Story by Richelle Brown

Senior leaders from U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command underscored the urgency of modernizing sustainment for future contested environments during the Army Aviation Association of America’s Cribbins Futures Forum, held Nov. 17–20 in Huntsville, Alabama.

AMCOM Commanding General Maj. Gen. Lori Robinson opened the Day 2 professional session by stressing that sustainment remains the decisive factor in maintaining aviation readiness.

“Today, tomorrow and in the future, we need every part that makes these great machines fly,” Robinson said, noting that spare-parts availability continues to be the Army’s most pressing sustainment requirement. She outlined three key priorities shaping future readiness: autonomous distribution, data-driven sustainment, and agile employment of sustainment forces.

Robinson also emphasized the Army’s effort to accelerate digital integration across platforms and supply chain systems. “If we truly want to move logistics quickly to the point of need, we have to be on a common sustainment COP,” she said.

A follow-on panel discussion led by LTG (Ret.) Doug Gabram brought additional insight from AMCOM Deputy to the Commander Don Nitti and former AMCOM Command Sergeant Major Tod Glidewell.

Nitti said future sustainment challenges will stretch across the entire enterprise. “Our sustainment is going to be contested from the factory to the foxhole,” he said, calling for strengthened supply chains and increased forward repair capacity.

Glidewell highlighted the significance of digital engineering and forward maintenance capability as future platforms evolve. “We put these aircraft and these soldiers in the dirt for months at a time, and we must be prepared to sustain them in that environment,” he said.

Together, AMCOM leaders reinforced that sustaining Army Aviation in the future fight will require integrated data systems, advanced manufacturing, agile logistics and close collaboration with industry and allied partners.

Story by Heather Douglas, Program Executive Office – Aviation

Soldiers from the Army Aviation community visited Redstone Arsenal this week giving critical feedback on the MV-75 Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA) program via its new Virtual Prototype (VP) and Virtual Reality (VR) demonstrators.

The Soldiers were taking part in the Special User Evaluation (SUE), a critical, hands-on event to gather direct feedback from the user community regarding proposed design elements of the MV-75 FLRAA multi-mission aircraft. SUEs facilitate direct interaction between the design team and intended users: pilots, maintainers, and operational personnel. This week’s event is the fourth SUE the MV-75 FLRAA team has hosted and remains an essential component of the iterative design process.

Personnel from the Army National Guard, the U.S. Army Aviation Center of Excellence (USAACE) at Fort Rucker, and the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) participated in the event, including both rated and non-rated fixed and rotary-wing crew members. The week-long event included classroom instruction and simulated flight operations, giving the MV-75 FLRAA Project Office valuable operational insights that inform ongoing design decisions.

FLRAA’s Program Manager, COL Jeffrey Poquette, emphasized the importance of early user engagement, stating, “The focus this week has been on ensuring FLRAA remains grounded in operational relevance through direct user interaction. We want to gather feedback from experienced users and some who will ultimately employ the aircraft, ensuring they have a voice in its development and feel a sense of ownership.”

In addition to time spent in the classroom focused on flight control characteristics, Soldiers rotated between the VP and VR demonstrators. The holistic approach familiarized them with the equipment before participating in test events later in the week.

During several events, Soldiers experienced realistic scenarios and shared their honest perspectives and insights. They evaluated the proposed Inter-Communications System (ICS) Panel, the Primary Flight Display (PFD) page, engine/hydraulic/fuel/maintenance fault display page, and other related aircraft sensors. They also reviewed Cabin Configuration options and other topics that the team presented.

During equipment evaluation, WO1 Benjamin Huff, Mississippi Army National Guard, emphasized the importance of adapting operational thinking to the MV-75’s multi-mission capabilities. “This week reinforced the value of contributing varying degrees of knowledge and experience to the platform’s ongoing development,” Huff said.

MAJ Nikolas Steele, FLRAA Assistant Project Manager, has spent the last several months gathering data and identifying key design considerations for the MV-75 FLRAA team to present to this group of Soldiers. He anticipates that their feedback will inform upcoming design decisions and help integrate valuable suggestions into the final design.

Steele emphasized the importance of this process. “We are committed to thoroughly analyzing the results and feedback from these operational engagements over the next few months, and will subsequently provide recommendations for implementation,” he said.

CPT Tyler Mason, Army National Guard CH-47 pilot, described the engagement with the MV-75 FLRAA Project Office as motivating. “Understanding the future capabilities being developed to deter the kind of fight that’s potentially on the horizon is valuable”, he said. “I’m returning to Mississippi looking forward to the opportunity to operate this platform one day.”

CW5 Brian McKnight, Lead MV-75 FLRAA Training Developer, traveled from Fort Rucker to support the SUE. “This SUE fostered collaborative discussion among subject matter experts, allowing for valuable input on the MV-75’s design,” he explained. “The positive reception to this new technology demonstrates a commitment to innovation and future integration.”

The MV-75 FLRAA team will prioritize Soldier and pilot input through a series of SUEs. According to COL Poquette, these engagements are vital to ensuring the future aircraft not only meets requirements but is also easier and cheaper to sustain. “We are committed to designing and developing an aircraft that is optimized for the warfighter,” he stated.

Story by Staff Sgt. Alyssa Lisenbe

CAMP BONDSTEEL, Kosovo – On someone’s worst day, two U.S. Army soldiers from Lexington, Kentucky, have the capability to save that person’s life, and they just happen to share the same last name.

