related his experiences in a visit to Israel in 1967.  He offered that he learned a lot about the Six-Day War, June 5-10, 1967:

“I would, with my background also mention the use of maybe a dozen Israeli Air Force light two-seater Bell OH-13 helicopters, made available to the Army.  The Middle East desert, almost everywhere has a roll to it.  Flying only a few feet off the ground these little choppers, with tank commanders aboard, allowed the Israelis to scout the location and formations of opposing Arab tanks, and then path find for the Israeli tanks across the wadis, (deep, dry ditches) and other terrain so that Israelis could catch their Arab opponents by surprise and from an unexpected direction—the flank or rear.  The Arabs had no helos,[1] and without them suffered a towering disadvantage; their tank formations were largely blind.  Israeli tank units knew Arab strength; dispositions, and in what direction they were faced, and therefore could (and did) first surprise them, in directions, timing and clobber them.”[2] Yet the Israeli Ministry of Defense offers further clarification of the IDF’s reliance on the helicopter performing a variety of tasks:

“Helicopters were used to extricate pilots shot down scores of kilometers behind enemy lines, wounded were evacuated from front line dressing stations and parachutists were landed in the very heart of an enemy strongpoint at the height of the battle.

“In several battles, paratroopers were landed in the thick of the fighting by helicopter.  The first time was in the capture of the large Egyptian system of fortifications at Umm-Gataf, on the Nitzana axis.  The paratroopers’ objective was to silence the artillery batteries shelling the armor trying to break through the perimeter.  At Sharm el-Sheikh an advance party of paratroopers was landed by helicopter to see whether it was defended and to prepare the ground for the eventual capture of the camp by an airborne unit.  The next day, a paratroop unit landed by helicopter on Ras Sudr and took possession of the Egyptian positions.

“Helicopter-borne paratroopers were also used in an assault on the southern sector of the Golan Heights.

“From the first day of the fighting, helicopters were active in rescuing pilots who either had to bail out or forced to land planes damaged in action.  One of the pilots was picked up near the Canal 15 hours after he had been shot down and after he had walked 15 kilometers from where he had bailed out.  One pilot who hit the silk near the Mitla Pass, in the heart of the Peninsula, was accorded a personal air cover to keep off the Bedouins who infested the area until a helicopter could reach him.  In all, 13 downed pilots were rescued during the war, seven of them from enemy territory.

“The helicopter crews, at considerable risk, repeatedly landed in the very thick of the fighting to speed wounded to the nearest field hospital.  Outstanding examples, though far from unique, were in the battle of Rafah, the tank battle north of Jerusalem and the Golan breakthrough.[3]

The Israelis, then, were on the upside of the learning curve with their use of the helicopter.  This education process had commenced in May 1951, when the Israelis began using the helicopter for such tasks as observation and reconnaissance, obtaining intelligence, a rotary wing taxi for brass.

During the War of Attrition, that period of unease between the conclusion of the 1967 war to the outbreak of the Yom Kippur or, if you will, the Ramadan War October 1973, the Israelis seemed to follow the American model in Vietnam.  Lift helicopters shuttling Israeli Air Cav troop on raids against the Egyptians, Jordanians or Syrians, were being escorted by Bell 205s mounting 7.62 mm machine guns, 30 mm cannon and rockets.[4]  The War of Attrition, then, could be construed as being that “anticipatory counterattack” or a continuation of the preemptive attack that had commenced the 1967 war.  Almost certainly this form of keeping potential enemies off balance caused Washington to frown on “Israeli Belligerence.”

That said, the 1967 preemptive strike by Israel was not allowed to be repeated in 1973.[5]  Especially with the political pressure applied by Washington, faced as it was with defeat in Vietnam and a broken and demoralized army to fix.  Yet the warning signs of an Egyptian continuation of war abounded.  For instance, the CIA’s “Growing Risk of Egyptian Resumption of Hostilities with Israel,” authored by Ray S. Cline,[6] May 31, 1973, in which he wrote:

“A recent National Intelligence Estimate 30-73, May 17, 1973, (copy attached) concludes that ‘substantial Egyptian-Israeli hostilities appear unlikely in the next few weeks,’ but that the danger of resumption of hostilities ‘probably will rise if the UN debates and the summit pass without any results judged useful by Cairo.’

“INR is inclined to state the case on the risk of hostilities for a political purpose with a little more urgency.  If the UN debates of the next week produces no convincing movement in the Israeli-Egyptian impasse, our view is that the resumption of hostilities by autumn will become better than even . . . , and that there is even a slight chance that Cairo may precipitate events before or during the June 10 Nixon-Brezhnev summit.”[7]

Among the steps taken by the Egyptians were those highlighted again by the CIA in a 1975 postwar report:

“Long before the war, the Egyptians had built a series of earth mounds overlooking the Israeli side of the canal (Suez Canal).  They were thought to be no more than observation posts.  On the outbreak of war, however, these mounds sprouted tanks and anti-tank units, the latter armed with Sagger missiles carried by men or BRDM vehicles.  By these means the Egyptians added still more antitank and covering fire to their crossing force.  At the same time, Egyptian artillery spotters on the mounds could look over the 40-to-50 foot sand wall the Israelis had built and call in artillery fire on Israeli installations and reinforcements as much as five kilometers from the canal.

“The Egyptians also built one of the densest and most diversified air defense systems ever erected to provide protection against the Israeli Air Force.  This system consisted of dozens of SA-2, SA-3, SA-6 and SA-7 SAM units, radar-guided anti-aircraft artillery, and conventional AAA heavy machine guns.”[8] The Egyptians commenced the war thus:

“At H-Hour on 6 October, 240 Egyptian aircraft crossed the Canal.  Their mission was to strike three airfields in the Sinai, to hit the Israeli Hawk surface-to-air missile batteries, to bomb three Israeli command posts, plus radar stations, medium artillery positions, the administration centers and the Israeli strongpoint known as “Budapest” on the sandbank east of Port Fouad.  Simultaneously, 2.000 guns opened up along the entire front: field artillery, medium and heavy artillery and medium and heavy mortars.  In the first minute of the attack, 10,500 shells fell on the Israeli positions at a rate of 175 shells per second.  A brigade of FROG surface-to-air missiles launched its weapons, and tanks moved up to the ramps prepared on the same ramparts, depressed their guns and fired point-blank at the Israeli strongpoints.  Over 3,000 tons of concentrated destruction were launched against a handful of Israeli fortifications in a barrage that turned the entire east bank of the Suez Canal into an inferno for 53 minutes.”[9]

On the Northern Front, the Golan, the Syrian attack was announced by heavy aircraft attacks and the liberal use of artillery.  The Syrian host vastly outnumbered Israeli units attempting to block numerically superior forces; to which the Syrians were bolstered by Jordanians, Iraqis and Moroccan contingents.  For instance, at the Rafid Opening, the Israeli 188th Brigade with 57 tanks, had to face a torrent of Syrian armor, some 600 tanks, in addition to the Syrian 5^th and 9^th Infantry Divisions.  But since the reader already knows (or should know) the eventual outcome, the narrative will focus briefly on the pivotal battle for Mount Harmon.

The commanding height known as Mount Harmon provided the occupant with a panoramic view, of not only the entire battlefield, but the roads leading in and out of Damascus.  The Israeli defenses atop this strategically significant peak, had been constructed to withstand aerial bombing and artillery bombardment.  The chink in the armor, though, was the accompanying trench system for the defending garrison, it had not yet been completed.

The Syrian attack on the crest was spearheaded by Air Cav troops lifted by four helicopters.  One crashed.  The remaining three dropped off their charges a mile from the crest.  These Syrian commandos overwhelmed the Israeli defenders and took the summit.

“For the Soviet advisors of the Syrians, who arrived shortly after the fall of the position, the electronic equipment captured there was of singular value.”[10]

“The Syrian 82^nd Commando Battalion took the position on 6 October, killing 25 to 50 Israeli troops.  On 8 October, troops of the Israeli Golan Infantry Brigade tried to recapture the position but failed, losing 50 killed in the attempt.[11]  But on October 11, the Israelis commenced a counteroffensive.

The assault to reassert Israeli control of Mount Harmon began on the night of October 20.  The Golani Brigade was to assault the lower elevations, leaving Israeli paratroopers to be concerned with the heights.  The latter were hoisted by helicopter, together with fighter escort.  A Lieutenant Colonel Hezi and his battalion secured a landing zone, perhaps a half mile from their objective.  Syrian artillery and aircraft attempted to intervene.  The Israeli Air Force neutralized the latter.  And three Syrian helicopters on their way to the slopes were lost.

Lieutenant Colonel Hezi’s paratroopers launched their assault, and by the early morning hours of the 22^nd of October, the Israelis were back in control of the dominating heights.  And, in turn, the strategically significant Golan Heights remained in Israeli hands.[12]  Yet . . .

. . . at its low point in the war, Israel’s material losses generated glum faces, including here in the United States.  But political problems existed in Washington:  President Nixon was under siege from the Watergate investigation; his vice president, Spiro T. Agnew, had had to resign, in addition to the quandary the United States found itself in with an embarrassing political defeat in Southeast Asia; the need to fend off the growing military power of the Soviet competitor in the superpower standoff; and, of course, the growing unpredictability of the Arab states and oil.  But following the pleas of Golda Meir, the decision was made to resupply Israel.  Hence, Operation:  NICKEL GRASS.

Concerned with an oil embargo by the Arab-producing states, many American allies forbid landing rights for aircraft participating in this 1973 version of the Berlin Airlift.  And so Military Airlift Command went to work.  Some 268 C-141s and 77 C-5As were committed.  Between October 12 and November 14, the USAF airlifted “22,395 tons of cargo—145 missions by C-5 Galaxys and 422 missions by C-141 Starlifters.  The C-5s delivered 48 percent of the tonnage but consumed 24 percent less fuel than the C-141s.  Included in the gross cargo tonnage was a total of 2,264.5 tons of ‘outsize’ material equipment that could be delivered only by a C-5.  Among these were M-60 tanks, 155 mm howitzers, ground radar systems, mobile tractor units, CH-53 helicopters and A-4E components.

