Story by Staff Sgt. Seth LaCount

JOINT BASE ELMENDORF-RICHARDSON, Alaska —During the culminating training event of exercise Special Operation Forces Arctic Medic 2025, Alaska Army National Guard aviators assigned to Golf Company, 2nd Battalion, 211th General Support Aviation Battalion landed a HH-60M Black Hawk helicopter on the platform of an Alaska Railroad rail car that was staged on a bridge above the Chena River, in the vicinity of Fairbanks, Alaska, Feb 20, 2025.

The two-wheel touchdown on a rail car had never been attempted by an AKARNG aviator and was a unique training experience for the entire crew. Dissimilar to runway landings or placing the entire aircraft down in an open space, the narrow rail car platform presented additional risk factors like loose debris and the need to precisely calculate the avenue of approach to hover on the rail car, while ground crews unloaded medical equipment and supplies.

The crew also lowered their critical care flight paramedic Staff Sgt. Steven Gildersleeve successfully onto the train to hoist a patient and medically evacuate them using a state-of-the-art hoist approved Patient Isolation Unit called the Operational Rescue Containment Apparatus, used exclusively by the U.S. Coast Guard. The hoist was executed right on target on the narrow landing strip of the rail car. Members of the USCG participated in the collaborative, medical exercise to field this innovative equipment and demonstrate its use cases.

“I am absolutely inspired by the Alaska National Guard team, their knowledge, professionalism, willingness to solve problems with minimal guidance to plan any given mission,” said Col. Manuel Menendez, Command Surgeon with Special Operations Command North and one of the lead planners for the exercise. “The flight crew that landed on the train was not just good, they were amazing and I’m looking forward to my next trip to Alaska to work with them again soon.”

The concept for a rail car operation was to evaluate how traumatically injured and chemically or biologically contaminated casualties could be moved, following decontamination and initial stabilization, via a hospital train.

Historically, the U.S. and NATO forces utilized hospital trains, and this exercise is an early effort to evaluate how this system of casualty movement could be applied to future large scale combat operations where there would be an overwhelming number of casualties coming back from combat. Recognizing that hospital trains would require enroute care, AKARNG flight surgeon, Maj. Titus Rund and Director of Experimentation worked with SOCNORTH to develop an augmented reality system that could be utilized on a mobile platform in austere locations.

This augmented reality system enabled a paramedic known as a “TeleDelgate” to work under the direction of a “TeleMentor” anesthesiologist, surgeon or other specialist to include documenting care. These “TeleMentors” were located at Brooke Army Medical Center in San Antonio,Texas.

The AR system was able to transmit “TeleDelegate” and casualty vital signs in real-time while the subject matter experts as BAMC provided guidance and supervision for anesthesia and airway management, damage control surgical procedures and intensive care measures to patient aboard the moving train.

TeleMentor monitoring of remote vital signs could someday allow a “TeleMentor” to better guide the “TeleDelegate” and make sure that they are providing the best instruction and feedback in real time which would help ensure that a “TeleDelegate” is not overwhelmed during the assigned task(s) and future research efforts should be evaluated looking at this technology.

In this scenario, a train carrying a simulated casualty who was exposed to a potential biological or radiological agent underwent treatment from an isolated railcar. This necessitated “ambulance backhaul” of medical supplies, Low-Titer O whole Blood and chemical countermeasures be delivered by the helicopter to get to the treatment and containment areas.

The combined air and ground mission bolstered a joint effort between NORTHCOM executed through SOCNORTH, SOCOM, U.S Customs and Border Protection – BORSTAR, the FBI, the U.S. Army, USCG, U.S. Air Force Reserves, AKNG, Alaska Railroad Corporation and University of Alaska Fairbanks Drone Program for all air and ground assets involved. Exercise planners brought the respective branches and agencies’ best equipment and practices to the fight.

The aviators supported the exercise from Feb.18-21 and transported simulated casualties to collection points while providing hoist capabilities to exercise participants. SOFAM 2025 saw some of the nation’s most elite warriors and field surgeons converge on Yukon Training Area near Ft. Wainwright to train on extreme cold weather medical care.

The AKARNG crew included pilot in command Chief Warrant Officer 3 JD Miller, support pilot Chief Warrant Officer 2 David Berg, crew chief Sgt..1st Class Brad Mckenzie, and flight medics Staff Sgt. Steven Gildersleeve and Staff Sgt. Michael Crane.

Miller, the company standardization pilot for the 2-211 GSAB worked with Rund as they prepared for successful mission execution. Berg, who is based out of Juneau, took this opportunity to fly this mission to enhance his core competencies and skills.

“I think a big part of what we brought to the fight here was our depth of experience working in these cold weather conditions and our ability to work with and coordinate with a multitude of different units to include active-duty troops, federal, state and local agencies,” said Berg. “We really want to push that we’re open for business in working with all of our training partners to hone our skillsets and relationships.”

Rund coordinated with the Alaska Railroad Corporation to provide the U.S. Army with railcars for the training event which included the Black Hawk landing, hoisting and enroute testing of the Augmented Reality TeleDelegated system on a moving train.

“We’re honored to be able to serve our communities and military,” said Tom Covington, Director of Safety for the ARRC. “We’ve been able to observe the military’s approach to utilizing these railcars over the course of this exercise and it’s given us insight into how we can improve our cold weather survival capabilities as an organization.”

This medical training and experimentation centered exercise enhanced casualty care and medical evacuation proficiencies with standard, nonstandard and experimental equipment from across the U.S. military and its NATO partner forces. Rund and his team coordinated with exercise leaders to get the AKARNG crew involved and to be part of the next era of warfighting in the Arctic as the SOCNORTH team work to establish medical requirements for operations in arctic or extreme cold environments.

“It’s fantastic being able to work with team leadership like Doc Rund and see the work that he’s put in and the people he’s surrounded himself with to accomplish this,” Berg said. “He talked about this training evolution and told us he sees us having an integral part in it. It’s the way of the future and a good test of expanding our horizons and opportunities for what we can achieve together.”

 

Story by Vanessa Schell

Efforts to increase U.S. Army warfighter capability and repair efficiency in theater were strengthened with the recent inception of an aviation engine repair shop.

Over a year ago, an aviation logistics officer with the 1st Theater Sustainment Command, Chief Warrant Officer 3 Codi Walker, brought forth a plan for an expeditionary engine shop in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility.

This plan was pitched to the 1st TSC commander, Maj. Gen. Eric Shirley, by the Aviation Field Maintenance Directorate at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. The plan was approved and would proceed as a three-phase project.

Helming the project is the 1100th Theater Aviation Support Maintenance Group, a National Guard unit from Edgewood, Maryland, and the 1st TSC forward aviation pillar in theater.

The 1100th worked directly with Department of the Army civilians in Logistics Readiness Center-Alpha, Ainsley Vickers, LRC-A CENTCOM chief, and Valkeith Williams, logistics management specialist.

Col. Jeremy Chiglo, commander, 1100th TASMG, moved from Alabama to Maryland to serve as the Maryland State Aviation Officer, shortly before the unit deployed overseas. He brought with him three Soldiers from Alabama, who also deployed.

“The National Guard has five TASMGs that support both the U.S. Aviation Missile Command and the 1st TSC. The TASMGs rotate through theater every 9 months and all TASMGs share this responsibility,” said Chiglo.

In addition to the Maryland TASMG, there are four throughout the continental U.S.; the 1106th from California, the 1107th from Missouri, 1108th from Mississippi, and the 1109th from Connecticut.

“We’ve been here about four months,” continued Chiglo. “When we first arrived, the engine shop had been conceptualized, there was a plan passed down to us from our predecessors, the 1108th. LRC-A and Chief Walker had secured the budget, as well as the containers.”

The containers are military-owned expandable containers similar to a shipping container, were already present in theater and roughly placed before the 1100th TASMG took command. These containers were acquired and sent by AFMD and came equipped with basic tools for engine repair.

Chiglo shared that, within the force structure of the TASMG, the Soldiers focus on routine and unscheduled aviation maintenance, and the bulk of the engine repair is done by contractors with Amentum, an aviation maintenance company, who are overseen by the DA civilians in LRC-A.

The 1100th were tasked to stand up the shop in four or five months, and they were able to complete it in half the time. “My biggest worry were the technical experts,” said Chiglo. “Once LRC-A secured the Amentum contractors for us, we were able to get the containers lined up and get power to the shop. It took us about a month just to procure the necessary parts.”

The first phase of the project was finalized with the engine shop’s inaugural ribbon-cutting, October 31, 2024. The shop is currently housed in two adjacent SPAMS and services two helicopter engines, the T-701, which seamlessly fits both the AH-64 Apache and UH-60 Black Hawk, and a T-55, for the CH-47 Chinook.

The next two phases include moving to a larger hard structure and acquiring a Modernized Flexible Engine Diagnostic System, a large machine capable of fully testing and verifying engines.