Meet Kentucky Army National Guard Chief Warrant Officer 2 Travis Holt and his son, Spc. Trevor Holt, a father and son duo serving together in Task Force Aviation in support of Kosovo Force (KFOR), the NATO-led peacekeeping mission dedicated to ensuring a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement for all people in Kosovo.

The Holts are part of the only UH-60 Black Hawk medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) unit supporting KFOR troops across the region. The team is on call 24/7, ready to respond to medical emergencies and nine-line calls, the distress signal used for air medical evacuations.

“The mission set that we do here as a MEDEVAC unit is important,” Travis explained. “We are the only MEDEVAC asset in Kosovo. If somebody gets hurt, we’re it.”

Trevor began his career as a UH-60 Black Hawk maintainer. During this deployment, however, he earned a promotion to crew chief, a rare achievement for a soldier with just two years of service.

“For his level of experience, he’s really, really good,” Travis said. “The standard is set very high for our unit, and he’s done a great job.”

During the interview, this was actually Trevor’s first day on the job as a MEDEVAC crew chief and he was able to do it with his dad.

Travis, a UH-60 pilot and test pilot, is also a former active-duty U.S. Marine who deployed multiple times to Iraq. His son decided to follow in his footsteps by attempting to become a U.S. Marine infantryman.

“I went to the Marine Corps first to enlist,” said Trevor. “But when I saw the aviation side of things, met the people that worked with my dad and got an insight into what our mission is back at home, I was like, this is way cooler.”

Today, both Holts are from the Kentucky Army National Guard’s only MEDEVAC unit in Charlie Detachment 2nd Battalion 238th Aviation Regiment. Normal day-to-day operations for this regiment is providing medical evacuation to the entire state of Kentucky, especially where the area is rural and mountainous.

At Camp Bondsteel, their mission is both demanding and dynamic. In between long shifts on standby, the MEDEVAC crews regularly train with multinational partners, refining their ability to respond quickly and coordinate across NATO units.

“At the end of the day, it’s a good experience, and we have fun. I’m proud of him,” said Travis. “Coming here opens a lot of doors for him.”

This deployment marks the Holts’ first time overseas, a unique experience for 19-year-old Trevor, who plans to become a firefighter when he returns home.

“I didn’t think coming in that I’d end up deploying with my dad,” said Trevor. “I don’t know how many people can say they’ve done that.”

Until they return home, the Holt’s focus continues to be on the mission in Kosovo and to each other.

“It’s very cool to do what we do on its own, but it’s much cooler to do it with my dad,” said Trevor.

Story by Leslie Herlick

FORT RUCKER, Ala. – Army Aviation Center of Excellence (AVCOE) Soldiers began training with the VXE30 Stalker Uncrewed Aircraft System (UAS) at Fort Rucker on November 18, in preparation for equipment fielding in December. This system incorporates observations from the modern battlefield, including reduced noise and visual signature, vertical takeoff capability, and cost-saving munitions technology, underscoring the Army’s push to integrate cutting-edge systems into training at Fort Rucker and Fort Huachuca, Arizona.

Maj. Wolf Amacker, the chief of the AVCOE Directorate of Training and Doctrine’s UAS and Tactics Branch, said the event represented a milestone in training the Army’s layered reconnaissance strategy.

“This is the first time in years that we will be utilizing a Group 2, almost Group 3 size UAS in support of an Army course at Fort Rucker, since before the Shadow was really employed,” Amacker said.

The Department of War categorizes UAS into Groups 1 through 5 based on weight, normal operating altitude, and speed. Group 1 UAS are small, weighing 20 pounds or less, and operate below 1,200 feet above ground level (AGL) at speeds of up to 100 knots. Group 2 UAS have a maximum takeoff weight between 21 and 55 pounds, operate below 3,500 feet AGL, and fly at speeds under 250 knots. Group 3 UAS, which included the Army’s RQ‑7B Shadow, weigh between 56 and 320 pounds at takeoff, operate up to 18,000 feet above mean sea level (MSL), and fly at speeds under 250 knots.

Edge Autonomy’s Stalker aircraft was recently awarded a contract to fill the Army’s long‑range reconnaissance role at the battalion level. Built on a modular open systems approach (MOSA), the Stalker can adapt to new sensors, payloads, and technologies to support changing operational needs.

Amacker noted that the 1st Aviation Brigade, part of the Army Aviation Center of Excellence and home to the Army’s UAS initial entry and advanced training courses, identified the Stalker during the recent UAS summit. The brigade moved quickly to acquire the system for training, ensuring students gain hands‑on experience with the latest reconnaissance technology.

Maj. Rachel Martin, the AVCOE Air Cavalry Leaders Course and Unmanned Advanced Lethality Course (UALC) director, emphasized the Stalker’s flexibility compared to legacy systems.

“This system can take off and land vertically like a quadcopter, then transition to forward flight where it goes deadly silent,” Martin said. “Its reduced visual and acoustic signature makes striking a target at 300 feet very likely, something that wasn’t possible with louder systems like the Shadow.”

The training demonstration also featured innovations in payload delivery from Orbital Research Inc., which has developed a modular, 3D‑printed munition system compatible with multiple UAS platforms, to include Stalker. The system integrates into the Army’s Common Lethality Integration Kit (CLIK), allowing soldiers to select warheads at the user level and employ both newly designed payloads and existing munitions such as 81‑millimeter mortars.

“What’s great about this is that it’s modular and fits on multiple UAS,” Martin said. “It’s a cheaper solution that can be rapidly reproduced. Orbital can make 250 a week in their office, with manufacturers producing even more.”