 

 

“The airlift had been a key to victory.  It had not only brought about the timely resupply of the flagging Israeli force but also provided a series of deadly new weapons put to good use in the latter part of the war.  These included Maverick and TOW anti-tank weapons and extensive new electronic countermeasures equipment that warded off successful attacks on Israeli fighters.  Reflecting on the operation’s vital contribution to the war effort, Reader’s Digest would call it, ‘The Airlift That Saved Israel.’

“Both U.S. transport types distinguished themselves by performing reliably and economically.  The C-5A had an 81 percent reliability while the C-141 registered a 93 percent reliability.  No accidents occurred.  The abort rate of all planned flights came in under 2 percent.

“The airlift taught the Air Force many lessons, large and small.  One was that Lajes was a godsend—one that the U.S. best not take for granted in a future emergency.  The Air Force established an immediate requirement for aerial refueling to become standard practice in MAC so that its airlifters could operate without forward bases, if necessary.  Another lesson was that commercial airlines, on their own, could not be expected to volunteer their services and aircraft.  This meant that access to commercial lift in the future would have to be met by activating the Civil Reserve Fleet, as in fact it was doing during the Gulf War.  Nickle Grass also led to the consolidation of all airlift aircraft under Military Airlift Command and its designation as a specified command, February 1, 1977.

“Finally, the C-5 proved to be the finest military airlift aircraft in history, not the expensive military mistake as it had been portrayed in the media.  Its ability to carry huge amounts of cargo economically, carry outsized pieces of equipment, and refuel in flight justified the expense of the program.”[13]

Operation:  NICKLE GRASS did show something else of a positive nature; that despite the aforementioned myriad of political and military problems facing the United States in 1973, the Republic could galvanize itself with the proper personnel and ample resources to perform in fine fashion.  And not only perform in fine fashion, but make a decisive contribution to the result.  In other words, it was something to build on for the future.

* * * * *

The Future is Now!

Indeed, for the United States, in 1973, the future is now!  For instance, the Egyptians and Syrians, which had jealously husbanded their forces, in addition to learning from their mistakes of the past, sought to profit from this soul-searching by delivering that grievous knockout blow to their antagonist, Israel, and return Palestine to the Arab fold; while at the same time, eliminating what they perceived as that hateful abscess of Western colonialism, Israel, from the Arab realms.  And by resorting to mass conventional mobile war of the Western variety to accomplish same.  In this resulting arena of High-Intensity Conventional Warfare was a wake-up call for the United States.  For the Soviet Union was that Western opponent schooling their Arab clients on the Western way of war.  And since this was so, it was that Soviet Army and their Warsaw Pact[14] allies, which enjoyed the luxury of superior numbers, that was to be faced in Europe by the United States and its NATO allies.

And so after twelve years of fighting in the jungles of Southeast Asia during the Second Indochina War, and against an enemy that could hardly be considered a major industrial power, an enemy that did successfully wage a protracted campaign designed to wear out its economically superior foe, by waging a campaign of attrition intended to erode its will to continue the struggle, therefore relegating to irrelevance such advantages of money, resources, technology, industrial production . . . a pattern repeated starting in 1979, when the Soviets blundered into Afghanistan.

Both countries, the United States and the Soviet Union, reputed to be the superpowers of the world, seemed to be emblematic of societies that no longer had the intestinal fortitude for war.  In the American case, 1968-1973 was not 1941-1945.  “Remember Pearl Harbor!” and this is “Our War!” or “Remember the Bataan Death March!” became “Hell No We Won’t Go!” and this is “The President’s War!”  For victory on the battlefield is based on three fronts:  The Political Front, the Battle Front and the Home Front.  Competent politicians and diplomats are required to staff the Political Front; talented, skilled and trained officers and soldiers are necessary to successfully wage the conflict on the Battle Front.  But the backbone is the Home Front.  Because it is from the Home Front that the political class and army emerge.  And from the Home Front comes the weaponry, equipment, supplies, goods, services and labor to be able to wage a conflict.  Take away any of these cogs, especially the latter, and chances for victory wane.[15]

However years of antiwar sentiments and backlash on the Home Front eventually caused the military to rethink conscription.  Instead, the opposition to the military was not only from large blocks of the citizenry, but from the ranks as well.

Following the TET offensive, January-February 1968, the downward slide of discipline, order and cohesiveness set in as the uniforms in-theater faced and dealt with the ineptitude of the suits stateside.  As offered by Richard W. Stewart, in Chapter 11 of his American Military History, published by the Center of Military History, Washington, D.C.

“Operations on the coastal plain brought uncertain outcomes as well.  Here, the Americal Division fought in an area where the population had long been sympathetic to the Viet Cong.  As in other areas, pacification in Southern I Corps seemed to improve after the 1968 TET offensive, though enemy units still dominated the piedmont and continued to challenge American and South Vietnamese forces on the coast.  Operations against them proved to be slow, frustrating exercises in warding off North Vietnamese and Viet Cong main force units while enduring harassment from local guerrillas and the hostile population.  Except during spasms of intense combat, as in the summer of 1969 when the Americal Division confronted the 1st PAVN Regiment,[16] most U.S. casualties were from snipers, mines and booby traps.  Villages populated by old men, women and children were as dangerous as the elusive enemy main force units.  Operating in such conditions day after day included a climate of fear and hatred among Americans.  The already thin line between civilian and combatant was easily blurred and violated.  In the hamlet of My Lai, elements of the Americal Division killed about two hundred civilians in March 1968.  Although only one member of the division was tried and found guilty of war crimes, the atrocity reverberated throughout the Army. However rare, such acts undid the benefits of countless hours of civic action by Army units and individual soldiers and raised unsettling questions about the conduct of the war.

“War crimes such as My Lai were born of a sense of frustration that also contributed to a host of morale and discipline problems among enlisted men and officers alike.  As American forces were withdrawn by a government eager to escape the war, the lack of a clear military objective contributed to a weakened sense of mission and a slackening of discipline.  The short-timer syndrome, the reluctance to take risks in combat towards the end of a soldier’s one-year tour, was compounded by the last casualty syndrome.  Knowing that all U.S. troops would soon leave Vietnam, no soldier wanted to be the last to die.  Meanwhile, in the United States, harsh criticism of the war, the military, and traditional military values had become widespread.  Heightened individualism, growing permissiveness, and a weakening of traditional bonds of authority pervaded American society and affected the Army’s rank and file.  The Army grappled with problems of drug abuse, racial tensions, weakened discipline, lapses of leadership.  While out right refusals to fight were few in number, incidents of ‘fragging’ (murderous attacks on officers and noncoms)[17] occurred frequently enough to compel commands to institute a host of new security measures within their cantonments.  All these problems were symptoms of larger social and political force and underlines a growing disenchantment with the war among soldiers in the field.[18]

“As the Army prepared to exit Vietnam, lassitude and war weariness at times resulted in tragedy, such as at Firebase MARY ANN in 1971.  There, soldiers of the Americal Division, soon to go home, relaxed their security and were overrun by a North Vietnamese force.  Such incidents reflected a decline in the quality of leadership among both commissioned and noncommissioned officers.  Lowered standards, abbreviated training, and accelerated promotions to meet the high demand for noncommissioned and junior officers often resulted in the assignment of squad, platoon, and company leaders with less combat experience than the troops they led.  Careerism and ticket-punching in officer assignments, false reporting and inflated body counts, and revelations of scandal and corruption all raise disquieting questions about the professional ethics of Army leadership.  Critics indicted the tactics and techniques the Army used in Vietnam, noting that airmobility, for example, tended to distance troops from the population they were sent to protect and that commanders aloft in their command and control helicopters were at psychological and physical distance from the soldiers they were supposed to lead.”[19]

Criticisms proffered above as to Airmobility certainly need to be addressed before moving on.  Depending on the source(s) of such challenges, the concept in question enables conventional troops to move like insurgents, so as to appear at the enemy’s front, rear or flanks.  Indeed, to appear then disappear, then suddenly turn up in another quarter.  This can only be done with the helicopter, which certainly presents obvious advantages over the limitations of competing forms of ground transportation.  In addition to the fact, that the Air Cav commander can be as mobile as his troops.  For instance, Lieutenant Colonel Harold Moore accompanied his command into Landing Zone X-Ray and shared the trials and tribulations of his men.

The disparagement of Airmobility from the perspective that it distanced the troops from the people they were sent to protect is not really a discussion worth entertaining when one understands the political situation.  The reality being that American troops were sent to Vietnam to shore up a government meant to keep that nation out of the Communist orbit and into that of the West.  And that meant defending a government that engendered a widespread unpopularity.  Instead, the only hearts and minds Washington should have endeavored to capture were those that really mattered, the millions on the Home Front.  But following the TET debacle that, too, became an exercise in futility.  Yet, as usual with history, lessons abound here,[20] lessons that will be addressed in Part III.     

Endnotes

[1]  Contrary to General Howze’s observation as to the Arabs having no helicopters, “The combined air forces of Egypt, Syria and Jordan, together with the two Iraqi squadrons which joined the fray, numbered about 600 aircraft on the fifth of June.  About 450 were jet bombers and fighters, and the rest, transports and helicopters.”  See page 30, “The Air Force at War:  The Destruction of the Arab Air Forces,” The Six Days War, Israeli Ministry of Defense, 1967.  In addition to the results of the initial Israeli Air Force attack against the Egyptian aerial threat:

“In less than three hours, nearly 300 Egyptian planes were destroyed.  A breakdown of the types of aircraft knocked out gives some idea of what was in store for Israel if the Egyptians had been able to get them into action against the I.D.F. and the Israeli population.  ‘Confirmed kills’ included 30 Tupolev-16s, 27 Illyushin-28 medium bombers, 12 Sukhoi-7 fighter-bombers (which Egypt had only just received), some 90 Mig-21 interceptors, 20 Mig-19s, Mig-17s and another 32 transports and big MI-6 helicopters.”  See page 32, The Six Days’ War.

[2]  See pages 38 and 39, “The Air Force at War,” The Six Days’ War, Chief Education Officer, Israeli Defense Forces.