Chiglo explained that although theoretically an engine could be tested and verified by hanging it back on the aircraft, the risk of compromising the safety and readiness of warfighters is too high.

“What we’re doing now is bridging the gap. The contractors will repair the engine, then, as a temporary measure, it will be routed to the Theater Aviation Sustainment Management – OCONUS (Outside Continental U.S.), for a final test run of the engine.”

An MFEDS is not always required to repair an engine back to full functionality, but Chiglo clarified that it could still save valuable time up front by diagnosing the problems. Without an MFEDS, technicians must dismantle an engine for diagnosis before they can begin the repairs, a process that is both timely and costly.

Since opening, the engine shop has already repaired a T-55, which did not require an MFEDS, and has returned it to its aviation unit. The shop is currently awaiting the final part for the cold section of a T-701, before the engine will be sent for testing on the TASM-O’s MFEDS.

“Our goal is to have everything we need here in theater – to fix engines, test them, and return them, while also being fiscally responsible,” concluded Chiglo.

The engine shop ultimately aims to expedite the repair and return of fully functional engines to the warfighter and aviation units, while saving the Department of Defense funds by reducing the expenditure of repair, maintenance, and new equipment.

As a new cornerstone of the Army’s aviation maintenance efforts, the shop plays a crucial role in ensuring readiness of Army aviation capabilities in theater.

Your AAAA National Executive Group, plus Executive Director, Mr. Bill Harris, have just returned from the annual Aviation Leaders Conference at Fort Novosel, AL.

Many thanks to our great Branch Chief, MG Clair Gill, for including the Aviation ‘Gray Beard’ cohort in this really impactful gathering of our Army Aviation leadership teams from all components and organizations. It truly is an invaluable opportunity to engage with our Army and Aviation leaders to understand the current state of the Branch, and importantly the vision for the future. AAAA exists to support the Army Aviation Soldier and family, and the broader Army Aviation community, and it is vital to understand the Branch’s activities, initiatives, and challenges so we can best shape your Association’s efforts, events, and advocacy on behalf of Army Aviation.

Another important feature of the Leaders Conference is the Annual Awards Dinner conducted at the Army Aviation Museum… a timely opportunity to present AAAA “Functional” awards to our outstanding and deserving Aviation Soldiers in the areas of Air Traffic Control, Medicine, Air Sea Rescue and Training, done in conjunction with the LTG Ellis D. Parker ‘Organizational’ awards presented by the Branch Chief. We featured the AAAA Functional award winners in the January issue and will feature the Parker awards in the March issue. It is always such an honor and pleasure to meet and visit with the awardees and their families the evening before the Annual Awards Dinner, at a private awardee dinner we host each year at AAAA Past President BG Rod Wolfe’s country club in Enterprise. There is no doubt that the strength of our Army and Army Aviation is embodied in those soldiers and their families!

Of note, the week prior to the Aviation Conference, our Executive Director and Deputy Director, Bill Harris and Art Agnew, hosted a joint dinner meeting for the boards of the Central Florida Chapter of Orlando (and thanks to our AAAA Vice President for Chapter Activities, Jan Drabczuk) and the Embry Riddle Chapter of Daytona Beach, FL. Bill and Art report out that it was a dynamic discussion ranging from the ROTC Cadets view of recruiting challenges among their peers to emphasis on the “Sacred Trust” between the Aviation Branch and the Troops on the ground. The meeting featured a diverse breadth of experience and perspectives – from combat veterans to ROTC Cadets, civilian industry executives representing aviation simulation and AI capabilities and even a couple of Marines thrown in for good measure. Many actions fell out of the meeting, and we look forward to using these two Chapters (that represent differing demographics) as a sounding board for AAAA initiatives going forward.

Finally, hopefully by now you have made your plans to join us at the AAAA Annual Summit May 14 -16, 2025 at the Gaylord Opryland, Nashville TN. Currently, registrations, exhibit sales, and all other metrics are at really strong levels. The agenda and program(s) are being finalized with our Aviation Branch leadership, and it is certainly shaping up to be another world-class Summit. See you there!

MG Walt Davis, U.S. Army Retired
36th President, AAAA
walt.davis@quad-a.org

Story by Kelly Morris

FORT NOVOSEL, Ala.–The U.S. Army Aviation Center of Excellence announced the winners of the 2024 Lt. Gen. Ellis D. Parker Awards Jan. 29, 2025.

The multi-component Department of the Army level awards, which recognize excellence at the battalion level, were presented during the annual Aviation Senior Leader Forum here.

The award’s namesake is a former Army Aviation branch chief. A true Army Aviation pioneer, Parker provided the vision, the masterful leadership, and the commitment necessary to consolidate and modernize Army Aviation during its formative years.

Parker assumed command shortly after the branch’s formation, and skillfully led a fledgling branch into its rightful place within the Army. As commanding general, Parker consolidated and modernized Army Aviation hardware, doctrine, training and logistics, making possible the Army’s transition from the Cobra helicopter to the Apache.

For the award, Aviation battalions are nominated annually across four categories—Combat Support, Table of Distribution and Allowances, Combat Service Support, and Combat–and are initially boarded against category peers.

They undergo an evaluation against four primary criteria, including safety, leadership, training and maintenance. The winners then compete for the top aviation battalion of the year award.

The 2024 Lt. Gen. Ellis D. Parker Award winners are:
• The Combat Support category, and overall Top Aviation Battalion of the Year winner is 1st Battalion, 214th Aviation Regiment (GSAB),12th Combat Aviation Brigade, V Corps, United States Army Europe.
• The Table of Distribution and Allowances category winner is Special Operations Aviation Training Battalion, U.S. Army Special Operations Aviation Command, Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia.
• The Combat Service Support category winner is 404th Aviation Support Battalion, 4th Combat Aviation Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, Colorado.
• The Combat category winner is 3rd battalion,160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, Fort Campbell, Kentucky.

Maj. Gen. Clair A. Gill, AVCOE and Fort Novosel commanding general, who serves as the U.S. Army Aviation branch chief, lauded the individuals and organizations who have excelled across the Army Aviation enterprise.

“These exemplars embody the culture of what we all emulate and champion to make our Army the decisive land force to defeat tyranny from oppressors,” Gill said.

“It’s on all of us to hone that warfighting culture in our branch. We owe it to our Soldiers to train them to be resilient, proficient, unrelenting and ready to fight on today’s battlefield.”

“I want to congratulate the award recipients and reaffirm that the actions that earned you this recognition are the mettle that enables Army Aviation to remain the decisive element of our combined arms team, ready to meet tomorrow’s challenges, today,” he said.

For more information about Lt. Gen. Ellis D. Parker and the awards process visit https://home.army.mil/novosel/usaace/edpaward .

Story by Kelly Morris

FORT NOVOSEL, Ala.–Aviation leaders across all Army components gathered at the home of Army Aviation at Fort Novosel, Ala., to focus on current and future operations, training and leader development Jan. 28-30.

With a theme of “Army Aviation–Ready to Meet Tomorrow’s Challenges Today,” the event included a three-day lineup of guest speakers and breakout working group sessions.

Maj. Gen. Clair A. Gill, Army Aviation branch chief, said Army aviation must prepare to defeat an enemy that is evolving at the rapid pace of technology and also maintain the readiness to be able to “fight and win tonight.”

“We have to have a sense of urgency and purpose about our collective readiness,” Gill said. “We have to adapt to the challenges of the future, while we are tethered to the reality of the here and now.”

History repeats itself, and Gill said the branch has been here before:

“We’ve seen belligerent nations and non-state actors, we’ve weathered changing administrations and inconsistent funding, and we’ve pushed through recruiting challenges as the economy has ebbed and flowed,” he said.

“So we find ourselves in another interwar period again. Once again our Army is in transition–transformation, in fact. We have clear guidance from our leadership to enhance warfighting readiness, deliver combat ready formations, transform at scale/pace, and continue to foster our profession of arms” as the Army shifts its focus to Large Scale Combat Operations, he explained.

Key topics included the changing nature of modern warfare, including drones, human-machine integration, additive manufacturing, machine learning, autonomous systems, AI-enabled maintenance conditions, resilient networks, rotorcraft with an open architecture and modularity.

“Our ‘Big Five’ is rapidly being fielded across the entirety of our Army right now,” he said. “The Future Long Range Assault Aircraft is bringing a generational leap forward in range and speed we haven’t seen in our lifetime. Army Aviation is the proponent for integrating UAS at every echelon while also serving as the trail boss for synchronizing airspace management in a complex operating environment.”

Dependence on legacy systems cannot be neglected though.

“We will always fight with what we have,” he said.

This makes the Army’s partnership with industry even more vital.

“Not only must our industry partners provide the technology for the future, they also must ensure that our legacy systems are sustained and can keep pace to fight and win today,” he said.

He also said the leaders at the event shared the same passion “for how we leverage the talent that emulates from training right here on Fort Novosel, and graduates to our warfighting formations to create war-winning advantage for our Army and the Joint Force.”