Martin noted the dramatic cost difference compared to traditional systems. “Instead of a Hellfire missile costing $100,000 to $150,000 per round, this solution costs about $800,” she said. “That disparity is significant, and it reflects lessons from the Ukrainian fight, where cheaper solutions are proving decisive.”

Amacker added that the Army is exploring ways to print training rounds in‑house, further expanding opportunities for instruction while reducing reliance on traditional procurement systems.

“This is the Army thinking outside the box,” Martin said. “We’re leveraging commercial technology to meet immediate needs in a faster, more affordable way.”

Training with the Stalker is scheduled to begin in December, ensuring instructors can incorporate the system into courses and prepare soldiers to employ it in tactical missions at the battalion and brigade levels.

Story by Alejandro Pena

BETHEL, Alaska — Alaska Army National Guardsmen assigned to A Company, 1-168th General Support Aviation Battalion transported a patient requiring advanced medical care from Scammon Bay to Bethel, Nov. 18, after severe weather grounded civilian air ambulances for two consecutive days.

The Alaska Rescue Coordination Center initiated the mission following a request for assistance from the Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta Regional Medical Center.

The patient, a Scammon Bay resident, had sustained a hip injury that exceeded the treatment capabilities of the local clinic. Initial attempts to evacuate the patient via a civilian air ambulance were halted due to persistent inclement weather.

By the third day, with weather conditions still preventing fixed-wing operations, local medical personnel sought support from the AKRCC.

The Alaska Army National Guard’s A Company, 1-168th General Support Aviation Battalion, accepted the mission and dispatched a Bethel-based UH-60L Black Hawk helicopter to conduct the evacuation.

The Black Hawk crew was able to avoid icing conditions thanks to the helicopter’s ability to operate at lower altitudes and slower speeds than fixed-wing aircraft. Its prepositioned location in Bethel further reduced response time, enabling a timely pickup.

Upon arrival in Bethel, the AKARNG aircrew transferred the patient to Yukon-Kuskokwim medical personnel for continued care.

Story by Kelly Morris

Two Aviation Center of Excellence Soldiers received the Soldier’s Medal during a ceremony at Fort Rucker, Ala., Sept. 30.

Capt. Gabriel A. Coppinger, who commands Company B, 1st Battalion, 11th Aviation Regiment, and Chief Warrant Officer 3 Shane T. Hawkins, who serves as an instructor pilot at 1st Battalion, 14th Aviation Regiment, received the award presented by Brig. Gen. Kenneth C. Cole, Aviation Center of Excellence deputy commanding general.

The aviators disregarded their own safety and attempted to rescue fellow Soldiers during a multi-ship aviation mishap in Alaska in April of 2023 that sadly resulted in loss of life of three aircrew members.

The narrator explained that Coppinger and Hawkins “quickly and without hesitation put themselves back in danger after a helicopter crash to render aid to severely injured Soldiers and coordinate the chaotic scene until the air medevac arrived. They risked their own safety in an attempt to save the lives of their fellow aviators.”

The Soldier’s Medal is the highest peacetime award for an act of heroism in a noncombat situation that the Secretary of the Army can bestow upon a Soldier and is seventh highest in order of precedence.

The medal goes beyond acts of a good Samaritan or saving a life. It is awarded to service members for acts of heroism not involving actual conflict with an enemy, that involve personal hazard or danger and voluntarily risking their own lives. The minimum degree of heroism required is comparable to that of the Distinguished Flying Cross for heroism.

In the ceremony’s invocation, 110th Aviation Brigade Chaplain (Capt.) Travis Wilson noted the Soldiers wanted the ceremony’s opening prayer to be for comfort and blessings for the families of the Soldiers who perished during the incident.

Cole said the Soldier’s Medal is a “precious recognition…of heroism not under fire from an armed enemy,” and fewer than 300 Soldiers in the Army today wear the medal.

Cole noted how Coppinger and Hawkins exemplified the Army Values of Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity and Personal Courage.

“Selfless service is easy to discuss, but harder to live. What does it look like on an impossible day, under impossible conditions?” Cole said. “It’s about putting the welfare of the nation, the Army and others before your own. The building block of selfless service is the loyalty and commitment, that each team member go a little further, endure a little longer…. As you hear some stories here in a couple minutes, you will hear those values epitomized.”

“Both of your actions embody the character that defines what it means to be an American Soldier and an American Army aviator. I am in awe of you both. Gentlemen, thank you for your service, valor and bravery. Thank you for your willingness to sacrifice for others,” Cole said.

Cole also noted that information about the Aviation Warfighter Culture was released in publications this month.

“Most critical, as we train our next generation, is developing and educating our soldiers on the character traits of the aviation warfighter and those are similar to the Army Values, but even more refined for Army aviators,” Cole said.

Coppinger thanked attendees for their support, as he spoke on behalf of the award recipients.

“This day is not just about recognition, it is a symbol of the journey many of us have endured these past two years. It represents the courage, the pain, and the resilience of those who lived through that day and those we will forever carry in our hearts,” Coppinger said.

He said they will always carry the grief of that day with them. “Yet in that grief, we have grown a deeper resilience, a stronger bond, and a renewed sense of purpose in how we live and how we serve,” he said.

Coppinger said, “I would be remiss if I did not take this opportunity to recognize the aviators we lost that day. Chief Warrant Officer 3 Christopher Eramo, Chief Warrant Officer 2 Kyle McKenna, and my copilot that day, Warrant Officer 1 Stewart Wayment. I am honored to have served alongside each of you. Blue skies and tail winds. Your memory will forever guide my service.”

He lauded the heroism on display that day.