[3]  See pages 38 and 39, “The Air Force at War,” The Six Days’ War, Chief Education officer, Israeli Defense Forces.

[4]  See page 3, “The Use of Helicopters Against Guerrillas:  The Israeli Model,” by Dr. Tal Tovy.

[5]   “In the main attack, nineteen Egyptian air bases in the Sinai, in the Nile Delta, the Nile valley and Cairo area were attacked in some 500 sorties, destroying 309 out of 340 serviceable combat aircraft including all 30 long-range Tu-16 bombers, 27 medium-range Illyushin Il-28 bombers, 12 Sukhoi Su-7 fighter-bombers, some 90 Mig-21 fighters, 20 Mig-19 fighters, 25 Mig-17 fighters and a further 32 transport aircraft and helicopters.” See page 161, Book III, The Six Day War, 1967, “Prologue,” The Arab-Israeli Wars, by Chaim Herzog.  Meaning, Mr. Herzog coincides with the Education Officer, Israeli Defense Forces.  Refer to endnote no. 1.

[6]  At the time, Ray S. Cline was INR or Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research for the Department of State.  He was a long-time member of the intelligence community.

[7]  See page 1, “Growing Risk of Egyptian Resumption of Hostilities with Israel,” INR Ray S. Cline, May 31, 1973, CIA Memo.

[8]  See page 13, “Growing Risk of Egyptian Resumption of Hostilities with Israel,” Intelligence Report:  The 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Directorate of Intelligence, CIA, September 1975.

Chaim Herzog offers some depth to the Egyptian threat, just prior to October 6, 1973:  “The total strength of the Egyptian Army (one of the largest standing armies in the world) included some 800,000 troops, 2,200 tanks, 2,300 artillery pieces, 150 anti-aircraft missile batteries and 550 frontline aircraft.  Deployed along the Canal were five infantry divisions and a number of independent brigades (infantry and armor) backed by three mechanized divisions and two armored divisions.  Each infantry division included a battalion of tanks for every one of the three brigades, making a total of 120 tanks in every infantry division.  The three mechanized divisions included two mechanized brigades and one armored brigade, a total of 160 tanks per division.  The two armored divisions were composed of two armored brigades and one mechanized brigade, out of a total of 250 tanks per division.  There were also independent tank brigades, two paratroop brigades, some 28 battalions of commandos and a marine brigade.”  See page 262, BOOK V, The Yom Kippur War, 1973, Prologue, Chapter 1, “The Southern Front,” The Arab-Israeli Wars, by Chaim Herzog.

[9]  See page 262, Chaim Herzog.

[10]  See pages 318 and 319, Chaim Herzog.

[11]  See page 67, “Intelligence Report:  The 1973 Arab-Israeli War:  Overview and Analysis of the Conflict,” Secret, SR IR 75-16, September 1975.

[12]  See page 340, Chaim Herzog.

The highest point of the Mount Harmon complex of heights is Mitzpe Shlaggim (Snow Lookout), which rises to some 7,336 feet.  It is the home of the Israeli armed forces, security service elements and police units which monitor Syria and Lebanon.

December 14, 1981, the Israeli Knesset, by a majority of 63 to 21 in favor of, adopted the Golan Heights Law; by which the State of Israel would “extend Israeli Law, December 14, 1981,” Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Of particular interest in the Golan Heights for Israel is fresh water.  “Syria is systematically violating water agreements with Lebanon and Turkey (Orontes River), Jordan (Yarmuk River), and Iraq (Euphrates River).  Israel’s average annual water potential is 280 cubic meters per capita, compared to 2,000 cubic meters for Syria and 1,400 cubic meters for the Middle East at large.

“70% percent of Israel’s water resources will not be under its control if it withdraws from the Golan (30%), Judea and Samaria (40%).  There is no precedent for a country giving away water sources . . . “  See page 1, “The Golan Heights, Syria and Water Sources,” Think Israel, by Yoram Ettinger, August 8, 2009.

[13]  See page 59, “Nickel Grass,” Air Force Magazine, by Walter Boyne.

[14]  Joseph Stalin died on March 5, 1953, marking the end of the iron hand of totalitarianism.  Just over two years later, though, and in response to the formation of NATO, May 14, 1955, the pact of Mutual Assistance and Unified Command was signed by representatives of the Soviet Union, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and East Germany.  More than a military association, the Warsaw Pact was an actual mechanism to solidify the Soviet Empire in Eastern and Central Europe.  See page 200, Chapter Six, “Military District, Fleets, Border Guards, and MVD Troops,” The Armed Forces of the USSR, by Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott.

[15}  “A stranger to our politics, who tried to read our newspapers, at the present juncture, without having previously inspected the plan reported by the Convention, would be naturally led to one of two conclusions:  either that it contained a positive injunction that standing armies should be kept up in time of peace, or that it vested in the EXECUTIVE the whole power of levying troops subjecting his discretion in any shape to the control of the legislature.

“If he came afterwards to peruse the plan itself, he would be surprised to discover that neither the one nor the other as the case—that this legislature was to be a popular body, consisting of the representatives of the people, periodically elected; and that instead of the provision he has supposed in favor of standing armies, there was to be found, in respect to this object, an important qualification even of the legislative discretion, in that clause which forbids the appropriation of money for the support of the army for any longer period of two years; a precaution, which, upon a nearer view of it, will appear to be a great and real security against the keeping of troops without evident necessity.”  See pages 152 and 153, “The Federalist No. 24, December 19, 1787,” by Alexander Hamilton.

Again, the importance of the Home Front is emblematic with Hamilton’s accent on the Legislative Branch, dully elected by the people, to raise armies and the funds for same, as opposed to providing such power in the Chief Executive.  Leading, too, that Congress has the power to Declare War, not the President.  Such speaks volumes as to why the Second Indochina War was an immense political setback for the United States.

[16]  PAVN or People’s Army of Vietnam was the armed wing of the Communist Party in Vietnam.  It was inclusive of the armed forces, People’s Army, People’s Navy and People’s Air Force.  See “People’s Army of Vietnam,” GlobalSecurity.org, www.globalsecurity.org/…/world/vietnam.htm

[17]  “One of the more disturbing aspects of the unpopular war in Vietnam was the practice known as fragging.  Disenchanted soldiers in Vietnam sometimes used fragmentation grenades, popularly known as frags, or other explosives to threaten or kill officers and NCOs they disliked.  The full extent of the problem will never be known; but increased sharply in 1969, 1970 and 1971, when the morale of the troops declined in step with the American role in the fighting.  A total of 370 well-documented cases involving 83 deaths have come to light.  There were doubtless others and probably some instances of fragging that were privately motivated acts of anger that had nothing to do with the war.  Nonetheless, fragging was symptomatic of an Army in turmoil.”  See page 349, Chapter 11, “The U.S. Army in Vietnam:  From TET to the Final Withdrawal, 1968-1975,” American Military History, Vol. II, by Richard W. Stewart.

[18]  The trials and tribulations that had beset the United States Army as a result of Vietnam was certainly not unusual in history.  In 1916, the Czarist Russian Army launched a huge summer offensive on the Eastern Front, inflicting 600,000 casualties on the Austro-Hungarian forces and crippling that army for the balance of World War I.  At the same time, 1,000,000 Russian casualties had been incurred; to which, peasant soldiers had had enough.  Several years of excessive losses, inept military leadership in addition to an ambivalent and incompetent Czar Nikolas II, caused the Russian soldiers to begin to walk off the battlefields and back to the farms.  Revolution was in the wind.  See page 304, Chapter 8, “The Year of the Battles,” The First World War, by John Keegan.  And page 136, Chapter 6, “The Land War in Europe:  Strategy,” Cataclysm, by David Stevenson.

1918, the vaunted German Army launched five major offensives on the Western Front, designed to bring the Allies to their knees and win the war.  At the cost of 500,000 casualties, the Germans failed to reach their objectives.  With American help, the British and French had withstood the Teutonic onslaught.  But German soldiers had had enough.  Like two summers before, German soldiers, like the Russians before them, began to call it quits.  Discipline fractured and unit cohesiveness split and cracked.

1917, fifty-four divisions of the French Army mutinied in the trenches.  They, too had had their fill of subpar food, inept leadership, disregard of their plight by the high command. . .   Courts-martial found 23,000 men guilty, of which 432 were sentenced to death, with 55 actually shot.  General Henri Petain shuttled busily among French divisions to quell the disenchanted Polius.  Still another 400 were consigned to incarceration, some of whom wound up in penal colonies like Devil’s Island in French Guiana.  See pages 279 and 280, Chapter II, “The Spring Battles in the West,” The Great War, by Cyril Falls.

1780 to March 15, 1783, mutinies and revolts plagued the Continental Army, due to lack of food, lack of new uniforms, pay, indeed, the officers had been promised a half-pay pension for life.  With the colonies some $40 million in debt, where was that money coming from?  For instance, 1781, elements of a New Jersey regiment rose up.  General George Washington not only had quelled the unpleasantness, but ordered the malcontents to pick their ringleaders.  He then had two of them shot.  See pages 413 and 414, General George Washington’s order, “To Robert Howe,” commander of the West Point detachment, to march on the offending New Jersey regiment, and, execute a few of the most active and most incendiary leaders.  George Washington:  Writings.

[19]  See pages 349 and 350, Richard W. Stewart.

[20]  The unstated notion, and one that has a basis of historical substance and precedent, was that of the Domino Theory.  It was started here in the United States with Korea, then Vietnam; that if either fell to the Communists, Southeast Asia, perhaps the Philippines and even Japan might eventually fall to the Reds.  But most important was Indonesia, owing to its more than ample reserves of crude.  And the precedent was 1941-1942.

The primary target for Japan, December 1941, was not Pearl Harbor but the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia), since in 1941 this cluster of islands was the globe’s fourth largest producer of crude.  In addition to the fact that as of July 26, 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, by Presidential Executive Order, cut off Japan from American oil exports.  This left the Imperial Japanese Navy with 18 months of oil.