In his update about the state of the branch, Gill covered topics including flight school, unit aircrew experience, aviation and transformation, unmanned aviation, airspace, safety trends, professional military discourse and aviation warfighter culture.

Gen. Gary M. Brito, who commands U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, greeted industry partners, legacy leaders, experts and Army aviation leaders, and spoke about TRADOC’s ongoing efforts to help brigade commanders in the field to build warfighting readiness as they continue to focus on transformation.

“Aviation has always been extremely relevant,” he said. “I sense it’s going to be even more relevant as we transition…and maintain overmatch in LSCO and MDO. Fires, sensor to shooter, support to casualty evacuation, deliver of our troops, long range fires, you name it. That’s no different than what we’ve done before, but it speaks to the relevance (as we transform) the types of aircraft and the way we train.”

This includes adapting Basic Combat Training and Advanced Individual Training, to ensure they are learning what they need in the future, which includes understanding what it means to be a member of a cohesive team and squad.

As to the speed of institutional transformation to accommodate commanders’ warfighting readiness, Brito said it’s not perfect but it will enable commanders to train their forces and meet the warfighting demands that the Chief of Staff of the Army has laid out in his Army priorities.

Participants heard from Army aviation branch senior leaders and experts, the director of Army Aviation, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff G-3/5/7; Program Executive Office for Aviation; Army Futures Command including the Future Vertical Lift Cross Functional Team; U.S. Army Combat Readiness Center; and the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command.

The forum included multiple scheduled breakout working group sessions focused on a variety of topics including mission command, extending operational reach, combat aviation brigade as division reconnaissance, and aviation sustainment.

Gill said the feedback from the working group sessions will feed into how he envisions the future of the branch.

Looking Back, March 2025
By Mark Albertson

Putting the House in Order
Part V: TRENDS AIRPOWER

“Close Air Support:  Experience of three decades has changed the concept and practice of close air support.  In some advanced forces, including those of the U.S. aircraft are dedicated to the support of the maneuver arms in recognition of the fact that the battlefield will provide an abundance of targets that can be destroyed by close air support.

“US tactical aircraft are far more powerful than those of 1945.  The USAAF P-47 of WWII, for instance, could fly 100 miles to a target, stay for less than half an hour, deliver .50 caliber machine gun fire and two 250 pound bombs, and return to its base.  Today, the USAF A-10 carries 30 times as much ordnance—about 16,000 pounds of cannon ammunition, bombs and missiles.  The A-10 can also fly to a target 250 miles from home base, monitor the target areas for as much as two hours, deliver its ordnance, and return.  In addition, the ordnance itself is far more lethal.  The GAU-8 Gatling Gun in the A-10 for example fires a 1.5 pound projectile capable of destroying tanks, armored personnel carriers, and other armored targets.  The GAU-8 is 7 times more lethal than the conventional 20 mm gun and for the first time combines the accuracy and flexibility of a gun with the true tank-killing capability.

“Modern Air Force tactical aircraft carry a variety of ordnance including guided and unguided bombs and missiles.  Guided bombs, those with electronic steering, and guided missiles, such as the Maverick, can achieve high probability of hit and kill.  Operational tests clearly demonstrate the effectiveness of the most modern fighters against tanks.  Moreover, both guided missiles and guided bombs provide standoff capabilities which combine their greatly increased accuracy with sharply reduced exposure of the attacker to opposing air defenses.

“Modern tactical aircraft with improved ordnance are now considered components of the Army/Air Force combined arms team.  In addition to close air support missions for the ground units, the aircraft today permits rapid development of destructive force beyond the immediate battlefield to deep-lying targets.”

* * * * *

“TRENDS:  ARMY AIRCRAFT”[2]

“Firepower:  The high-mobility and armor-killing capability of attack helicopters makes them unique to the battlefield.  Their weapons systems are capable of defeating the entire spectrum of battlefield targets.  Ongoing development of the advanced attack helicopter (AAH) incudes an advanced fire control system to provide extended range target acquisition and engagement and a laser HELLFIRE missile system which will have commonality with cannon-launched guided munitions and USAF/Navy missiles and bombs.  In addition, product improvement of the existing 2.75-inch aerial rocket and the introduction of the 30 mm cannon will further enhance the staying and killing capability of the attack helicopter.  These improvements will spell greater accuracy against point and area targets on the future battlefield.”

* * * * *

“AERIAL vs. GROUND RANGES”

“Attack helicopters can fire at extended ranges more often than their ground counterparts since they can rise above the mask to increase both target acquisition and firing range.  The difference of only 5 feet in elevation can convert an 800 meter shot on the ground to a 3,000 meter kill from the air.

“Mobility:  Firepower and mobility are inseparable.  By increasing the mobility of ground forces are of influence.  Examples of increased mobility include moving ground firing units and air assaulting maneuver forces.  When speed is essential, distances great, and terrain about the battlefield restrictive, air assault forces make a significant contribution toward winning the battle.

“Intelligence, Command and Control:  To win battles, awareness of enemy capabilities and intentions is a prerequisite.  Intelligence-gathering aircraft, to include air cavalry, provide a source for this essential information.  Observation helicopters can provide commanders an aerial look at terrain on which the battle may take place so that they may more rapidly evaluate and plan the effective use of the combined arms team and directly influence the flow of the battle.

“Combat Service Support:  Modern forces with their unprecedented mobility and complex equipment consume vast quantities of supplies.  Therefore, a highly responsive, yet flexible, system is necessary and is indispensable.  One medium lift helicopter, for example, can carry almost two times the load of a 5-ton truck, five times as fast.  Further, aerial resupply is not affected by road traffic ability or congestion.  Using external loads makes loading and unloading almost instantaneous at the point of need.  Responsive logistics lighten the basic combat loads of maneuver units and increase their mobility.”

* * * * *

Endgame Toward Branchhood

This work consisting of five installments merely scratched the surface in relating that decade of transformation, 1973-1983, as the Nation attempted to bounce back from an embarrassing, yet profound political defeat in Southeast Asia.  Damage control so as to maintain that coveted position as the globe’s ranking power must be pursued with intelligence and purpose.  British defeats at Saratoga in 1777 to an army hardly of world class standards and, again later, early 1942 with the fall of Fortress Singapore to the Japanese, stand as examples of the long-term decline of the British Empire.

In effort to prevent such a protracted decay from occurring, required the Army to shift its focus, from that of counterinsurgency to conventional war; and this necessitated acclimating the ground forces to the resulting political, economic, technological and strategic realities of the period in question.

Officers of the 1970s who sought to prepare the Army for the post-Vietnam War era are to be held in good stead.  To start with, they were not seeking to fight the next war like the last war.  In this they were following in the footsteps of such astute general officers as Lieutenant General Roy S. Geiger of the Marine Corps and Major General James M. Gavin of the United States Army.  They were among those who thoroughly understood the game-changing nature of atomic weaponry following Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  Du Puy, Starry and Gorman, then, were among those revisiting the post-Korean War era, to not only maintain the Army’s stock-in-trade, conventional warfare, but in a nuclear environment and doing so with a reduced force; and this required an concerted reliance on the technological advantage that would provide the post-Vietnam army the ability to be mobile, but at the same time, effect grievous damage on any opponent encountered.

Such was the success of Genghis Khan and his Mongol Army:  Effective use of mobility—the Mongols’ stock-in-trade—which was second to none.  Superb generalship; and that talent to adapt to ever-changing situations and use of new or even unfamiliar technologies.  Indeed, this was the U.S. Army in 1973-1983.  For instance, the UH-1 Huey, which proved a workhorse in Southeast Asia, was viewed as lacking in the technologically oriented new Army and was going to be eventually replaced by the UH-60 Black Hawk.  The AH-1 Cobra, the Army’s frontline attack helicopter, would be eventually overtaken by a Cadillac known as the AH-64 Apache.  Weaponry would be updated while new types came off the drawing boards.  Such as the 2.75” rocket which was updated and improved and, the HELLFIRE missile which would provide attack helicopters with a lethal punch, are among the examples offered here.

Like the United States Army itself, Army Aviation had to be transformed for the post-Vietnam War era.  Provides a better understanding of the acceptance of Army Aviation; and this despite the persistence of the doubters and detractors.

But in the analysis, it was not merely an acceptance, but the willingness to utilize the advantages posed by the near limitless expanse of the Third Dimension for success on the battlefield for the infantry, armor, artillery, medical evacuation, observation, reconnaissance, intelligence collection. . .   Though, of course, differences of opinion would abound with regards to organization and control of Army Aviation and its assets, both human and material.

Same argument evolved during the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s.  Those in the Army Air Corps and later the Army Air Forces who saw strategic bombing as that ticket to independence from the Army as opposed to the Army Ground Forces who wished to maintain control for that assurance of support for the foot soldier.  But airpower was becoming too sophisticated for the ground force officers.  Airpower was becoming a specialty that only those involved in its implementation could fully comprehend and control.  So, following World War II, National Security Act 1947 saw to the divorce of airpower from the Army which became the United States Air Force.