“Six Soldiers flying in three separate aircraft landed without hesitation in the aftermath of the mishap. Without regard for their own safety, each of them quite literally ran directly into harm’s way,” Coppinger said.

“If not for their selfless actions, I don’t know that I would be standing before you today.”

Story by Capt. Lydia LaRue

ANSBACH, Germany – The 12th Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) has reflagged its attack battalion from 1st Battalion, 3rd Aviation Regiment (Attack), to 2nd Battalion, 159th Aviation Regiment (Attack), effective immediately, Oct. 14, 2025.

The activation of the “Gunslingers” Battalion is largely a change in name-only for the 12th CAB, part of the wider Army Aviation Transformation Initiative (AATI). This action returns the 1-3 Attack Battalion lineage to the 3rd Combat Aviation Brigade at Fort Stewart, Georgia, while re-activating a historic unit name for the U.S. Army’s attack presence in Europe.

“We are redesignating back to 2-159th, and my team is excited to resume the heritage of this storied unit,” said Lt. Col. Comador M. Ferguson III, commander of the 2-159th Attack Battalion. “We will continue to fly and fight the world’s most technically advanced Apache with a laser-like focus on addressing potential near-peer threats, while continuously showcasing our expertise in hard-hitting, gritty lethality.”

Crucially, no Soldiers or equipment will be leaving the 12th CAB. The personnel, helicopters, and mission readiness currently provided by the unit remain here in Germany, continuing their vital role in support of U.S. Army Europe and Africa (USAREUR-AF).

The return of the 2-159 name reestablishes a unit with a strong connection to Germany. The 2nd Battalion, 159th Aviation Regiment was originally constituted in 1968 and was reorganized and redesignated in August 2006 as the 2nd Battalion, 159th Aviation Regiment, stationed in Germany at Storck Barracks. In October 2015, as part of a restructuring initiative, it was reflagged as the 1st Battalion, 3rd Aviation Regiment at Katterbach, the name the battalion carried until this current transformation under the AATI.

“Katterbach has always been more than a duty station; it’s a home to generations of Soldiers, Families, and our German neighbors who have welcomed and supported us,” said Col. Adam R. Bock, commander of the 12th Combat Aviation Brigade. “As we reactivate the 2-159th Attack Battalion, let us also rededicate ourselves to the mission, to one another, and to the trust placed in us by our nation.”

Story by Capt. Lydia Laga

BOLESŁAWIEC, Poland – The 3rd Combat Aviation Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, assumed authority of U.S. Army aviation operations in Europe from the 1st Armored Division Combat Aviation Brigade during a transfer of authority ceremony held in Bolesławiec, Poland on October 28, 2025. This rotational handover underscores V Corps’ commitment to warfighting readiness, providing combat credible forces equipped with attack aviation as a cornerstone capability to remain lethal and agile in deterring potential adversaries.

“I think the one thing that 3rd CAB and 3rd Infantry Division brings to V Corps during this rotation is the absolute flexibility that this aviation brigade is capable of and has presented in many cases throughout its history. Absolute flexibility is our keystone as far the division and our aviation brigade is concerned,” said Col. Robert Harless, commander of 3rd Combat Aviation Brigade.

The transition marks the start of 3rd CAB’s rotation supporting Operation Atlantic Resolve and broader missions across the European theater. The brigade’s Soldiers, aircraft, and maintenance teams are now positioned across multiple sites to deliver critical aviation support. This includes reconnaissance, rapid troop movement, sustainment logistics, and fire support for U.S., NATO, and partner forces, enhancing interoperability, and enabling a unified response to transnational threats.

During its rotation, the 1st Armored Division Combat Aviation Brigade supported over 15 multinational training events, including the Polish Apache Initiative summit in January 2025 at Katterbach Army Airfield. This event, part of a three-phased approach to bolster attack aviation interoperability, brought together key leaders from the United States, Poland, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Australia.

Discussions focused on organizing training, fighting, and sustaining AH-64 Apache operations, refining joint tactics and improving coordination between Allied aviation and ground forces during large-scale joint operations across Europe. These efforts directly align with USAREUR-AF’s priorities of building readiness, driving experimentation, and accelerating integration of U.S. and NATO command and control.

As 3rd CAB assumes the mission, the brigade will continue building on those achievements, aligning operations with U.S. Army Europe and Africa’s priorities of readiness, experimentation, and transformation in contact (TiC). The brigade’s distributed presence will enable flexible, rapid responses to emerging requirements while supporting NATO regional defense plans and multinational exercises.

“I think this transfer of authority absolutely empowers every Soldier, within this combat aviation brigade, to represent first the United States of America, the support to the U.S. Constitution and lastly our alliances and partnerships with NATO we have throughout Europe, dating back to our World War I heritage as the 3rd Infantry Division,” Harless said.

Each rotational deployment contributes to the Army’s broader transformation agenda: evaluating network communications, adapting tactics to multi-domain environments, and modernizing aviation assets amid complex threats. For the 3rd CAB, this mission represents both continuity in sustaining deterrence and progress in shaping tomorrow’s aviation force.

Looking Back, November 2025
By Mark Albertson

Operation: DESERT SHIELD

* * * * *

The single biggest maneuver factor on the battlefield was the Apache.  If there was one leverage device that we used it was the Army general support aviation battalion.  In my judgment, for the number of soldiers involved, and the price involved, the biggest leverage we got out of the very few numbers of helicopters, the tiny number of helicopters, that we devoted to support logistics, and command and control in general:  the Signal battalion commander, the Maneuver Brigade commanders, the DISCOM commander, and the Division G3.  Had COL James King (DISCOM Commander) not had Army Aviation UH-60s, UH-1s and Chinooks, there would have been a far different outcome.  Many of us will never know the full story on that one.  It made the difference of getting POL to the right spot because we could move the key logistics around the battlefield.