The Domino Theory here saw not only Pearl Harbor attacked, but the Dutch East Indies taken, Guam, Wake, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Burma, the Philippines, New Guinea, the Solomons, . . .  All and more fell like dominos to the rampaging Japanese.    

Bibliography

Boyne, Walter, “Nickle Grass,” Air Force Magazine, December 1998, www.airandspaceforces.com/PDF/MaragazineArchive…

Cline, INR Ray S., “Growing Risk of Egyptian Resumption of Hostilities With Israel,” CIA Memo, May 31, 1973.  Declassified, March 14, 2000.

Ettinger, Yoram, “The Golan Heights, Syria and Water,” Think Israel, August 8, 2009.  Mr. Ettinger was a consultant on U.S. Israeli relations, prior to which he was the Minister for Congressional Affairs to the Israeli Embassy in Washington, D.C.  www.think-israel.org/ettinger.golanheightswater.html

Falls, Cyril, The Great War, G.P. Putnam’s & Sons, New York, 1959.

Hezog, Chaim, The Arab-Israeli Wars:  War and Peace in the Middle East:  From the War of Independence Through Lebanon, Random House, Inc., New York, NY., 1982.

Howze, Hamilton H., A Cavalryman’s Story:  Memoirs of a Twentieth Century General, Smithsonian Institution Press, Washington and London, 1996.

Intelligence Report:  The 1973 Arab-Israeli War:  Overview and Analysis of the Conflict, Secret SR IR 75-16, Copy No. 56, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, September 1975.  Approved for release, August 29, 2012.

Jay, John; Hamilton, Alexander and Madison, James, The Federalist, edited with Introduction and Notes by Jacob E. Cooke, Wesleyan University, Middletown, Connecticut, 1961.  Eighty-five efforts of remarkable political literature were penned by three representatives of the most dynamic political generation in American history, spanning the post Constitutional Convention debates, October 27-1787 to May 28, 1788.  As a book form, the first appeared in 1788, then 1802 followed by 1819.  It ranks with Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan, Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Social Contact, John Locke’s, Of Civil Government, . . . as one of the notable political treatises ever penned.   

Keegan, John, The First World War, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., New York, 1999.

“People’s Army of Vietnam,” GlobalSecurity.org, www.goobalsecurity.org/…/world/vietnam.htm

Scott, Harriet Fast and Scott, William F., The Armed Forces of the USSR, Westview Press, Inc., Boulder, Colorado, 1979.

Simpson, Keith, History of the German Army, The Military Press, Bison Books Corp., Greenwich, Ct., 1985.

Stevenson, David, Cataclysm:  The First World War as Political Tragedy, Basic Books, New York, NY., 2004.

Stewart, Richard W., General Editor, Vol. II, American Military History:  The United States Army in a Global Era, 1917-2008, Army Historical Series, CMH Pub 30-22, Second Edition, Center of Military History, Washington, D.C., 2010.

The Israel Ministry of Defense, The Six Days’ War, The Israeli Press, Ltd., 1967.

The Library of America, George Washington:  Writings, Literary Classics of the United States, New York, NY., 1997.

Tovy, Dr. Tal, “The Use of Helicopters Against Guerrillas:  The Israeli Model,” Journal of European, Middle Eastern & African Affairs, Air University, August 2020, www.airuniversity.af.edu/JEMAA/D   

Van Creveld, Martin; Canby, Steven and Brower, Kenneth S., Air Power and Maneuver Warfare, for the Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 1994.

It is great to continue the rhythm of events and activities that showcase Army Aviation’s essential capabilities, and your Association’s contribution to enabling the pillars of Networking, Voice, Recognition and Support for our Army Aviation soldiers and families.

On November 7, I had the privilege and honor to represent the Association at the U.S. Southern Command Change of Command and retirement ceremony for GEN Laura Richardson and induct her into the Gold Order of Saint Michael in recognition of her incredible accomplishments, service, and support to our Army, Joint Force, and the Army Aviation Community.

The event served as a reminder of how fortunate we are to now have five retired Aviation four- star generals (GEN Doug Brown, GEN Dick Cody, GEN Dan Hokanson, and GEN Jim McConville) that have been incredibly impactful and supportive of our Army Aviation family and Association. Additionally, I was honored to attend the retirement ceremony of CW5 Wade Ziegler, the 6th Command Chief Warrant Officer of the Army Special Operations Aviation Command and present him with the Gold Order of Saint Michael in recognition of his more than 32 years of dedicated service and accomplishments in support of our Army, Army Aviation, and the Army Special Operations community. What an incredible Army Aviation force we have!

Let me transition and speak about our AAAA Senior Executive Associates. Conceived over two decades ago by GEN Crosby E. ‘Butch’ Saint and Brig. Gen. Harry Bendorf, USAF (who at that time headed our AAAA Strategic Planning Committee), this is the group of our retired, non-Aviation Flag Officers, who volunteer their time to help generate understanding of Army Aviation capabilities, priorities, and challenges outside of the Army Aviation community.

The Associates come together twice annually to meet with the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Army Aviation General Officer Steering Committee led by our Branch Chief, MG Clair Gill… with our most recent meeting occurring on the heels of the Association of the United States Army’s Annual Meeting and Exhibition in mid-October. Our Senior Executive Associates perspective from the ‘Big Army’ point of view, as former Division, Corp, and Army Commanders, is simply invaluable. Under the leadership of the Chairman, GEN J.D. Thurman, Generals Dan Allyn, J.C. Campbell, Dave Perkins, Gus Perna, and Steve Townsend, along with Lieutenant Generals Dave Halverson, Mike Oates, Jim Pasquarette, Roger Schultz and Frank Wiercinski, work very effectively to ensure Army Aviation’s value is understood. We can’t thank them enough for their volunteer efforts in support of the Army Aviation Community and our Army Aviation soldiers and families.

By the time you read this we will have completed our second largest gathering of the year. The AAAA Cribbins Readiness Conference is always a signature event as we gather in Huntsville, AL to present and discuss all things acquisition and sustainment, in the context of being able to fight tonight and prepare for future operations with all the new emerging technology before us. Exciting times for sure as we meet the challenge of gaining effectiveness and advantage in protection, lethality, and supportability through the integration of uncrewed aircraft systems, launched effects, the modular open systems approach, and the realization of the Future Long Range Assault Aircraft.

Finally, if you haven’t already…please make sure to sign up and join us for the AAAA Army Aviation Mission Solutions Summit, May 14-16, 2025, in Nashville.

From all of us at the AAAA Global Headquarters, we hope you and your families had a wonderful Thanksgiving! Thanks for all you do in support of Army Aviation!

Above the Best!

MG Walt Davis, U.S. Army Retired
36th President, AAAA
walt.davis@quad-a.org

Looking Back, November 2024
By Mark Albertson

Putting the House in Order
Part I: Less is More

To establish a tradition, therefore, which will prove effective, if only a threat of what is to follow afterwards is displayed, the Air Force must, if called upon to administer punishment, do it with all its might and in the proper manner. One objective must be selected—preferably the most accessible village of the most prominent tribe which it is desired to punish. All available aircraft must be collected. . . . The attack with bombs and machine guns must be relentless and unremitting and carried on continuously by day and night, on houses, inhabitants, crops and cattle. . . . This sounds brutal, I know, but it must be made brutal to start with. The threat alone in the future will prove efficacious if the lesson is once properly learnt. . . .[1]

* * * * *

After January 1973, with the American chapter in the Second Indochina War drawing to a close, Army Aviation found itself in a situation not too unlike that faced by the fledgling RAF after the Versailles Treaty of 1919:Establish justification for its continued existence.Though by 1973, Army Aviation was on surer political footing, perhaps, when compared to the RAF in 1919.This is significant from the perspective that airpower itself had, by 1973, masses of adherents as opposed to 1919, when the practitioners of this developing weapons system known as the heavier-than-aircraft had to compete for a seat at the postwar budget table with the Establishment . . . in this case, the British Army and the Royal Navy.Yet, the historical comparison can still be applied and with some merit.

For instance, Sir Hugh “Boom” Trenchard[2] was deeply concerned that with the conclusion of the 1914-1918 conflict, from the perspective that well-trained RAF personnel would be mustered out and much of its aircraft would be scrapped.But of overriding concern was that much of what had been gleaned from combat experience might be consigned to the shelves to collect dust; and therefore, disregarded or even forgotten.[3]For budgets in the postwar era are going to be slashed, leaving the newly-minted RAF to vie with the established services for a financially secure future.A future that was going to have to be created to justify the future existence of the RAF, especially as a standalone service.

Trenchard certainly understood Britain’s growing economic dilemma.For as a result of the 1914-1918 industrialized war, Britain, like France, needed to retain access to those resources and manpower pools that had been supplied from their empires.Yet at the same time, Revolutionary Nationalism was given a decided boost as a result of the internecine conflict among the colonial overseers; indeed, the 1914-1918 struggle accelerated the precipitous decline of European colonial domination, the demise of which can be seen in 1945 with the victory in a war that did not start in 1939, but rather 1914:And those victors were the United States and the Soviet Union.A new political-strategic course had been charted: Hence, the Cold War.

Trenchard understood that as a result of the 1914-1918 war the adverse economic changes wrought made it costly to station troops throughout the empire; in addition to the fact, that after four years of horrendous bloodletting, loved ones wanted their fathers and sons to come home.[4]

To the British Government, Trenchard pitched the idea of troop reductions in some of the colonies.Air squadrons, then, would take up the slack, especially since the indigenous populations in question did not have aircraft and lacked the sophisticated anti-aircraft weaponry with which to defend themselves.And Trenchard offered an example to bolster his case . . . Somaliland.