What happened in 1947 has an historical parallel in 1983.  Army Aviation became a separate entity within the United States Army’s masthead of branches.  A result any savvy individual could have made book on, when in viewing that seed planted by William Wallace Ford in 1942 known as the Air Observation Post.  For in forty-one years, Army Aviation developed within a progression both fascinating and innovative, and both in peacetime and in war.  From the L-4 Cub to the AH-64 Apache, from directing artillery fire to becoming the tactical air branch of the United States Army, such was the path to branchhood emblematic and required with the continuing technological evolution and sophistication in war.  And owing to Man’s penchant for conflict, the aforementioned progression was both certain and perpetual.

Endnotes

[1]  See pages 2-20 and 2-21, Operations, FM 100-5.

[2]  See pages 2-21 and 2-22, Operations, FM 100-5.

Bibliography

[1]  Army Aviation:  Cub to Comanche, Army Aviation Publications, Inc., Westport, Ct., 1992.

[2]  Duval, Geoff, Republic P-47 Thunderbolt, Described, Part I, Series I, No. 8, Technical Manual, Kookaburra Technical Publications, Dandenong, Victoria, Australia, 1969.

[3]  Munson, Kenneth, Aircraft of World War II, Doubleday & Company, Inc., and prited in Great Britain by Crampton & Sons, Ltd., Sawston, Cambridge, 1968.  First published by Ian Allen, 1962.

[4]  Operations, FM 100-5, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1 July 1976.

[5]  U.S. Air Force Fact Sheet Display, “A-10C Thunderbolt,” www.af,mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article…

Story by Christopher Hurd

WASHINGTON — Almost seven years into his Army aviation career and Capt. Phillip C. Fluke, AH-64 Apache pilot, was looking for a new assignment last year following his time with the 1st Combat Aviation Brigade.

“I really wanted something different, intellectually challenging and stimulating,” he said.

He said his unit leadership at the 601st Aviation Support Battalion, thought he would be a good candidate to support the Harding Project, a chief of staff of the Army initiative started in 2023 to renew the service’s professional publications.

The opportunity, a Harding Fellowship, would allow Fluke to serve as an editor for Aviation Digest and make an impact by spreading Soldiers’ ideas in the aviation community.

“I think some people [in the Army] think they don’t have a way of making their voice heard about topics that impact them professionally,” he explained. The journals are a way of offering solutions and making others aware of new tactics and technologies that may make their jobs easier.

The Army selected Fluke and several other Soldiers as the first group of Harding Fellows. Each is assigned to a center of excellence, serving as editor on their respective branch journals for two years.

There are 17 different publications: Special Warfare, Army Sustainment, Military Police, Engineer, Chemical, Infantry, Air Defense Artillery, Armor, Field Artillery, Association of Army Dentistry, U.S. Army Chaplain Corps Journal, Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, Applied Language Learning, The Army Lawyer, The Medical Journal, Army Communicator and Aviation Digest.

Shortly after arriving at the Aviation Center of Excellence at Fort Novosel, Alabama, last summer, Fluke joined his fellow editors for a job training workshop in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The group worked on learning their new roles.

In the months that followed, the Soldiers routinely held group discussions with the Harding Project director and the deputy director of the Army University Press to get a better understanding of how to move the modernization project forward.

“For the first cohort, it’s been more of a learn-as-you-go,” Fluke said. “I enjoy the job; it’s a lot of problem-solving you wouldn’t normally encounter in the day-to-day force.”

Those problems include increasing readership of the journals and encouraging Soldiers, Army civilians, and contractors to contribute by writing and submitting their ideas for articles.

“Their thoughts, perspectives, and ideas don’t do a lot of good if no one has access to them,” he said. “By contributing, hopefully, we can move the knowledge base across the Army forward.”

To start that push, the Army moved each journal online to a centralized website called Line of Departure. Here, people from across the service have access to articles from every branch publication.

The Harding Project also started a noncommissioned officer journal in October called Muddy Boots and is working on podcasts and audio articles. These changes are part of the project’s modernization initiative to bring the journals into the future and create a tool for information sharing amongst Army personnel.

“I hope by the time I leave this assignment the Aviation Digest serves as the primary outlet for discussing important topics,” Fluke said. “I also want the community to weigh in, so we can figure out problems together and make the digest a vehicle for change in the Army aviation branch.”

Anyone wishing to submit an article can contact the editor for their respective branch journal. Their information is available on the journal’s Line of Departure website.

Last month, the Army announced the selection of the second group of Harding Fellows. They will be the first cohort to attend a year-long accelerated master’s degree program for journalism and mass communications at the University of Kansas before serving as editors-in-chief for their branch journals.

Story by Brooke Nevins

FORT CARSON, Colo. — In a recent exercise involving U.S. Army Chinook and Black Hawk helicopters, the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command’s 1st Space Brigade, 4th Infantry Division Combat Aviation Brigade and U.S. Marine Corps Forces Space Command demonstrated rapid deployment of personnel and tactical space systems to provide close space support on the battlefield.

Soldiers with 18th Space Control Company, 1st Space Battalion, conducted the joint air assault and medevac training at Fort Carson on Jan. 31 to validate expeditionary deployment and delivery methods of Army space forces and equipment. Capt. Anthony Portuesi, 18th Space Company officer-in-charge, organized and led the exercise.

The 18th Space Control Company supports Army and joint force commanders by deploying platoons and crews into positions of advantage to seize and retain key terrain in the electromagnetic spectrum. These platoons deploy on land to monitor friendly satellite communications and report on sources of electromagnetic interference.

More than two dozen Soldiers and two MARFORSPACE Marines practiced loading and unloading a CH-47 Chinook helicopter before being flown to a landing zone near compound buildings, where they received lessons on area reconnaissance. Following the transport of troops, a second Chinook carried a small form factor kit, the tactical vehicle used to move the kit, and its crew to the landing zone.

“As a space control company, we are exercising our proficiency to conduct rapid deployment into a theater with our space-enabled assets,” said Capt. Daniel McGee, 18th Space Control Company. “It’s important for our space operators to understand the bigger picture in how Army Space contributes to the maneuver force. We are not directly supporting maneuver battalions or brigades, but really several corps within a field Army or a larger element in the corps’ close and deep fight. This air assault mainly focused on our ability to conduct an area reconnaissance, electromagnetic reconnaissance and forward observation, and a site survey for follow-on space control operations.”

Though not the first time 18th Space Control Company has partnered with 4th Infantry Division Combat Aviation Brigade – the two units conducted an air assault and medevac training using UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters in May 2024 – it was the company’s first exercise in deploying its tactical vehicle and small form factor system via rotary-wing assets.

Such training is an example of efforts to further integrate space capabilities with more expeditionary special operations forces units, joint forces like MARFORSPACE, or adjacent aviation units within the 4th Infantry Division on Fort Carson to enhance those partnerships’ ability to enable movement and maneuver of the joint force and allow space Soldiers deeper physical access into austere operating environments.

“This was my first training mission at the company,” Spc. Ireshia Paige said. “It was interesting working with service members of different branches and mission sets in a tactical environment. I was tasked with calling in a nine line to retrieve an urgent casualty, which was made to feel accurate to a real-life scenario.”

Spc. Fernando Barroso said the hands-on training in safely boarding and exiting aircraft, securing a casualty in a stretcher to prepare for air evacuation and properly hoisting the casualty to the Black Hawk “instilled a strong sense of confidence” in his operational capabilities.

“Beyond enhancing my technical proficiency, this training underscored the vital importance of teamwork, precision, and decisive action in high-pressure environments,” Barroso said. “As a future sergeant, I will leverage these capabilities to train and mentor the next generation of Soldiers, ensuring they are well-prepared for air assault operations. By passing on these lessons, I will contribute to the effectiveness of individual Soldiers and strengthen the overall readiness of the unit. This training has not only enhanced my confidence but has also deepened my motivation to continue developing as a Soldier.”

Looking Back, February 2025
By Mark Albertson

Putting the House in Order
Part IV: The Helicopter and Conventional War

The makeover of Army Aviation in the wake of the Second Indochina War was actually a continuation of a process that had been ongoing during the 1950s; when the U.S. Army, seeking to make itself useful on the nuclear battlefield of Europe, attempted the use of light aircraft and helicopters to shuttle ground troops to and from various quarters of the battlefield; along the lines of the Marine Corps with the Vertical Assault Concept, but which unlike the Army, was acclimating amphibious warfare to the nuclear age.

But the Army’s effort in Europe was interrupted by President John F. Kennedy’s military doctrine of Flexible Response; to which was sought a more balanced military response to pursuing the Nation’s national interests.  So for twelve years the Army was focused on a counterinsurgency/jungle warfare effort in Southeast Asia.  Then by 1973, the Army had to do a 180-degree turn, back to conventional warfare following Vietnam.  In addition to the fact that Army Aviation, like the rest of the armed forces, were now going to have to pay for the political failures of Vietnam and learn to operate in a fiscal environment of, Less is More.