Who won the battle?  Certainly, the artillery and the Apache.  It will be hard to remember that eleven years from now, when you are in charge of force development working 20 hours a day.  The artillery and the Apache are the hammers that make the endgame work.[1]

* * * * *

Economics of War

Colonel Tackaberry’s observation on the success of airmobility over Saddam’s host during Operation:  DESERT STORM must conform to the preparatory process.  For victory is not possible without same.  And to understand that victory, we must return to that series of events that led up to STORM.

Saddam marched into Kuwait, August 1990, and triggered the massive military response to evict him from Kuwait, known as Operations:  DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.  Shown with Saddam in this 1987 photo is Massoud Rajavi, leader of the Iranian People’s Mujahidin.

August 1, 1990, Saddam Hussein sent his army crashing into Kuwait.  One week later, he had annexed same.[2]  Yet Efraim Karsh provides the rationale for Saddam’s actions:

“Though the Iraqi regime went out of its way to portray the end of the war as a shining victory (that is, the Iran-Iraq War), the truth was that Iraq, no less than Iran, emerged from the eight-year conflict a crippled nation.  At least 200,000 Iraqis had lost their lives, while about 400,000 had been wounded and some 70,000 taken prisoner; an exorbitant price for a nation of 17 million people.  In 1980 Iraq could boast of a $35 billion foreign currency reserve; eight years later it had accumulated a foreign debt of some $80 billion—roughly twice the size of its Gross National Product.  This debt was extremely onerous, since repayment arrears and the consequent reluctance of foreign companies and governments to extend further credits meant that the reconstruction of Iraq from the destruction wrought by the war would have to be shelved.

“Economic estimates put the cost of reconstruction at $230 billion. . .    As things were a year after the termination of hostilities, Iraq’s oil revenues of $13 billion did not suffice even to cover ongoing expenditures:  With civilian imports approximating to $12 billion ($3 billion for foodstuffs), military imports exceeding $5 billion, debt payments totaling some $5 billion; and, transfers by foreign workers topping $1 billion, the regime needed an extra $10 billion per annum to balance its current deficit, before it could even think of reconstruction; and this without taking into account the substantial domestic economic costs, such as the $2.5-$7.9 billion defense expenditure.”[3]

The harsh economic realities unfolding underscored the political corner Saddam had painted himself into.  He needed cash and, in one quick hurry.  In February 1990, in Amman, Jordan, Saddam petitioned King Hussein and President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt to notify the Gulf States that Iraq wanted a postponement on the loans by its “principals” during the war with Iran.  And in addition, Baghdad wanted another $30 billion to boot.

Bottom line was that Iraq was over its head with $80 billion in red ink.  Kuwait chose not to overlook $65 billion in economic assistance to Iraq in its war against its Persian neighbor.  Baghdad countered that Iraq’s invasion of Iran was in Kuwait’s and Saudi Arabia’s benefit, since Saddam was carrying the Arab standard against the detested Shia Fundamentalist regime in Tehran.  This, in addition to Iraq’s complaints that Kuwait was reaping undeserved oil profits from the Rumaila oil field, located as it was in territory under dispute by both Iraq and Kuwait.  Baghdad, too, was hardly happy with the price of oil being depressed owing to the oil glut, blaming Kuwait for overproduction.[4]

“To pay off his country’s debts, Saddam Hussein needed oil prices to remain in the range of $25 a barrel (at the height of the Iran-Iraq War, prices had reached as high as $35 a barrel).  He watched in despair as the international price slumped to $14 by July 1990.  The Gulf, at peace once again, was now able to export all the oil the world needed.  To make matters worse, some Gulf States were producing well beyond their OPEC quotas.  Kuwait was one of the worst offenders.  Kuwait had its own reasons for breaking ranks with OPEC over production quotas.  Earlier in the 1980s, the Kuwaiti government had diversified its economy by investing in Western refineries and opening thousands of gasoline stations across Europe under the new brand name ‘Q-8,’ a homonym for ‘Kuwait.’  Kuwait’s crude oil exports increasingly went to its own facilities in the West.  The more crude oil the Kuwaitis sold to their refineries, the higher their profits in Europe.  These refining and marketing outlets generated higher profit margins than the export of crude and insulated Kuwait from variations in the price of crude oil.  Kuwait was more interested in generating maximum output than seeking the highest price per barrel by hewing to OPEC’s guidelines.”[5]

But what does the above economic explanation have to do with Army Aviation?  Simple, war is economics, as stated by none other than Adolf Hitler.  Economic primacy is the major factor for the preservation of the modern American military.  Paramount, if you will, of the preservation of American interests; which underscores the striving of fashioning an American military able to respond at a moment’s notice.  Same has been reinforced on the pages of Army Aviation magazine, the publisher of this work.  Yet . . .