“Since the 1890s, Mohamad bin Abdullah Hassan, a charismatic tribal leader known as ‘the Mad Mullah,’ had caused trouble in the British protectorate by raiding tribes friendly to the British.From 1900 to 1904, the British mounted several punitive expeditions against him and took fairly heavy losses.In 1904 they finally brought the Mad Mullah’s main force to battle, defeated it, and drove him out of British territory.However the trouble did not end.In 1909, Abdullah started raiding again, and in 1913 his forces shot up a unit of British constabulary.During World War I, the British ignored the problems in Somaliland, but after the war, the British government decided to reinforce the protectorate with an RAF squadron of DH-9 reconnaissance/light bomber aircraft.Eight aircraft arrived by January 1920, and the British set to work with surprise bombing raids on Abdullah Hassan’s forts.The army field force—consisting of detachments from the King’s African Rifles, Somaliland Camel Corps and Indian Army—moved in pursuit of the Mullah’s force.Over the next three weeks, the RAF reverted to supporting the ground force by reconnaissance and bombing.The Mullah escaped and took his remaining forces over the border into Ethiopia, where he died the next year.For the astoundingly low price of 80,000 pounds, airpower had played a central role in defeating a force that had irritated the colony for many years.”[5]

In March 1921, at the Cairo Conference on Mideast Affairs, Winston Churchill, chairman of the proceedings, fielded Trenchard’s application of allowing the RAF to take control of military efforts in subduing the rambunctious Iraqis; this, of course, in the wake of the bargain basement approach to the use of airpower in Somaliland.And “on October 22, 1922, the Air Ministry officially took control of the country.[6]Over the next ten years, the punitive use of airpower helped to subdue recalcitrant tribesmen, such as the autonomous-minded Kurds, marsh Arabs, bombed raiding Wahhabis causing disturbances in southern Iraq.And in other policing efforts, bombed an illegal dam erected by a sheikh who cut off his neighbors from badly needed water and who refused to pay his taxes.By the end of the decade, at a fraction of the cost of committing large numbers of troops, the RAF, together with colonial ground detachments, had largely subdued Iraq, at a human cost to itself of 14 killed and 84 wounded.[7]

But man has a tendency to acclimate himself to a given situation; and the indigenous on the receiving end of British bombs and machine gun fire attempted to cope.One such were the rebellious Kurds.Kurds in the mountains upon hearing the drone of approaching British aircraft, would light fires, creating smoke which indicated to the villagers of the impending airborne threat.

Such air policing efforts throughout the empire by the RAF helped to stimulate that culture, already evolving on the Western Front by 1918; that of Douhet’s theory of bombing civilians behind the lines.Mussolini’s Regia Aeronautica would perform this function during the 1935-1937 Italo-Abyssinian War; German and Italian bombers in support of fellow Fascist, Francisco Franco, bombed Spanish cities during the tune up to 1939, the Spanish Civil War; as well as the Japanese bombing of Shanghai and other Chinese cities starting in 1937.Followed, of course, by British Bomber Command, joined later by the United States Eighth Army Air Forces, in a concerted strategic bombing campaign waged against Nazi Germany.

But air policing/counterinsurgency/disciplining recalcitrant populations, showcased the RAF’s ability to acclimate itself to the changing strategic as well as tactical states of affairs following 1918.Such is the situation Army Aviation found itself after January 1973.

* * * * *

           Major General Allen M. Burdett, Jr., Director of Army Aviation in 1970, alluded to the post-Vietnam War course for Army Aviation during the decade of the 1970s.He outlined this path in a speech to the National Capitol Chapter of the Air Force Association, to which he said, “At the outset, I want to make clear that we seek no changes in service roles and missions, nor a grab for a disproportionate share of a relatively smaller defense budget.[8]All that we ‘Green Suiters’ want is to improve through innovation and technology our effectiveness in doing a better job for the Nation.Our job, our mission—as we all know—is to control, with coercion when necessary, the activities of people within a land area.’”[9] To which he added:

“This mission today is more challenging than ever before.Confronted by threats ranging from the nuclear through tank-intense, mechanized forces, to large numbers of small guerrilla bands—and even to domestic rioters,[10] somehow we must find ways to increase our capabilities even as personnel and dollar resources are being reduced.[11]

General Burdett’s references to limited access to money and manpower forecast the reality of the coming times . . . austerity.And his rationale of “increasing our capabilities” in an attempt to cope with the impeding reductions in money and manpower, underscores that the armed forces will have to operate from the mindset that less is more.However . . .

. . . the post-Vietnam period was marked, perhaps, by a thoughtful analysis put forth by Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN, with regards to airmobility, which he viewed as a concept that would be a requirement for an army that would shrink in size following the end of the war:

“This is a concept comparable in significance to the airborne and armor concepts which reached their maturity in World War II,” the admiral adding, “The Joint Chiefs of Staff were unanimous in accepting airmobility as a sound concept in the low-intensity environment of Vietnam.”

He added, “It is possible for some combination of airmobility and, for example, armor, may prove more suitable in certain future situations than either capability used alone.

“If so,” he said, “the Army might considerably increase its versatility by such a marriage of capabilities.This is the sort of thinking going on in the Army today to get more performance out of a smaller force.”[12]

* * * * *

Yet with the abundance of funds or the scarcity of funds, the reality of the world applies:Man cannot co-exist peacefully for an extended period of time.[13]For whether a “brushfire war” such as in Vietnam or potential large conventional war, the larger picture still existed.The global competition with the Soviet contender.Army Aviation, then, would be required to readjust; readjust, that is, back to what it was training for in the 1950s.

* * * * *

Limited War Rules

July 25, 1969, President Richard Nixon, as the growing reality of the Vietnam debacle was rapidly becoming apparent, announced this Nation’s commitment in keeping its treaty obligations with its Asian allies, such as SEATO.[14]This was sustained on February 18, 1970, when the President reiterated this Nation’s willingness to abide by its treaty obligations and to provide and maintain that nuclear shield to those nations allied to the United States.This became known as the Nixon Doctrine.[15]

Yet a situation developed in one of the most oil-soaked regions of the globe that could not be ignored despite America’s commitment to Southeast Asia.For in January 1968, growing financial constraints forced the Labor Government in Britain to formally announce the withdrawal of British forces from the Persian Gulf by the end of 1971.

“At the time of the announcement, the British presence involved about 6,000 ground troops, as well as naval forces and air support units, costing around 12 million pounds a year (about $29 million at the exchange rate of the time).The rulers of the Persian Gulf received the British announcement with dismay and offered to meet Britain’s expenses out of their mounting oil revenues.Defense Secretary Denis Healy poured scorn on the suggestion that the British become ‘mercenaries’ for people who like to have British troops around,’ and the Labor Government considered it politically unwise to maintain its military presence east of Suez.It signaled its retreat from empire by applying for membership in the European Economic Community.[16]

This posed an issue for Washington.For the British signified that token representation of Western colonial interests.For sure the United States could not perform such a strategic function, owing to its massive exposure in Southeast Asia, troop obligations on the Korean peninsula in the wake of the 1950-1953 war and, its manpower and equipment commitment to NATO in Europe.And, there was the anti-military backlash in the streets at home.Despite having the best military in the Middle East, Israel was not politically palatable.So the Shah of Iran, long a Western client, was chosen to be the caretaker of Western concerns in the Middle East; to which he was lavished with weapons and equipment, a proxy that would prove, like many of them do in the end, disastrous.[17]

At the same time, President Richard Nixon rendered political overtures to China.The split in the Communist world was evident and had been so for many years.And with the Soviets expanding their military capabilities, the Nixon/Kissenger effort sought to open relations with the gold standard of Peasant Revolution versus the practitioner of the Proletarian Revolution and broaden even further the political crevice within the Communist ranks; a difference of opinion evident with the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia to end the brutal Pol Pot regime, a client of Peking, with Moscow backing Hanoi.[18]

As alluded to in note 18, the Chinese, as a result of its costly campaign into the territory of its feisty neighbor to the south, will begin a progression of military modernization, and away from its peasant origins.The United States, too, was undergoing a transformation militarily.Yet both giants had violated Clausewitz’s cardinal rule of, “Accordingly, war can never be separated from political intercourse, and if, in the consideration of the matter, this is done in any way, all the threads of the different relations are, to a certain extent, broken, and we have before us a senseless thing without an object.”[19]

In both cases, Washington and Peking had limited war objectives, without recourse to Total Victory.Therefore their entries into conflict proved fruitless.Peking, of course, was not going to consult the average Chinaman as to his or her stakes in a war with its truculent neighbor.Washington, too, in the end, ostracized the American public from the Second Indochina War, setting up the country for a decisive political defeat.At the same time, though, Airmobility was proved, on the tactical battlefield, underscoring what Major General James M. Gavin wrote in 1947:

“The future of our armed forces is in the air.All fighting men and everything they need to fight with in the future and live on as they fight must be capable of movement by air.Only through flight can we wage a future war in accordance with the principles of surprise, mass and economy of means.Only by exploiting to its utmost the great potential of flight can we complete dispersion in the defense with the facility of rapidly massing for counterattack which today’s and tomorrow’s army must possess.Even without the power and use of atomic energy for war these things would be true.With the use of atomic energy they become axiomatic.”[20]

What General Gavin put forth in his book could be applied in either environment of limited or unlimited war.The U.S. Army proved this in Vietnam.Yet big power ineptness will continue; for the Soviets will blunder into Afghanistan, repeating America’s mistake of 1961.Again, a big power will go down to ignominious defeat to a nation, which by comparison, was backward, lacking an industrial and technological infrastructure and in the case of Afghanistan, was devoid of a functioning system of central government.Or as Roger Trinquier noted in his A French View of Counterinsurgency:

“Warfare is now an interlocking system of actions—political, economic, psychological, military—that aims at the overthrow of the established authority and its replacement by another regime.To achieve this end, the aggressor tries to exploit the internal tensions of the country attacked—ideological, social, religious, economic—any conflict liable to have profound influence on the population to be conquered.Moreover, in view of the present day interdependence of nations, any residual grievance within the population, no matter however localized and lacking in scope will surely be brought by determined adversaries into the framework of the greater world conflict.From a localized conflict of secondary origin and importance, they will always attempt sooner or later to bring about a generalized conflict.”[21]

For America, what Trinquier was expressing was tantamount to a cultural change.For up to November 25-26, 1950, the conventional or Total War doctrine of the United States was based on the destruction of the enemy’s army so as to bring the foe to the conference table or, unconditional surrender.The popular notion of same was effected towards the defeat of the Axis Powers.