But with the focus on the conventional mode of warfare, aircraft that perhaps proved effective in Vietnam would have to be replaced; and/or, new tactics and modes of operation so as to operate in environments other than the jungle.  And for this, the Army will again consult the lessons available from the Yom Kippur War.  For instance, the Sinai front in the south, . . .

“. . . the Egyptians began the war with three armies of which the Second and Third Armies would be deployed for the operation.  Under the command of Lieutenant General Saad El Shazli, the Egyptian Army forces which were employed in the crossing included 5 infantry divisions, 2 mechanized and 2 armored divisions and 9 separate brigades.  Altogether, the Egyptian Army had approximately 1,500 tanks committed to the operation.  In addition, having experienced the ability of the Israeli Air Force to provide overwhelming close air support and battle interdiction, the Egyptians assembled over 200 batteries of SA-2, SA-3 and SA-6 surface-to-air missiles to provide an integrated air defense umbrella over the theater.  The ADA umbrella was intended to deny the Israeli Air Force (IAF) the air supremacy which had been a critical element of Israeli victory in the 1967 war; and which the Egyptians had identified as the single greatest threat to a surprise crossing of the canal.”[1]

General Hamilton H. Howze referred to the above with his viewpoints on Army Aviation, as it prepared to continue its existence in the post-Second Indochina War era:

“Right after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, General Paled, the Chief-of-Staff of the Israeli Air Force, was quoted by unbelievers[2] as saying that the helicopter could not be employed at the forward edge of the battle of the Suez Canal.  No doubt he was right—neither could any kind of aircraft, including fighters.  In the extremely intense anti-aircraft environment that prevailed on that very short front, but which would not have prevailed had the front been moved a few miles to the east or west, as it was about to do when the ceasefire came.

“Shortly after the war, General Paled came to the United States.  Why?  To buy helicopters, particularly, Cobras, for the Israeli Air Force.”[3}

For the United States, though, “The extensive combat experience of Vietnam does not ‘prove’ the effectiveness of the weapons helo in Europe.  The biggest area of doubt, of course, is vulnerability.  This being so, it is probably a good idea to face up to the matter at once.”[4] To which he continues . . .

. . . “In Vietnam the prime threat to the helicopter, armed or unarmed, was the fire of enemy small arms, and this I think would be true in Europe.  Undoubtedly, some helicopters will fall prey to larger enemy weapons, but proper helo tactics will keep machines very low in the nap of the earth, beneath enemy radar, and in the field of view of very few gunners at any given time.  And since the helicopter will usually operate only against the outside edges of the enemy array of forces, it will not be visible to the crews of the heavier aircraft weapons.”[5]

Howze offered as well the maneuverability of the helicopter, its ability to operate close to the ground, fire and move.  The helicopter, then, can provide a challenging target for enemy gunners.  And he states, “The proximity timer fuse won’t work in flat trajectory direct fire, for it will explode the projectile prematurely.”[6] But the helicopter in Europe would be working in concert with the tank.

“There is nothing abnormal in any army fighting vehicle which does not, in ones and twos, penetrate an enemy position.  Even tanks penetrate only in quantity, and not in the course of penetration police up the area as they move through.  In a sense, therefore, the tank, even in exploitation, shoots from friendly territory (which the tanks just made friendly by overrunning it) into enemy territory.  So too will the armed helicopter which will incidentally, be the most valuable companion to the exploiting tank.”[7]

General Howze added that helicopters, whether troop-carriers or attack types, would never be able to violate enemy territory which, as he states, actually depends on the fluidity of the battlefield; in addition to that, the functionality of the helicopter, let alone its survivability, depends in part with its coordination with other weapons systems, such as artillery, mortars and tanks, and even heavy machine guns, as well as missiles and jet aircraft such as fighter-bombers.

With regards to the survivability of the helicopter, it presents a target hard to hit owing to its svelte signature, in comparison to fighters and bombers.  Indeed, nocturnal operations would increase the survival rate of helicopters; though missiles could prove an issue.  Such could require frequent base changes near the front lines to insure continued availability.  Reminiscent of the L-4 Cub in World War II, the helicopter can operate on soft ground as opposed to fighter-bombers and many other fixed wing types which require hard-surfaced strips.

And the atomic battlefield?  Can the helicopter survive?  Again Howze brings up the point, that within range of the blast, the helicopters would be destroyed, as will mortars, machine guns, trucks, buildings, fighter-bombers, communications, . . .   This revisits, of course, the 1950s, where the Army was seeking to insure continued employment within the defense establishment—in what was seen by some experts, as a nuclear-dominated military environment—in which the Army experimented with light planes and helicopters so as to shuttle troops around a nuclear battlefield in Europe.

But, if a massive conventional conflict broke out in Europe, would a nuclear exchange be the result?  Such is not what resulted in World War II; to which, of course, here we are not referring to atomic ordnance, but chemical weapons, and quite specifically, nerve gas.  For the Germans had the monopoly unlike the Allies.  In fact, the Allies did not know that such a capability even existed.  Yet, the Germans, who had many thousands of tons of this breakthrough in chemical weaponry never employed same, even in the darkest hours.[8]

In western Poland, at a place known as Dyhernfurth, construction of a plant unique, thus far in the war, commenced in January 1940.  Its lot in life was the production of nerve gas, 1,000 tons of Tabun per month, with a capacity three times that number.  Some 3,000 workers labored at the plant, all Germans.  Since the Allies were not cognizant of the existence of nerve gas, they therefore, had no defense.  Yet when Germany’s fortunes fell into decline, “three of the most fanatical Nazi leaders, Martin Bormann, Joseph Goebbels and Robert Ley, repeatedly urged Hitler to unleash nerve gas.  Goebbels wanted to bathe British cities in revenge for the destruction of Dresden.  Albert Speer, Minister of Armaments in the Third Reich, recalled a secret conversation with labor leader, Robert Ley, who by profession, was a chemist, held in a special railroad car.  Ley’s increased stammering betrayed his agitation:  ‘You know we have this new poison gas—I’ve heard about.  The Fuhrer must do it.  He must use it, now he has to do it.  What else!’”[9]

Obvious question here is, why didn’t Hitler resort to his nerve gas?  “The reason he failed to do so probably had much to do with a conversation at the Wolf’s Lair, his headquarters in East Prussia, back in May 1943.  After the collapse at Stalingrad, both Speer and his chemical warfare expert, Otto Ambros, were summoned to a special conference by Hitler to discuss using gas to stem the Russian advance.  Ambros began by saying that the Allies could out-produce Germany in chemical weapons.  Hitler interrupted to say that he understood that might be true of the conventional gases—‘but Germany has a special gas, Tabun, in this case we have the monopoly.’

“Ambros shook his head.  ‘I have justified reason to assume that Tabun, too, is known abroad (which it was not—author).  According to Ambros, the essential nature of Tabun and Sarin had been disclosed in technical journals as long ago as 1902, and like many German scientists he could not believe that the chemical warfare experts at Parton Down and Edgehill Arsenal had failed to develop them.[10]  Whether Ambros genuinely believed that the Allies had nerve gases, or if he was trying to put Hitler off from resorting to these lethal poisons, the result was the same:  Hitler turned on his heels and abruptly left the meeting.”[11]

In a trick of fortune, perhaps, a forlorn Hitler never did resort to his monopoly.  Yet  contemplate for a moment the carnage that might have been inflicted upon the British citizenry as the result of Tabun and Sarin in the warheads of V-1s and V-2s.  Consider, too, the vulnerability of the Allied landing force, paratroopers and glider-borne troops with the mass employment of these gases at Normandy on June 6, 1944; to which must be added the said exposure of the defenseless French populace inhabiting this battlefield environment.

The above does give rise to the lesson offered by Marine Corps Lieutenant General Roy S. Geiger, after he had witnessed the atomic bomb tests at Bikini Atoll, July 1946; and that of Major General James M. Gavin, with his movement of troops in the Third Dimension with light planes and helicopters.  Perhaps bolstered here, too, by General Hamilton H. Howze, was quite with bringing up the German example; that is, Hitler’s dilemma of not being sure as to whether  he had the chemical warfare monopoly or not.

But in the 1970s and 1980s, with a “parity” existing between the superpowers, with regards to nuclear weaponry, one needs to consider whether such an option would have been employed, depending, of course, on what was happening on the conventional battlefield.  But unlike 1944, the ability to move troops over wider vistas and in a shorter period of time now existed in the 1970s.  This certainly makes the helicopter, both transport and attack types, certainly relevant.