“. . . As a strategic force, the Army must be prepared for instantaneous transition from peace to war.  Our Army is trained and ready to make that transition should we ever be called upon to do so.”[6]

That “instantaneous transition” as alluded to by General Vuono has already been showcased with the invasion of Grenada.  What will transpire in the liberation of Kuwait would provide a window, though, into Army Aviation’s role to be played in the AirLand battle concept.  What far-sighted individuals such as Generals William DePuy and Donn Starry were attempting to forge in the wake of the calamitous result of Vietnam, came to fruition during Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

* * * * *

From Staunch to Storm

The preparatory phase of Desert Shield/Storm was the Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988.  This conflict was an overt threat to Western energy interests, since more than fifty percent of the globe’s marketable and tradeable crude flowed from the area in contention  The basic preference of the West in this conflict can be seen within the analysis of Anthony Cordesman in 1987:

“The West will not benefit from U.S. efforts directly supporting Iraq with weapons or other major assistance.  This is a role that France and other European nations can perform.  U.S. support of Iraq should be indirect, and linked to efforts to open lines of communication to Iran and to strengthen the southern Gulf States.  In practice, this means using every political means to limit arms shipments to Iran, providing quiet intelligence support and providing political support for every serious peace initiative.

“The U.S. will, however, need to revitalize and sustain ‘Operation:  STAUNCH,’ the U.S. effort to halt the flow of arms to Iran that began in 1983.  It will need to continue to provide Iraq with agricultural credits, and be ready to support emergency aid by the EXIN (Export- Import) Bank and collective action by the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and World Bank.  The U.S. should continue to share intelligence with Iraq of a kind it has provided since mid-1984 and to make every effort to reduce the risk of a successful Iranian offensive or surprise attack.

“In contrast, Europe needs to halt its arms shipments to Iran as much as possible and to concentrate on building up economic ties.  It needs to be ready to extend and renegotiate loans, and help ensure Iraq can keep fighting.  France plays a particularly critical role.  Its arms supplies to Iraq are vital not only to preventing an Iranian victory, but to reducing Iraqi dependence on the USSR.”[7]

But the Iran-Iraq War proved a decisive factor in the destabilization of the most strategic area of the globe.  Saddam Hussein, seeking to position Iraq as the new major Arab power in lieu of Egypt, which no longer was, expected quick victory in severing the Iranian province Khuzestan, known to Arabs as “Arabistan,” which would most certainly solidify Saddam’s effort at domination of the Arab world, let alone, perhaps, OPEC.  For 70 to 80 percent of Iran’s oil reserves are in Khuzestan.  Not only would Saddam be able to improve his standing and political advantage among Arab councils, but would cause irreparable damage to the Shia standard bearer, Iran.

Both Iraq and Iran emerged from the resulting protracted conflict crippled.  The Iraqis, as mentioned previously, incurred upwards of 200,000 dead and another 400,000 wounded, with an additional 70,000 taken prisoner.  Heavy losses for a nation of only 17 million.  But a proper understanding of the opponent the Iraqis were engaged with for eight years is called for:

The Shia Fundamentalist regime in Iran had purged some 12,000 officers from the hated Shah’s regime that had been recently toppled.  The Khomeini government created its own militia, the Pasdaran or Revolutionary Guard, a political military formation organized to act as a prophylactic to potential counterrevolution.  Hence the aforementioned purge.[8]

On March 20, 1982, another military formation was formed in Iran:  Basij e-Mustazafin or Mobilization of the Deprived, featured the mobilization of the young, those ages 12-18, organized into what were literally, in many instances, suicide squads.

Many of these recruits came “mainly from rural areas or from the most devout Shi’ite families, these poorly trained and ill-equipped youths, some as young as 12, were little more than cannon fodder or human minesweepers sent in advance of Iran’s other military forces to clear fields, desert scrubland and marshes.  With their red and yellow headbands proclaiming Allah’s or Khomeini’s greatness, a piece of white cloth pinned to their uniforms as a symbol of a shroud, each one carrying his death with him, and a plastic key around their necks, issued personally by Khomeini as a symbol of their assured entry into paradise upon martyrdom, they charged towards Iraqi positions in total disregard of the danger to their lives, and to the shocked disbelief of their enemies.

“They came on in their hundreds, often walking straight across the minefields, triggering them with their feet as they are supposed to do. . . “  See page 62, “Iran’s Boy Soldiers,” The Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988, by Efraim Karsh.[9]

Such an opponent was pulling out all the stops to throw out the invader.  And, was emblematic of the brutality of this conflict.  A conflict which, together with the rise of the Shia fundamentalist regime in Tehran, would help to harden the lines of division between Shias and Sunnis and lend to what will become the faceoff between the Shia standard bearer Iran versus the Wahhabi agenda in Riyadh.

The year following the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the Soviets would evacuate Afghanistan, presaging the decline and collapse of not only the Soviet Union but also its vassal states in Eastern and Central Europe.  The bipolar balance of power that had replaced the end of European domination of global affairs as of 1945, had given way to a unipolar world as the United States became the sole superpower.  Yet the peace dividend that many expected has proven to be an illusion, one typical of the human condition.  For China was coming on as a competitive power; as was India, Japan was still in the game.  The European Union was trying to find itself in an uncertain New World Order, as was a struggling Russia.

Yet the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan and the ensuing Carter Administration assistance of the Mujahideen, carried forward by the Reagan Administration, opened a new conflict, that of the Jihadis.  If they could throw an infidel power out of Afghanistan, then what could they do in the Middle East, after centuries of tiresome Western meddling and incursions.

* * * * *

Shield to Storm

“At about 2 a.m. (Baghdad time) on August 2, 1990, three Iraqi Republican Guard divisions invaded Kuwait.  One proceeded down a coast road to Kuwait City, a second seized the inland oil fields, and the third proceeded to the Saudi Arabian border.  Kuwaiti A-4 aircraft and Chieftain tanks fought for three days until their fuel and ammunition were exhausted.  The small Kuwaiti Navy also made a valiant showing, with the last two fast attack craft escaping while firing at pursuing Iraqi tanks.