January 1943, Casablanca Conference, featuring President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill, where unconditional surrender was announced.Earlier in the war, Churchill had proclaimed, “Victory at all Costs!”At the same time, FDR, during a fireside chat, September 29, 1940, stated, “’A nation can have peace with the Nazis only at the price of total surrender . . . such a dictated peace would be no peace at all.It would only be another armistice, leading to the most devastating trade war in history.’Nevertheless he adopted this hypothetical Nazi policy, and, as we shall see, its results were identical to those he foretold.[22]But what about the American Civil War or, what it actually was, the Revolt of the Planters, since the Confederacy was a revolution from the Right.However whatever label is applied, it was the first war in which America engaged in industrialized, corporatized war.

Commander-in-Chief of the Union or United States Army, General Winfield Scott, showcased a basic understanding of economic warfare:Close off Southern ports; control the Mississippi River and cut off the eastern portion of the Confederacy from its western frontier.Despite this, the Confederacy was able to best, for the most part, the battlefield tactically; that is, of course, until the North got its wartime economy in gear, per Levee en Masse, then the South was doomed.An example of how a nation of farmers was not going to best a nation of wrench-turners in a conventional war during the age of the Industrial Revolution.

Of some of the leading Union generals after Gettysburg, such as Meade, Sheridan and Grant, the one who seemed to have the firmest grip on modern economic warfare was William Tecumseh Sherman.Total defeat of the Southern armies rested on attacking the economy.And during 1864-1865, hearkened back to the Mongol depredations of the 13^th century.Destroy it, so that it would be not available to the enemy tomorrow.Indeed, Sherman acknowledged his policy of terror and destruction:“Until we can repopulate Georgia, it is useless to occupy it; but utter destruction of the road, houses and people will cripple their military resources . . . I can make the march, and make Georgia howl . . . Should I be forced to assault . . . I shall then feel justified in resorting to the hardest measures, and shall make little effort to restrain my army . . . We are not only fighting hostile armies, but a hostile people, and must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard hand of war . . . The truth is the whole army is burning with an insatiable desire to wreak vengeance on South Carolina.I almost tremble at her fate.”[23] Thus April 9, 1865, Robert E. Lee will sign an armistice, which in reality, was an admission of utter defeat of that four-year experiment known as the Confederacy.At the same time, the Southerners of 1864-1865 must be acknowledged as those Americans, unlike any other generation in the history of this country, who understood the rudiments of modern, industrialized, conventional war . . . Total War, because they were on the receiving end of it and endured it.A lesson of stark significance that is seemingly ignored.Indeed, the blaze in bloody Kansas waged by the likes of John Brown became that firestorm of economic warfare by William Tecumseh Sherman.

1914, the European colonial powers bungled their way into another industrialized conflict; one more horrible and costly than the American tragedy some fifty years earlier.For Man’s talent for innovation, invention and production, financed by Capitalism, would bring on a struggle of global proportions not yet seen in the history of Man.A manmade cataclysm that will spam the years of 1914-1945.

For the United States, which in 1914 was the world’s ranking industrial power going on twenty years, the basic American military doctrine remained unchanged, as understood in the 1914 Field Service Regulations of the United States Army:

“Only by means of an energetic pursuit of the beaten army can the full fruits of victory and decisive results therefrom can be obtained.It is not mere defeat of the enemy’s army, but its destruction, that ends the campaign.[24]The task of the victorious army is less than half performed when it remains satisfied with the mere possession of the battlefield.Pursuit must immediately follow victory, and every effort be made to continue contact with the enemy, day and night, up to the absolute limit of physical endurance of the troops.”[25]

By the summer of 1918, the United States Army, together with the British and French armies, defeated the winded German armies, forcing imperial Germany to an armistice on November 11, 1918, followed by the Versailles Treaty, June 28, 1919.Such was the American approach to war in 1865, 1918 and 1945.

Such was the American military doctrine on June 25, 1950.Following the breakout from the Pusan perimeter, in conjunction with General Douglas MacArthur’s inspired amphibious effort at Inchon, once South Korea had been cleared of invading North Korean troops, President Harry Truman concurred with General MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to push across the 38^th parallel, invade North Korea, destroy the North Korean People’s Army and unify the peninsula under the banner of President Syngman Rhee.But as United Nation’s forces closed on the Chinese border, America’s Cold War use of military force would be changed.

Initial Chinese “encroachments” into North Korea served as warnings, indicating that Peking would not tolerate UN armies on the Chinese border.Such warnings were ignored.And so on the night of November 25-26, 1950, 300,000 Chinese “volunteers” from the People’s Liberation Army flooded across the Yalu River.From this date forward, America’s military doctrine was changed.

The Korean War would end where it began, the 38^th parallel.The quest to destroy the North Korean People’s Army and unify the contested peninsula ended in failure.The destruction of the enemy’s army to bring him to the conference table failed.Stalemate brought both sides to the conference table, in a struggle that has come to be representative of every war America would fight from here on in, Limited War.

Limited War dominated the Second Indochina War, bolstered, in part, by concern of another Chinese intervention.Again, November 25-26, 1950 loomed large in the 1960s.Unlike the Korean conflict, which ended as a stalemate, Vietnam proved to be an unmitigated political defeat.The Persian Gulf War, again, a Limited War effort, which in the end, left Saddam in power.Iraq, Afghanistan, Limited War, with the former and the latter both ending in political defeat.

Such was the era the United States Army found itself in immediately following Korea.Yet it was the calamity of Vietnam that would cause a transformation of the ground forces.A period of limited budgets, limited manpower, limited assets, limited support and Limited War.Yet it was expected to prepare for large scale conventional war in Europe.

Airmobility, though, had been proven.The Army would be able to hold on to its tactical aerial assets as well as control of same.In turn, this will lead to Aviation joining the service masthead of branches.It now truly had a seat at the table.

Endnotes

[1]RAF Wing Commander, J.A. Chamier, 1921.See page 5, “The Myth of Air Control,” by Dr. James S. Corum.

[2]Sir High “Boom” Trenchard has come to be known as the noted British practitioner of the strategic use of airpower.And he is considered by the United States Air Force as the godfather of strategic bombing.American air commanders such as Henry “Hap” Arnold and Carl Spaatz saw Trenchard as the “Patron Saint of Airpower.”

[3]Along the lines, perhaps, of the fate of the Union Army Balloon Corps, 1863.

[4]This first chapter of Man’s greatest industrialized, corporatized conflict cost the British 908,371 dead to preserve their empire.Cost the French 1,357,800 to retain their colonial holdings.The big loser here was Germany, which lost 1,773,700 dead and lost her colonies.The competitor that came out of this conflict smelling like a rose was Japan.As an Allied power, Tokyo’s reward for being a dutiful Allied power was to receive many of Germany’s holdings in the Pacific . . . at a cost of only 300 to 400 dead.

[5]See page 2, James S. Corum.

[6]See page 4, “British Air Control,” by Captain Davis Willard Parsons, USAF.

[7]See page 5, Captain Davis Willard Parsons.

[8]Italics belong to the author.

[9]See page 9, “The Army Aviation Requirements for the ‘70s,” Army Aviation, by Major General Allen M. Burdett, Jr., March 31, 1970.

[10]The rambunctious nature of the Civil Rights and Anti-War movements is obvious here.Of course, the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act renders the employment of regular troops on America streets, generally, as unlawful.Or as found in 6 USC 466:Sense of Congress reaffirming the continued importance of applicability of the Posse Comitatus Act,” text contains those laws in effect on October 18, 2024:

1)Section 1385, of title 18 (commonly known as the “Posse Comitatus Act”) prohibits the use of the Armed Forces as a posse comitatus to execute the laws except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress.

2)Enacted in 1878, the Posse Comitatus Act was expressly intended to prevent United States Marshals, on their own initiative, from calling on the Army for assistance in enforcing Federal law.

4) Nevertheless, by its expressed terms, the Posse Comitatus Act is not a complete barrier to the use of the Armed Forces for a range of domestic purposes, including law enforcement functions, when the use of the Armed Forces is required to fulfill the President’s obligations under the Constitution to respond promptly in time of war, insurrection, or other serious emergency.In addition . . .

. . . Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Forces as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both . . .    Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 1385.

[11]Major General Burdett is warning of the similar situation faced by Air Marshal Trenchard in 1918-1919; as well as for the United States Army following 1945 and again after 1953.Italics are the author’s.

[12]See page 5, “How to do More Things Better With a Given Size Force,” Army Aviation, by Brigadier General William J. Maddox, February 15, 1971.

[13]“Unfortunately, we have not yet attained the idealistic goal wherein nations can live in harmony with each other with little likelihood of aggression.As Sir John Winthrop Hacket has stated:A society of men in which no resort to forces is possible, either for the common good or against it, is inconceivable, so long as man remains what he is.”See page 6, “Aviation in the ‘70s,” an address by Lieutenant General George I. Forsythe, August 1970.

[14]Southeast Asia Treaty Organization was founded in September 1954.Founding members were the United States, Great Britain, New Zealand, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan.Most of the signers were not of the region; though the agreement was an attempt to stop the spread of Communism in the area in question.“Beyond its activities, the SEATO charter was also vitally important to the American rationale for the Vietnam War.The United States used the organization as its justification for refusing to go forward with the 1956 elections intended to reunify Vietnam, instead maintaining the divide between Communist North Vietnam and South Vietnam at the 17^th parallel.As the conflict in Vietnam unfolded, the inclusion of Vietnam as a territory under SEATO protection gave the United States the legal framework for its continued involvement there.”See Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 1954,” 2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/lw/88315.htm

[15]See pages 116 and 117, Chapter 5, “The Nixon Presidency,” American Presidents and the Middle East, by George Lenczowski.

[16]See page 35, Chapter 2, “Succeeding John Bull,” War and Peace in the Middle East, by Avi Shlaim.It must be understood that this period of 1968-1971 is a quarter century beyond the actual collapse of the British Empire, 1945.The changing of the guard was already in full-blown progression, with European dominance over and the new balance of power that had arisen from the ashes of history’s greatest industrialized, corporatized war, the Great War, 1914-1945; indeed, Levee en Masse personified:That is the United States and the Soviet Union.