Yet General Howze goes on to clarify, that the helicopter “is in no sense a competitor with the fighter-bomber or the fighter recon aircraft . . . “[12]

That the helicopter is a ground fighter’s weapon and taxi, provides that potential for striking the enemy’s front, rear and flanks; while at the same time accomplishing same in finer fashion than competing ground-tied mediums of mobility and transportation by overcoming such impediments as rivers, hills, blown bridges and minefields.  “It is enough to say that the armed helicopter platoon (three or four aircraft) may be attached to armored cavalry, tank and infantry battalions and brigades, and will aid those units materially in the performance of their assigned missions.”[13]

“In defense against tank attack, one common helicopter tactic (by two or three ships as a rule) will be simple ambush.  Even at the beginning of an enemy armored attack, when his tanks are moving generally abreast on a wide front, normal terrain found in Europe provides countless positions in which helicopters can lurk against the moment at which they can rise to attack, usually flanking fire against advancing tanks.  The aircraft can position themselves in small woods or clearings, in villages, behind streams, or in rough ground and other terrain impassable for tanks. . .

“One might contend that enemy infantry may force helos from these positions.  This, of course, is possible, but if a general Soviet assault can be slowed to the pace of infantry combing all the forests and by-ways, then the shooting helo would be justified by that accomplishment alone.  The very rapid armored sweeps by the Germans in 1940 and 1941 and by the Allies in 1944 and 1945, were confined mostly to the roads—enemy infantry in the woods and fields were by-passed in the interests of speed.  The helo would put a stop to that tactic.”[14]

Howze also brought up the factor of mines, alluding to the time factor of perhaps weeks required to plant anti-tank and anti-personnel mines, and in quantities sufficient to adversely impact a massive offensive.  Here, though, the helicopter(s) could prove that medium of delaying an enemy thrust by saturating suspected avenues of attack with mines.  Mine-laying rotary wing aircraft, quite possibly, could channel the enemy thrust into areas of a front more agreeable to the defender, in addition to inflicting losses on the attacker with the AT and AP mines.

Attack helicopters, operating close to the front (and perhaps operating off cow pasture type fields like L-4 Cubs in World War II), provide that quick reaction force unlike fighter-bombers operating off hard-surfaced strips.  But at the same time, control of the air by the Air Force, could only accentuate the potential of the attack helicopter in helping to break up an armored attack.

However a rosier picture was presented from a different quarter.  In his “Aviation is the key,” General George S. Blanchard, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army in Europe, expressed how excited he was about the future of Army Aviation in Europe and in the Army itself.  He did relay the feelings of Army Aviators, when he first arrived in Europe, of their disappointment and even dejection, that after all they had accomplished in Southeast Asia, that they were no longer needed, a lament shared by warrant offices and down through the enlisted and maintenance personnel.  That their presence in Europe, as well as in NATO, was no longer required.

Five years later, the turning point had been reached, according to General Blanchard.  “The Battalion and Brigade Commanders came to recognize that Army Aviation is a force multiplier of very major proportions, and in the process of the build up we’re at the point of having some 1,100 aircraft in all the battalions of the command.  Some 230 of these were Cobras, and our tank-killing capability, both from the standpoint of actual capability of the aircraft and the weapons system and the people who fly, has increased tremendously.

“All of our Divisions have Combat Aviation Battalions, including 42 TOW Cobras each.  Our ACRs have two Aviation Troops, including 21 TOW Cobras each.  This provides 12 more attack aircraft in the 4^th.”[15]

He noted, too, that Army Aviation would operate in conjunction with A-10s, F4s and other U.S. Air Force elements to deal with, as he calls it, “the very dangerous air defense envelope in which Soviet forces practice and plan to use their forces.”[16]  To which he added . . . the multi-national effort of the British, Germans, Dutch and Belgians provide, both ground and air, accentuating NATO’s ability in destroying Warsaw Pact armor.  The united effort, he suggests, is required because we cannot go it alone.  A reality that not only transcends military requirements solely, but economic as well, understanding as General Blanchard does, apparently, the imposition bloated military budgets have on the civilian economy.  Noting, too, as he does that the Soviets spend “forty percent or more in dollars, or equivalent, into their (defense) programs for total Army, Navy and Air Force equipment hardware.”[17] Hence the reliance on the multinational approach.[18]

But General Blanchard noted, too, a development that would send practitioners of airmobility into apoplexy.  “We have to give up our Air Cav Troop in the process, and we can discuss this at a later time because I am sure there is great interest in what we’re going to do for the future.  We’re going to reinstate Air Cav, perhaps in a different configuration somewhat as time goes by, and we hope to get it moving by 1985 at a minimum, or hopefully before then.”[19]

General Howze leveled criticism at just this sort of development the previous year in Army Aviation.  “We ended the Vietnam War with two airmobile divisions; we now have one, and that faces major cuts in strength.  We have only one so-called air cavalry combat brigade, which is really not air cavalry, but an aerial tank-destroying force.  It has considerable capability in that role, but along with the airmobile division it may also feel the chop.

“I recently had access to the Army’s new operations manual, FM 100-5.  There is periodic acknowledgment therein the usefulness of light aircraft, but it is a patch job, with paragraphs apparently being added to an earlier but recent version.  Quite obviously Army Aviation is not contemplated in the manual as a basic tool—as strong, added, available and sometimes decisive capability, as it emphatically should be.”[20]

And to add insult to injury, General Howze infers, “And a few months ago I talked to a number of young officers who were just graduating from the Advanced Class at the Artillery School.  I asked the group what the course had included about the techniques of artillery support of airmobile operations.  The answer:  Nothing.

“I am guessing now, but I venture to say that Fort Sill has developed no special technique for the purpose.  I am not guessing when I say that such a technique will be different from the normal, will require special training, and will be very applicable to winning battles.”[21]

General Howze goes on to make the argument that Army enthusiasm for airmobility had chilled and seemed more enamored with “ground mechanization of practically everything.”  To which he added, that the Army was committing a monumental error in judgment.  Yet, at this stage, when reading General Howze’s criticisms, which, too, are to be considered legitimate concerns, there is the reality alluded to, not many pages back.  That the Army went from 1,570,000 in 1958 to 784,000 in 1974. And that it was more than thirty years beyond America being the only game in town.[22]

Again, returning to the burgeoning American-Israeli relationship following the Yom Kippur War, was not merely based on rapport, but the fact that the Israeli armed forces had enjoyed a measure of success which could no longer be ignored. From 1948, which by comparison was a military establishment which made do with hand-me-downs and the goodwill approach to gathering arms and equipment, to learning, honing and employment of a military doctrine of mobile warfare which, by the 1967 and 1973 wars, showcased the IDF as one of the globe’s most professional of military forces.  So, from the American perspective, why not?

Yet while resorting to the wealth of data available to be sifted, a constant needed to be understood:  That despite the fact that the Arab forces used Soviet weaponry and adopted Soviet training, they were not Soviet formations; had not waged war in Europe and, had not the long-term benefit of having fought against the likes of Heinz Guderian, Erich von Manstein, Ewald von Kliest and Hasso von Manteuffel on the Eastern Front, like the Soviets had.

In returning to generals Starry and DePuy, both believed that concerns about the tank’s obsolescence were overblown and that the tank simply needed adequate combined arms support to enable its continued preeminence in ground combat.[23]

General DePuy, in his report, “Implications of the Middle East War on U.S. Army Tactics, Doctrines and Systems,” included analysis of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.  A chart was “included depicting the tank’s continued centrality with air defense, mechanized infantry, close air support, and field artillery in support.  This represented four of what would become the ‘Big Five’:  The Abrams main battle tank, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, the Apache Attack Helicopter and the Patriot air defense system.  The unmentioned fifth capability, the Black Hawk helicopter, reflected Starry’s views about rapid transport of troops around and between close and deep areas.”[24]

“Historians have criticized Starry and other officers for a selective and overly rosy portrayal of the IDF’s performance in the war.  For one thing, Starry focused heavily on the theater of war in the Golan Heights while paying less attention to the decisive front in the Sinai Peninsula.  More broadly, the American generals’ reports on the war’s lessons paid scant attention to the IDF’s many errors, including suffering surprise at its outset.  But this was a strategic failure, and TRADOC’s interest in the war was not about strategy but rather tactics, campaigning, and modernization.  What may look like a selective or dishonest analysis to a trained historian was, from Starry’s perspective, a focus on what was important to the U.S. Army of the 1970s.”[25]

Major of the Infantry, Paul H. Herbert, in his 1988 study of General William E. DePuy and his version of FM 100-5, intimated that as a result of the Vietnam War that “This erosion of the Army’s physical strength coincided with a major reassessment of U.S. strategic policy with profound implications for the Army.  The conclusion drawn in the early 1970s was that the American capacity to repel or deter aggression anywhere in the world was limited and that, therefore, the American means to resist must be allocated to regions of the world according to the priority of U.S. security interests.  As a result, many Third World nations resisting aggression would have to handle their own security, with only indirect U.S. assistance and perhaps assistance from major U.S. allied nations within the region.  Therefore, in paring down the defense establishment and budget, the United States assumed a ‘1.5 war’ contingency instead of the ‘2.5 war’ contingency that had prevailed in the 1960s.[26]  This meant that the United States would be prepared to fight one general war and one minor war, but it would not fight two general wars simultaneously.  This interpretation of U.S. security interests, first enunciated as the Nixon and Guam Doctrine in 1969, and later called the ‘strategy of realistic deterrence,” required that strategic planners shift their attention from, Asia to NATO Europe, with a ½ war glance at the Middle East, especially the security of Israel and the access routes to Persian Gulf oil.”[27]

Major Herbert continues his analysis by the degree of change in 1976.  Indeed, “Because these earlier editions of FM 100-5 were not agents of change, they shared the quality of anonymous authorship.  Not so within the 1976 edition.  No officer on active duty in 1976 could fail to identify its author as General William E. DePuy.  As the nineteenth century drill manuals tended to bear the authors’ names (Henry W. Halleck, William J. Hardee, Silas Casey, Emory Upton), so too would the 1976 edition be known as the DePuy manual.  This is because the DePuy manual was an attempt to change the thinking, not the organization, of the entire United States Army.