“Iraqi forces quickly captured Kuwait City and the Emir’s palace, while the Kuwaiti ruler, Sheik Taber al-Ahmed al-Sabah, fled to Saudi Arabia and established a government-in-exile.  On August 3^rd, the remainder of Kuwait was captured and by the 4^th, Iraqi forces were massed along the Kuwaiti-Saudi border for a possible invasion of Saudi Arabia.  If Iraq occupied Saudi Arabia, it would not only establish itself as the secular leader of the Arab world, but would also control forty-five percent of the world’s oil.”[10]

If Saddam had banked on the Soviet Union acting as a counterweight to the U.S. and NATO taking action to prevent his Anschluss with Kuwait, he most certainly had miscalculated.  For the Soviet monolith was well along that progression of collapse; in addition to the unfolding demise of the Warsaw Pact, which demonstrated unequivocally what that “military alliance” really was, an empire.[11]  Perhaps, too, the Iraqi dictator had thought that America had not recovered from the Vietnam debacle.

Following Saddam’s steamrollering of Kuwait, the United States and its NATO allies poured military personnel and equipment into Saudi Arabia.  But due to the efforts of James Baker, forces other than that of the United States and NATO formed a broad-based coalition.[12]

“President George Bush, Sr., ordered American military forces to Saudi Arabia on August 7, 1990.  By August 11, 13 Army helicopters had arrived in country.  By the time the ground war began on 24 February 1991, XVIII Airborne Corps had 920 aircraft in Saudi Arabia, VII Corps had deployed 808, and Echelon Above Corps (EAC) and Army Special Forces had 160 for a theater total of 1,888 Army aircraft.  During the period of August 1990 through March 1991, 2,010 Army aircraft flew 182,960 hours as part of the Army team.  Ten aviation brigades directly participated in combat operations and other aviation forces provided essential combat support and combat services support to the theater.”[13]

The AH-1G Huey Cobra was Army Aviation’s first true attack helicopter.  Coming out of Vietnam, it will be the Army’s attack helicopter until the advent of the AH-64 Apache.  The Cobra still performed in the Operation:  DESERT STORM.

Yet according to Major General Donald R. Williamson, “Operation Desert Shield found the U.S. Army Aviation Systems Command (AVSCOM) operating on an underfunded spares budget supporting an over-programmed flying hour program.”[14] Production, though, was expanded and accelerated.  Additional stocks, transport of supplies, maintenance of aircraft and equipment to accommodate not only a noticeable increase in flying time, but the expected wear and tear with operations in a challenging environment.

“This stepped up activity included over $300 million in new procurement, 2,000 spares programs accelerated, and 600 depot programs surged.  This magnified response by both AVSCOM and industry was only hampered by lead times for raw materials and in some instances, forgings and castings.”[15]

The AH-64 Apache became and still is the Army’s premier attack helicopter, having assumed that mantle from the AH-1 Cobra.

In face of the wear and tear in the desert, Colonel Thomas W. Garrett, Commander, Aviation Brigade, 101^st Airborne Division (Air Assault), from Fort Campbell, Kentucky, explained some of the conditions faced even in the assembly areas:

“Even at semi improved areas, the sand and dust quickly began to exact a heavy maintenance toll.  Blade erosion, engine problems, and avionics trouble were the most worrisome.  Our newest aircraft have faired the best.  AH-64, OH-58D and newer UH-60s (in order) have held up well.  Dust control has become a major concern.  Low cost, widely available, and easily applied dust control measures are urgently needed.

UH-60 Black Hawk replaced the aging UH-1 Huey as the utility helicopter for the AirLand Battle Concept.

“Desert night flying has proved to be the toughest of challenges.  We are adjusting tactics and techniques to allow us to continue to accomplish our mission, but we had to learn the hard way.  Heads up displays for goggles, continued goggle refinement in the areas of acuity and field-of-view, forward looking radar altimeters, and aural altitude warning would greatly enhance our ability to conduct safer night desert operations.  A system like the USAF’s ‘Harvest Bare’ needs to be reviewed by Army Aviation.  Crew rest, especially for night crews, is next to impossible.  A portable base like ‘Harvest Bare’ would be a present from Heaven for many an aviation brigade here in Saudi Arabia.

“Accurate navigation in a featureless desert, day or night, has been challenging.  Old maps coupled with shifting dunes and lake beds make even Doppler update waypoints suspect (if you’re lucky enough to have Doppler), allowing for drift errors to build.  We must press on with GPS hand-held commercial LORANS, which have been a life saver.”[16]

Perhaps it was Major General Rudolph Ostovich, III, then Chief, Aviation Branch, Commanding General and Commandant, U.S. Army Aviation Logistics School, who observed that with the coming end of the Cold War, the Army was to be reduced, from 28 divisions to 22, resulting, then, in fewer forward deployed forces.  “The forces stationed in CONUS will provide both reinforcing combat power for forward deployed forces as well as a contingency capability to respond quickly and decisively in support of our national security interests.  Our contingency forces will include heavy, light, and special operations units and there will be a premium on deployable weapons systems that are both versatile and lethal.  Army Aviation stands at the forefront of these initiatives.  Pound for pound, we are the most deployable, versatile, and lethal of today’s Army forces.”[17]