[17]A fateful decision that would help lead to the Iranian Revolution in 1978.

[18]Hanoi completed the unification of Vietnam by April 30, 1975.The Vietnamese will invade Cambodia, December 25, 1978 to rid their neighbor of the murderous Khmer Rouge.It is important to understand that Pol Pot had evicted Vietnamese settlers from Cambodia and back into Vietnam as refugees; in addition, to Vietnamese concerns of the large Chinese minority (the Hoas) in South Vietnam, seen as potential fifth columnists, a realistic outlook when one understands, too, the 20^th century relationship of enmity and discord between the Vietnamese and their huge neighbor to the north.

Chinese troops flooded across the Sino-Vietnamese border in the north so as to punish their fellow Communists.Some 250,000 Chinese troops were earmarked for this campaign.Hanoi arranged some 150,000 militia to engage the invaders, keeping in reserve, upwards of seven NVA regular divisions in defense of Hanoi.The Border Militia did most of the fighting and, were hardly second stringers.

The Vietnamese gave ground, acceding provincial capitals Lao Cai, Cao Bang, Dong Dang and Lang Son.But the short, sharp war cost the People’s Liberation Army dearly.“General Wu Xiuquan, the Chinese Deputy Chief of the General Staff told a delegation from the Institute of Higher Studies for National Defense, France (led by General Andre Marte) that the Chinese Army suffered 20,000 killed and wounded in this four-week war.”See page 7, “The Sino-Vietnam War-1979:Case Studies in Limited Wars,” Bharat Rakshak, Monitor, Vol. 3, November-December 2000, by Colonel G.D. Bakshi, VSM.

The 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War was seen by Deng Xiao Peng as justifying his concerns as to the modernization long necessary to bring the People’s Liberation Army up to contemporary standards of modern war.While at the same time, the United States committed itself to refurbish the American armed forces in the post-Vietnam War era.

Addendum:Reported, too, by intelligence sources of the Vietnamese use of chemical weapons to turn back the Chinese incursion, including the use of Botulin bacteria or toxin, supplied, of course, by the Soviet Union.Author Sterling Seagrave wrote in his book Yellow Rain, interviewing American diplomats who related that “a number of terse, cryptic Chinese army radio transmissions, from unit to unit, mentioning coming under chemical attack.”See page 214, Chapter 11, “Dig Tunnels Deep,” Yellow Rain, by Sterling Seagrave.

[19]See page 402, Book Four, “Plan of War,” Chapter VI, (A) “Influence of the Political Object on the Military Object,” On War, by Carl von Clausewitz.

[20See page 140, Chapter 6, “Airborne Armies of the Future,” Airborne Warfare, by Major General James M. Gavin.

[21]See page 5, “Modern World Defined,” A French View of Counterinsurgency, by Roger Trinquier.

[22]See page 278, Chapter XIII, “The Conduct of World War II,” The Conduct of War, 1789-1961, by J.F.C. Fuller.

[23]See pages 108 and 109, Chapter VI, “The American Civil War, 1861-1865,” The Conduct of War, 1789-1961, by J.F.C. Fuller.

[24]To be added here as well, to destroy the enemy’s capability to wage war . . . attack and destroy the enemy’s economy.

[25]See page 87, Article V, “Combat:The Pursuit,” Field Service Regulations, United States Army, 1914.

Bibliography

6 USC 466:Sense of Congress Reaffirming the Continued Importance and Applicability of the Posse Comitatus Act, Text Contains Those Laws in Effect on October 18, 2024, uscode.house.gov/view.xtmi?req=(title:6secton…

Baker, Bonnie, “The Origins of the Posse Comitatus,” www.airuniversity.af.edu/portals/10/ASPJ/joirnals/Chronicles/baker1.pdf

Bakshi, Colonel G.D., VSM, “The Sino-Vietnamese War—1979:Case Studies in Limited Wars,” Bharat Rakshak Monitor, Vol. 3 (3), November 2000.Republished with permission by Lancer Publications, Indian Defense Review, Vol. 14 (2), July-September 2000.

Burdett, Major General Allen M., Jr., “The Army Aviation Requirements for the ‘70s,” Army Aviation, Army Aviation Publications, Inc., Westport, Ct., March 31, 1970.

Clausewitz, Carl von, On War, Penguin Books, Middlesex, England, 1968.Originally published 1832, Vom Kriege.

Corum, Dr. James S., “The Myth of Air Control, Reassessing the History,” Aerospace Power Journal, Winter 2000.www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj00/win00/corum.htm

Forsythe, Lieutenant General George I., “Aviation in the ‘70s,” Army Aviation, Vol. 19, No. 8, Army Aviation Publications, Inc., Westport, Ct., August 1970.

Fuller, J.F.C., The Conduct of War, 1789-1961, Da Capo Press, New York, NY., 1961.

Gavin, Major General James M., Airborne Warfare, The Battery Press, Inc., Nashville, Tennessee, 1980.

Lenczowski, George, American Presidents And the Middle East, Duke University Press, Durham and London, 1990.

Maddox, Brigadier General William J., Jr., Director of Army Aviation, OACSFOR, DA, Army Aviation, Vol. 20, No. 2, Army Aviation Publications, Inc., Westport, Ct., February 15, 1971.

Parsons, Captain David Willard, USAF, “British Air Control:A Model Application of Air Power in Low-Intensity Conflict?” Airpower Journal, Summer 1994.www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj94/sum94/parsons.html

Posse Comitatus Act, 1878, Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 1385, liveman.sdsu.edu/docs/1878PosseComitatusAct.pdf

Seagrave, Sterling, Yellow Rain:A Journey Through the Terror of Chemical Warfare, M. Evans and Company, Inc., New York, New York, 1981.

Shlaim, Avi, War and Peace in the Middle East, Penguin Books, New York, New York, 1995.

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 1954, 2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/lw/88315.htm

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 1954, Milestones:1953-1960, Office of the Historian, Department of State, United States of America, history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960’seato

“The Pursuit,” Field Regulations, United States Army, 1914, Changes No. 7, The Collegiate Press, George Banta Publishing Company, Menasha, Wisconsin, August 18, 1917.

Trinquier, Roger, Modern Warfare:A French View of Counterinsurgency, Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1985.Originally published in Great Britain, 1964, Pall Mall Ltd., London, England.

It is great to be back into the rhythm of the events that showcase Army Aviation’s essential capabilities, and your Association’s contribution to enabling the pillars of Networking, Voice, Recognition and Support.

First was the Association of the United States Army Hot Topic on Aviation, which occurred in early September at AUSA Headquarters in Arlington VA. Bill Harris, our Executive Director, and I were invited to participate in this important event; I was honored to chair the opening panel on “Army Aviation in the Air-Ground Littoral of 2040,” while Bill introduced all the day’s speakers and panels. Our Branch Chief MG Clair Gill, BG Cain Baker, our Future Vertical Lift Cross-Functional Team director, BG David Phillips, Program Executive Officer Aviation, GEN JD Thurman, Ret. (our AAAA Senior Executive Associates Chair), and COL Tom Von Eschenbach, Ret., Senior Vice President for Air and Space Systems, Parry Labs, were exceptional in their articulation of the criticality of Army Aviation capabilities and their contributions to the future fight. Our Branch is simply in great hands with not only our incredible Aviation General Officer Steering Group leaders, but also with our exceptional Industry Partner leaders that are so committed to the Branch.

At the end of September, we hosted the AAAA Army Aviation Survivability Forum in Huntsville. It was a dynamic event with great questions being raised for the speakers and panel from the many Aviation Mission Survivability Officers (AMSO) in attendance. A huge thanks to COL Brock Zimmerman, Project Manager Aircraft Survivability Equipment, and our Program Executive Officer for Intelligence, Electronic Warfare and Sensors, BG Ed Barker, whose support ensured the attendance and participation of unit AMSOs from all components for both the classified and unclassified Forum sessions. Industry feedback was also critical and reinforced how your AAAA is a vital enabler and platform for lateral discussions among the entire Aviation community to explore solutions that have a real-world impact for our force.

As always, a key highlight of the Forum was the recognition of our outstanding awardees both on stage and at the Awardee Dinner the night before the presentations. We are so fortunate to have these great Soldiers in our formations. See page 44 for photos and a more detailed wrap up of the event.

Finally, we will have held our Senior Executive Associates Dinner which occurs after the conclusion of the Association of the United States Army’s Annual Meeting and Conference, in mid-October. This is the group of our retired, non-Aviation Flag Officers, who volunteer their time to help generate understanding of Army Aviation capabilities, priorities, and challenges outside of the Army Aviation community. We were fortunate indeed to have had Army Chief of Staff, GEN Randy George and the Aviation General Officer Steering Committee (A-GOSC) join us again this year at that dinner.

In support of our AAAA Support pillar, remember that the Scholarship Foundation’s application process is now open. See the website for application process details quad-a.org/scholarship.  This incredible program grants over $600,000 each year to our Soldiers and Families for higher education. It is certainly one of our greatest AAAA membership benefits.

And remember, the Cribbins Readiness Conference is coming up in Huntsville, AL, in November and the Luther G. Jones Army Aviation Depot Forum in December in Corpus Christi, TX. We hope to see you there!

MG Walt Davis, U.S. Army Retired
36th President, AAAA
walt.davis@quad-a.org

U.S. Army PEO Aviation Showcases Future Long Range Assault Aircraft to 25th Combat Aviation Brigade

WHEELER ARMY AIRFIELD, Hawaii – The U.S. Army’s Future Long Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA) is set to deliver a transformational capability for ground forces and aircrews alike. With enhanced speed and improved range, FLRAA accomplishes the mission twice as far and twice as fast, creating multiple dilemmas for the enemy, expanding the depth of the battlefield and extending the reach of air assault missions. Its design allows for rapid exploitation of freedom of maneuver, enabling decentralized operations across vast distances. With unmatched reach and standoff capabilities, FLRAA will ensure mission success through tactical maneuvering at both operational and strategic levels. As the Army transforms to meet an uncertain future, FLRAA is one of the many modernized capabilities paving the way for the Army of 2030 and beyond.