“Published in striking, camouflage-patterned covers and thoroughly illustrated with colored charts and realistic depictions of Army units in combat, the new manuals were to effect a break with the past—especially the Vietnam War—and to prepare the Army doctrinally to win the next war, not the last.”[28]

Major Herbert, in his analysis, bolsters General Starry’s view on the tank.  “According to the manual, the U.S. Army must be prepared to fight outnumbered and win and to win the first battle, points that the author acknowledged were not part of the Army’s historical tradition.[29]  Also emphasized was that the tank was the ‘decisive weapon’ of ground combat, but that it could not survive on a ‘modern battlefield’ except as a part of a ‘combined arms team’ that included all the other branches of the Army and tactical air forces.’  FM 100-5 accepted ‘force ratios’ as a primary determinant in battle and specified that successful defense required a 6-to-1 superiority.  The manual stressed that cover (protection from enemy fire), concealment (protection from enemy observation), suppression (disruption of the enemy’s fire with one’s own fire), and teamwork (cooperation between the branches of the Army and between the Army and Air Force) were essential to victory on the battlefield.”[30]

Added to the discussion is the reality that weapons have increased in lethality owing to advances in technology.  And so while basic military doctrine may remain consistent—concentration of force, mobility, supply and training. . .—the helicopter did not exist in World War II as a decisive presence as it did in Vietnam and afterwards.  “Consistent with this focus on weapons systems, FM 100-5 recognized emerging technological capabilities such as remotely controlled drones for collecting intelligence and identifying targets; special sights and goggles expected to give the Army full night vision capability; and the soon-to-be fielded M1 main battle tank, the M2 mechanized infantry combat vehicle, and an advanced attack helicopter.  It attempted to present concepts and techniques that could be implemented using equipment currently on hand but that would allow the Army to practice a style of warfare consistent with the possession of new equipment.[31]  Again Major Herbert, with his analysis, observed FM 100-5’s emphasis on armored warfare, Soviet weapons systems, emerging technology, and U.S. numerical inferiority all reflected its deliberate focus on the defense of NATO Europe.  The manual even included a chapter each on fighting alongside NATO allies and fighting in cities, both contributed by U.S. Army, Europe.  It stated that the defense of NATO Europe was the U.S. Army’s most important and most dangerous contingency and that an army prepared to fight Warsaw Pact forces in Europe could probably fight successfully in other areas of the world against other enemies with little modification to its doctrine.  FM 100-5 relied heavily on the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War to assert that contingency missions outside NATO were likely to pit the Army against enemies organized, trained and equipped in the Soviet style in any case.[32]

“. . . the 1976 edition of FM 100-5 introduced the term “Air-Land Battle’ for the first time.  The chapter titled ‘Air-Land Battle’ only described the joint procedures agreed to by the Air Force and Army for cooperating in areas of mutual interest, such as airspace management, air logistics, aerial reconnaissance, and electronic warfare.  The use of this term and the dedication of a chapter to its discussion signaled the Army’s strong interest in a new concept of theater warfare that recognized the total interdependency of the Army and Air Force and that sought to describe their activities within the theater in a single, unified battle.[33]

“In each of these particulars, the 1976 edition of FM 100-5 was distinctly different from its predecessors.  It was a deliberate attempt to change the way the U.S. Army thought about and prepared for war.”[34]

Much of the aforementioned analysis by Major Ethan Orwin and Major Paul H. Herbert is borne out by what is actually written in FM 100-5.  For instance:

“The war in the Middle East in 1973 might well portend the nature of modern battle.  Arabs and Israelis were armed with the latest weapons, and the conflict approached a destructiveness once attributed to nuclear arms.  Use of aircraft for close support of advancing armor, in the fashion generally practiced since 1940, was greatly reduced by advancing surface-to-air missiles and air defense guns.  In clashes of massed armor such as the world has not witnessed for 30 years, both sides sustained devastating losses, approaching 50 percent in less than two weeks of combat.  These statistics are of serious import for U.S. Army commanders.”  And . . .

. . . “All great armies of the world rest their land combat power upon the tank.  The armies of the Warsaw Pact, fashioned on the Soviet model, incorporate masses of tanks, backed by an impressive industrial base producing large numbers of quality armored fighting vehicles.  Warsaw Pact doctrine anticipates use of nuclear weapons in the future war, but teaches preparedness to fight without them.  For both conditions, it emphasizes heavy concentrations of armor.”[35]

The significance of and reliance on the tank is clearly evident in FM 100-05, as intimated earlier in the narrative, was bolstered, too, by such support units as modern anti-aircraft artillery and ground-launched anti-aircraft missiles.  Both armor and A.A. defensive armaments were produced in aggregate quantities and quality that required the appropriate response.  Hence the notion of the helicopter and its significance as a mobile platform in modern conventional warfare.

Endnotes

[1]  See pages 6 and 7, Chapter 2, “Overview of the Sinai Campaign:  6 Oct. 1973-24 Oct. 1973,” Yom Kippur 1973:  An Operational Analysis of the Sinai Campaign, by Arthur B. Loefstedt, III, Major, U.S. Army.

[2]  Referring to those critical of using the helicopter on the conventional-nuclear battlefield.

[3]  See page 55, “Airmobility, A New Board on Army Aviation is Fourteen Years Overdue.” By General Hamilton H. Howze, Army Aviation, August-September 1977.  And, in addition, . . .

       . . . “After the war was over, the IDF sought to learn its lessons and overcome its shortcomings by proceeding on a parallel three-track approach.  First, it was necessary to replace war losses.  Next, the size and quality of its force structure was considerably improved by the purchase of modern F-15 and F-16 fighter aircraft as well as Cobra attack helicopters armed with tube-launched, especially tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missiles.  Finally, a concerted attempt was made to develop technological and tactical responses to Arab anti-armor and anti-aircraft capability, partly by purchasing avionics from the United States and partly by pushing indigenous solutions,” see page 185, Chapter 6, “Israel:  Maneuver Warfare, Air Power, and Logistics,” Air Power and Maneuver Warfare, by Martin van Creveld with Steven L. Canby and Kenneth S, Brower.

[4]  See page 9, “Combat Operations:  The Armed Copter in the Defense of Europe,” by Hamilton H. Howze, Army Aviation, July 30, 1977.

[5]  See page 10, General Hamilton H. Howze.

[6]  See page 10, General Hamilton H. Howze.

[7]  See page 10, General Hamilton H. Howze.

[8]  Tabun, the initial version of nerve gas, was invented by Dr. Gerhard Schrader in 1936, followed four years later by Sarin.  Soman followed in 1944.

[9]  See page 68, Chapter Three, “Hitler’s Secret Weapon,” A Higher Form of Killing, by Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman.

[10]  The British, by 1943-1944, had developed the N-Bomb, an anthrax weapon, testing same on Gruinard Island off the coast of Scotland.

[11]  See page 69, Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman.

[12]  See page 12, General Hamilton H. Howze.

[13]  See page 12, General Hamilton H. Howze.

[14]  See page 14, General Hamilton H. Howze.

[15]  See pages 17 and 18, “Army Aviation on the Horizon:  Aviation is the Key,” Army Aviation, by General George S. Blanchard, December 31, 1978.

[16]  See page 19, General George R. Blanchard.

[17]  See page 18, General George R. Blanchard.

[18]  The point can be made here that an economy focused on military spending versus the civilian economy will eventually collapse or foster a popular backlash or both.  Especially from the civilian perspective, that the military the people are wasting hard-earned money on cannot seem to win wars, at least within the parameters of how victory had been previously viewed and charted.  In the Soviet case, the situation became acute in the wake of the debacle in Afghanistan.  To which must be added, that the Muslims fought and won the last battlefield action of the Cold War and, played no small part in humbling the Soviet Union and bringing same down, a contribution to the effort that is virtually ignored by news pundits and foreign policy analysts in either public pronouncements or print.  An effort, too, that cost the Muslims north of 1,000,000 souls.

[19]  See page 18, General George R. Blanchard.

[20]  See page 53, “Airmobility:  A New Board on Army Aviation is Fourteen Years Overdue,” Army Aviation, by General Hamilton H, Howze, (Ret.), August-September 1977.

[21]  See pages 53 and 54, General Hamilton H. Howze.

[22]  The inference here is that unlike 1945, when the United States was economically peerless, in the world today, and at this writing, according to the Federal Reserve, third quarter, 2024, the GNP is, $29,384.064 trillion; GDP, $29,374.9 trillion; national debt:  $35.46 trillion.  And this is a multipolar world of more kibitzers vying for position and the growing impact of the de-dollarization movement.

[23]  See page 49, “Not an Intellectual Exercise:  Lessons from the U.S.-Israeli Institutional Army Cooperation, 1973-1982,” Military Review, by Major Ethan Orwin, U.S. Army.

[24]  See pages 49 and 50, Major Ethan Orwin.

[25]  See page 50, Major Ethan Orwin.

[26]  An historical parallel here is 1941-1942, the Eastern Front.  Hitler’s ambitious plan, Operation:  BARBAROSSA, some 3,300,000 German soldiers in three large army groups invaded the Soviet Union.  But by March 1942, with upwards of 1,000,000 casualties and large material losses (in only nine months), in addition to the growing Desert War in North Africa, Hitler no longer had the capability for such an expansive offensive in 1942.  He consigned his attacks in Ukraine and the Caucasus, resulting in the epic battle of attrition known as Stalingrad.

[27]  See page 5, Chapter 1, “Of Doctrines and Manuals,” Deciding What Has to be Done:  General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations, by Major Paul H. Herbert.

Worth a read here as to the Nixon Doctrine, is that written by Colonel Richard M. Jennings, U.S. Army, “The Thrust of the Nixon Doctrine,” Army University Press, February 1972.   www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military…     

[28]  See page 7, Major Paul H. Herbert.

[29]  Grant, for instance, enlisted complaints from representatives and senators that had to be fielded by President Lincoln during the Civil War.  “He takes too many casualties.”  Lincoln:  “But he wins.”  General Grant knew about manpower advantage, resources, productive capacity and, of course, the financial backing of a superior financial structure, with which to wage America’s first industrialized war, Total War.  Vietnam, however, was not an industrialized Total War, for the United States.  After 1965-1966, it did for North Vietnam, favoring Levee en Masse, organizing the population and all its capabilities for war.  America did not, and if anything, divorced the masses from the conflict.  Hence, America went down to an embarrassing and even predictable defeat.

[30]  See pages 7 and 8, Major Paul H. Herbert.

[31]  See pages 8 and 9, Major Paul H. Herbert.

[32]  With regards to taking on enemies outside Europe, equipped with Soviet weaponry, bolstered by the lessons of the October 1973 War, “with little modification of doctrine,” perhaps the 1991 short-lived Persian Gulf War comes to mind here.  Evident was the use of powerful armored spearheads backed by interdiction-style and close air support by aircraft.  And most important, first asserting absolute control of the air.  Of course, though . . .

. . . following the collapse of the Soviet Union, America reverted to counterinsurgency forms of warfare, in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Again a defeat in Iraq and defeat at the hands of the Taliban in Afghanistan showcased the repetition of history here by the United States.

This historian’s method of historical study, Horizontal Determinism, again had been vindicated by rostering the years of 1973-2021.  The repeat of history is never exact; but, the basic repetition is undeniable.

[33]  Here, perhaps, we see a return to the Schwerpunckt, the massing of armor at the point of attack, backed by the tactical use of aircraft in close cooperation with the armor.  Schwerpunckt, then, is that “weight of effort.”  Consult Milan Vego, Ph.D., “Clausewitz’s SCHWERPUNCKT,” Military Review, January-February 2007.

[34]  See page 9, Major Paul H. Herbert.

[35]  See page 2-2, Chapter 2, “Modern Weapons on the Modern Battlefield,” Operations, FM 100-05, 1 July 1976.

Bibliography

Blanchard, General George S., Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army, Europe, “Army Aviation on the Horizon:  Aviation is the Key,” Army Aviation, Vol. 27, No. 12, Westport, Ct., December 31, 1978.

Clarke, Robin, The Silent Weapons, David McKay Company, Inc., New York, 1968.

Creveld, Martin van with Canby, Steven L. and Brower, Kenneth S., Air Power and Maneuver Warfare, Air University Press, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1994.

FM 100-5, Operations, C-1 FM 100-5, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 29 April 1977.

Harris, Robert and Paxman, Jeremy, A Higher Form of Killing:  The Secret History of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Hill & Wang, A Division of Farrar, Straus & Giroux, New York, 1982.

Herbert, Major Paul H., U.S. Army, Deciding What was to be Done:  General William DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5 Operations, Leavenworth Papers No. 16, Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1988.

Howze, General Hamilton H., (Ret.), “Airmobility:  A New Board is Fourteen Years Overdue,” Army Aviation, Vol. 25, Nos. 8 & 9, Westport, Ct., August-September 1977.

Howze, General Hamilton H., (Ret.), “Combat Operations:  The Armed Copter in Defense of Europe,” Army Aviation, Vol. 25, No. 7, Westport, Ct., July 30, 1977.

Jennings, Colonel Richard M., U.S. Army, “The Thrust of the Nixon Doctrine,” Army University Press, February 1972.  www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military…

Loefstedt, Major Arthur B., III, U.S. Army, Yom Kippur War 1973:  An Operational Analysis of the Sinai Campaign, 19960501 247, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, February 12, 1996.

Orwin, Major Ethan, U.S. Army, “Not a Intellectual Exercise:  Lessons from the U.S.-Israeli Institutional Army Cooperation, 1973-1982,” Military Review, January-February 2020.

www.armyupress.army,mil/,,,/Orwin-US-Israeli

Tucker, Jonathan B., War of Nerves:  Chemical Warfare From World War I to Al-Qaeda, Pantheon Books, New York, 2006.

Vego, Milan, Ph.D., “Clausewitz’s SCHWERPUNKT:  Mistranslated from German—Misunderstood in English,” Military Review, January-February 2007.  www.armyupress.army,mil/Portals/7/military…

From all of us at the AAAA Global Headquarters, we hope you all have had a wonderful Holiday Season… time with family and loved ones. And especially during this time, our thoughts and prayers are with our men and women in uniform who are deployed and engaged around the globe in support of our Nation’s vital mission.

I’m pleased to report that we had a very successful Cribbins Readiness Conferrence in Huntsville, AL beginning on Veterans Day in November. The professional programs and sessions were incisive and impactful, and we thank the entire Aviation General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC) for their presence, participation and support for the forum’s entirety.

Our Industry partner support and participation, as always, was incredibly strong and invaluable to the realization of our Networking and Voice pillars. Please take a look at page 74 for a complete wrap up and especially the coverage of our incredible AAAA awardees. A real highlight was the AAAA Murder Mystery Dinner hosted by our AAAA Scholarship Foundation… what a tremendous evening (the Roaring Twenties Speakeasy theme was taken seriously by your AAAA National Executive Group… you determine whether you believe your Association has adequate leadership after viewing the group picture!) where over $95,000 was donated in support of our signature Recognition and Support program. And in that spirit, I want to highlight Chapter President, COL (Ret.) Ron Lukow’s AAAA Washington Potomac Chapter Annual Scholarship Fund Raising Formal held in late November. What an incredible evening; one that truly showcases the programs and activities of our chapters, which are the backbone, and indicative of the strength, of our great Association. I was privileged to attend, and witness first-hand the impact that our incredible scholarship program has on the lives and future success of the recipients.

Not to be left out, our Voice pillar was firmly addressed over the last month. Our very own AAAA Executive Director, Mr. Bill Harris (the epitome of persistence), was able to meet with our Army Aviation Caucus Co-Chair, the Honorable Rosa DeLauro (D CT-3) in her office in Washington, D. C. on Thursday November 14, 2024. During the meeting with her staff the course was set for the next year with the selection of the Honorable Dale Strong, (R AL-5) as her Republican co-chair, and the next meeting projected to take place in the first quarter of CY 25. There is still some work to do to get additional members of Congress to join the Caucus in the new Congress next year. If you have a Congressman in your district that may be interested due to a connection to Army Aviation through personal experience, having an installation in their area, or related industry please send your suggestions in to Bill at bill@quad-a.org who will forward to the co-chairs for action.

Finally, on behalf of the Association, I’d like to welcome back LTC (Ret.) Kevin Cochie who will transition back to serve as the Chairman, Legislative Affairs Committee and the Association’s Legislative Liaison. We can’t thank LTC (Ret.) Josh Baker enough for all of the work he has done in that role for the past several years… very much appreciate his passion and edication in support of our Association.

As we look forward to 2025, we hope to see you at one of our events – the Luther Jones Depot Symposium has shifted to February 11-12 and of course our AAAA Annual Summit on May 14-16. Thanks to all our members for a really great 2024!!!

Above the Best!

MG Walt Davis, U.S. Army Retired
36th President, AAAA
walt.davis@quad-a.org