FLRAA Mockup Demonstrated to the 25th Combat Aviation Brigade

In line with this vision, U.S. Army PEO Aviation recently visited the 25th Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) at Wheeler Army Airfield, Hawaii, to showcase a mockup of the FLRAA cabin. The event provided a unique opportunity for the 25th CAB’s flight crews to experience the cutting-edge platform and offer critical aviation-based feedback on the aircraft’s design and functionality. On site for the demonstrations was Jason P. Lucas, Deputy Project Manager for the FLRAA. Lucas expressed his enthusiasm for the project, saying “FLRAA is really the Army’s next generation utility and assault aircraft. We’re really focused on doing two key things: twice as far and twice as fast.”

Augmented Reality Brings FLRAA to Life

The centerpiece of the showcase was a FLRAA cabin mockup, equipped with augmented reality (AR) glasses that superimposed a complete virtual model of the aircraft over the physical mockup. This immersive technology allowed pilots and flight crews to visualize the full scope of the FLRAA’s capabilities, from its seating configuration and controls to its storage and maneuverability within the cabin.

Soldiers Provide Critical Feedback

Multiple flight crews from the 25th CAB, as well as infantry soldiers from 3rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) cycled through the mockup, providing valuable insight on everything from ergonomic design to mission-based functionality. The interactive experience gave crews the chance to walk through air assault scenarios and adapt their feedback in real-time using the AR technology.

25th Infantry Division light fighter infantry soldiers expressed enthusiasm for the opportunity to test out the FLRAA’s features. “This exercise is important for my soldiers.” said Sgt. 1st Class Jack N. Young, a platoon sergeant with 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment, 3rd IBCT. “By the time this aircraft is fully fielded, my soldiers who are testing this today will be leaders, and for them to have the opportunity down the road to say that they personally assisted with the development of this aircraft that will have revolutionized air assault operations is truly just phenomenal.”

Soldier Input Shapes the Future of FLRAA

PEO Aviation representatives noted that the input from experienced flight crews like those in the 25th CAB is vital for refining the FLRAA platform. “I think the soldiers who tested the platform today really appreciate that tilt rotor technology is the necessary technology to get us to that twice as far, twice as fast aspect of an assault aircraft” said Col. Jeffrey A. Poquette, FLRAA Project Manager. “The other thing that I think they (flight crews) truly appreciate is the ability to enhance the features that matter to them. What they think about is where are the controls, are they easy to get to, can they get in and out of their seats quickly, can they get off the aircraft without tripping and falling. So, this soldier evaluation is really about seat configuration and the ergonomics of getting off the aircraft and on the aircraft as quickly as possible in a tactical environment.”

FLRAA and the Future of Army Aviation in the Indo-Pacific

As the Army continues to modernize its aviation fleet, events like this underscore the importance of collaboration between developers and the warfighters who will employ the technology in future conflicts. The feedback from the 25th CAB will play a crucial role in ensuring that the FLRAA platform is mission-ready, providing the Army with the speed, range, and operational flexibility needed to succeed in a rapidly evolving battlespace. Following the visit, Col. Matthew J. Scher, commander of the 25th Combat Aviation Brigade, conveyed his excitement for the new platform and his appreciation towards the team who brought it all the way to Hawaii for the demonstration, saying “We are excited to be able to provide feedback into the design of the Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA) and grateful to the Future Vertical Lift Cross-Functional Team (FVL CFT) and PEO Aviation for inviting us to participate.” Scher went on to indicate that this new platform possesses special relevance to the Indo-Pacific: “This platform is ideally suited for Army aviation operations in the Pacific Theater, where vertical lift with extended range and speed provides a critical capability to our land forces, particularly in operations along island chains and archipelagos.”

The U.S. Army PEO Aviation’s visit to the 25th Combat Aviation Brigade provided an invaluable opportunity for soldiers to engage directly with the FLRAA platform and offer critical feedback. The interaction between developers and flight crews underscores the Army’s commitment to ensuring that its next-generation aircraft meets the demands of modern warfare, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. As the Army continues its modernization efforts, the FLRAA will be instrumental in enhancing air assault capabilities and maintaining a tactical advantage in future conflicts.

Special Thanks
The author and the 25th Combat Aviation Brigade would like to extend special thanks to the following organizations for their support and contributions to the FLRAA project:
• DEVCOM Soldier Effectiveness Directorate (SED)
• Redstone Test Center (RTC)
• DEVCOM Analysis Center (DAC)
• Cross Functional Team (CFT)
• Aviation – Capability Development Integration Directorate (CDID)

FLRAA: The Future of Army Aviation is Here.

 

The Army Futures Command’s (AFC) Future Vertical Lift (FVL) Cross-Functional Team (CFT)’s 2024 iteration of the Experimental Demonstration Gateway Event (EDGE) concluded earlier this week after three weeks of experimentation.

EDGE 24 was deliberately smaller in scale than previous iterations of the event and focused on autonomous collaborative behaviors of unmanned aerial systems (UAS), launched effects (LE), and unmanned ground vehicles.

“Our specific experimental objective was learning how launched effect surrogates behave on a network and off a network,” said Brig. Gen. Cain Baker, FVL CFT Director. “Based off a simulated enemy threat array, we allowed the launched effect surrogates to operate on a network and pass information back at extended ranges, then deliberately removed the network to see if the autonomy could continue. We experimented with that very specifically and had a lot of success in the information we captured and the behaviors we saw from platforms from multiple vendors that were out here.”

The behaviors within launched effects provide a decisive advantage to ground commanders, giving them the capability to extend the range of sensing and use machines instead of Soldiers to make first contact with an adversary. The Army is rapidly integrating layered UAS and LE across formations in a combined arms fight that is synchronized with fires and maneuver across phases to penetrate, exploit, and defeat near-peer adversaries in a complex environment.

“We know looking into the future that we are going to be operating in congested airspace: there will be a number of friendly and adversary platforms that will exist in that space,” said Brig. Gen. William Parker, Director of the Air and Missile Defense CFT. “Reducing the cognitive burden on the operator and helping us deconflict what is in the air with respect to friendly and adversary capabilities will go a long way in how we fight that small UAS threat while protecting friendly UAS in that same airspace.”

The FVL CFT sees EDGE providing the Army Futures Command an experimentation and demonstration platform to help deliver the Army of 2030 and design of Army of 2040, and has chosen U.S. Army Yuma Proving Ground (YPG) as its venue for the last two years. The proving ground’s clear, stable air and extremely dry climate combined with an ability to control a large swath of the radio frequency spectrum makes it a desired location for the type of testing EDGE was interested in: counter-unmanned aircraft solutions, extending network access, and flying autonomous and semi-autonomous aircraft. YPG’s wealth of other infrastructure meant for other sectors of the post’s test mission were utilized to support the demonstration, including technical and tactical targets.

“YPG was essential for us to have the simulated threat array to conduct the experiment in at echelon that would replicate an enemy capability that we would potentially face in the future,” said Baker. “YPG has the air space that allows us to operate at the distances we need and the instrumentation to collect the data to inform our requirements from an analytical standpoint.”

YPG’s deep institutional knowledge allowed the participating industry partners to run complex test scenarios each day across three weeks of demonstrations, and the event paid dividends that could inform the Army for years to come. One industry partner exercised autonomous collaboration between an Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) and an Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) through real-time aerial mapping of an urban environment to deliver a recommended route for the UGV to follow. Another successfully executed an automated target hand off between a UAS with a radio frequency sensor and a UAS with an electro optical infrared sensor. The demonstration also saw a long-range data communications relay of over 250 miles to execute a strike from a surrogate lethal long range launched effect.

“We’re seeing autonomy advance year after year when we do events like EDGE and Project Convergence,” said Baker. “If we operate these effects en masse, how do we offload the requirements for operators to control from one controller to one vehicle versus one controller for multiple vehicles? How do we share information about the battlefield rapidly and accurately, and how do we do that at extended ranges so crews can maximize the mission set they’re faced with?”

California Army National Guard Soldiers from Company B, 1-126th Aviation Regiment deploy CH-47 Chinook helicopters to assist in the Line Fire response in the San Bernardino Mountains, California, on Sept. 15, 2024. With over 6,000 personnel on the ground, the Chinooks conduct water drops and troop transport, playing a vital role in protecting threatened communities as the fire continues to burn over 39,100 acres. (U.S. Army National Guard Video by Sgt. Joaquin D. Vasquez-Duran)

A Tennessee National Guard UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter crew chief, from Knoxville’s 1-230th Assault Helicopter Battalion, monitors the wildfires in the Great Smoky Mountains National Park, August 27.

U.S. Army Soldiers of the Arizona National Guard (AZNG) guide tourists into a UH-60 Blackhawk, August 24, 2024 at the Havasupai Indian Reservation.

The Arizona Department of Emergency and Military Affairs provided UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter support to evacuate 104 tourist and tribal members out of the canyon after flood waters impacted the Havasupai community and tourists visiting the Havasupai Falls. (U.S. Army photo by Maj. Erin Hannigan)

Looking Back, October 2024
By Mark Albertson

Remembering the Air Observation Post Fliers

October 1978, Air Observation Post fliers held a reunion at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. During World War II, it was the Air OPs who planted that seed for what would later become Army Aviation.

Commander was Colonel (later brigadier general) William Wallace Ford. An artilleryman who became a flier, Ford was the first Director of Air Training and formed the Army’s first Air Observation Post for the Field Artillery. He will be inducted into the Army Aviation Hall of Fame in 1975, as being representative of the Pre-1942 Period. He will be followed into the Hall of Fame by other members of the Air Observation Post.

Resurrected from the May 31, 1979 issue of Army Aviation, is a roster of photos of the Air OPs, at Fort Sill, 1942. Such is a living record of the origins of Army Aviation. Click on a photo to enlarge.

 

Sources:

• Pages 25, 27, 29, 30, 31 & 33, Army Aviation, Vol. 28, No. 5, May 31, 1979.
• Army Aviation Hall of Fame, “Inductees,” William Wallace Ford.