He continues his analysis, thus:  “In response to the challenges in our future, CG, TRADOC initiated Studies and General Officer workshops to redefine our doctrine and identify alternative balance force structures.  Through these concept development vehicles, we examined an emerging doctrine tagged AirLand Battle-Future.  The concept is founded on a precept that future battlefields will be nonlinear.  By this, we mean that no longer will we have the forces to line up hub to hub or rotor to rotor and stretch from coast to coast.  We accept the fact that there may be large gaps between formations.  We will no longer concentrate our effort to seize and hold terrain.”[18]  Rather we will focus our destructive power on the enemy force.  We will employ state-of-the art intelligence gathering sensors and air cavalry to find and fix the enemy.  Attack helicopters, Close Air Support/Battlefield Air Interdiction, and long-range artillery fires will shape the battlefield for decisive destruction of the enemy through high speed and dynamic maneuver.  Depth and rapid concentration of overwhelming destructive power are the essence of aviation’s contribution to our future as a fighting doctrine.”[19]

* * * * *

Endnotes

[1]  See pages 28 and 29, “24^th Aviation Brigade in Desert Storm,” Part I, Army Aviation, June 30, 1991, by Colonel Burt S. Tackaberry.

[2]  See page 152, Chapter 8, “Bush, Clinton, and the Triumph of Wilsonianism,” The Folly of Empire, by John B. Judis.

[3]  See page 89, “A Costly Exercise in Futility,” The Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988, by Efraim Karsh.

[4]  See page 17, Part 1, “The Prelude,” Military Lessons of the Gulf War, by Bruce W. Watson; Bruce George, Labor MP; Peter Tsouras and B.L. Cyr.

[5]  See page 442, Chapter 14, “After the Cold War,” The Arabs, A History, by Eugene Rogan.

[6]  See page 4, “Training and Readiness,” Army Aviation, May 1, 1989, by General Carl E. Vuono.

[7]  See page 158, Chapter Eight, “The Impact on Western Policy,” The Iran-Iraq War and Western Security, 1984-87, by Anthony H. Cordesman.

[8]  In Egypt, beginning in 2011, the uprising against Hosni Mubarak, eventually resulted in the Muslim Brotherhood attaining power, though only briefly.  The Egyptian armed forces reclaimed power, unseating the Brotherhood.  Understood among the Egyptian Officer Class was the brutal purging of the Shah’s officer class by the Shia fundamentalists in Iran.  History, here, In Egypt, was not to be repeated.

[9]  Throughout history, nations or empires attempting to deal with manpower shortages, or generate manpower superiority in the face of material disadvantages or seek to galvanize patriotism or, seek to create a more disciplined environment, utilized aspects of the above to create a military advantage.  For instance, Stalin’s infamous Order No. 227, July 28, 1942, “Not a Step Back,” which was to stiffen the spine of Soviet soldiery.  No commander had the right to retreat without specifically being ordered to do so.

Known as penal battalions or Shtrafbats, such troops were cannon fodder, as they ran through minefields or assaulted enemy positions prior to regular line troops.  Soldiers consigned to such units were considered to have exhibited the less than required intestinal fortitude against the “fascist invader.”

Blocking detachments, formations of NKVD (forerunner of the KGB) lay in wait behind the lines to enforce the compliance of those who retreated.  Though it was possible to be reassigned to a regular unit when a candidate had demonstrated that he was ready for such a hoped for transfer.

Upwards of 442,700 Soviet soldiers served in the penal battalions.  This, in addition to the fact, that Stalin had some 158,000 shot for cowardice or incompetence.  This included 248 generals and admirals, so Stalin did have a more “liberal” view on maintaining discipline.   Indeed, Stalin is reputed to have replied, to a question as to the Shtrafbats, that “. . . it took a brave man to be a coward in the Red Army.”

Germany, too, 1944-1945, resorted to young teens when hard up for men.  February 1945, Hitler ordered the induction of 6,000 boys, ages 15 to 16, to “beef up the rear defense line.”  See page 236, Chapter 9, “The Final Sacrifice,” Hitler’s Children, by Gerhard Rempel.  There was also the Werewolves, German youth organized to conduct behind the lines disruption and sabotage, as well as carryout assassinations of enemy soldiers, agents and German “collaborators.”  Indeed, on March 25, 1945, the American-installed mayor of Aachen, Franz Oppenhoff, was liquidated by a local Werewolf commando squad.  Such squads of Hitler Youth were active to well into 1946.  See pages 182-184, Chapter 10, “The End of the Hitler Youth,” Hitler Youth, by Brenda Ralph Lewis.

[10]  See page 15, Part I:  “The Prelude,” 1:  “The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait,” Military Lessons of the Gulf War, by Bruce W. Watson; Bruce George, MP; Peter Tsouras and B.L. Cyr.

[11]  Adolf Hitler returned home, to Austria, March 12, 1938; to which he even brought a large circle of friends for the happy occasion, that being the success of the German Army.  Known as Operation:  OTTO, the absorption of Austria into the German Reich, is known to history as the Anschluss or annexation, which was in violation of the Versailles Treaty, Section VI, Article 80.  To Saddam and other Iraqis, Kuwait was known as the 19^th province.

[12]  Such contributors as:

Afghanistan:  300 Mujahideen troops (under Joint Forces Command).

Bahrain:  3,500 troops (under Joint Forces Command).

Bangladesh:  2,500 troops (under CENTCOM administrative command).

Czechoslovakia:  350 men, chemical troops and 170 to Saudi Arabia (under administrative command).

Egypt:  40,000 troops, 400 tanks, 600 APCs and 300 artillery pieces.

Kuwait:  7,000 troops (under administrative command).

Morocco:  2,000 troops (under CENTCOM administrative command).

Niger:  400 troops (under CENTCOM administrative command).

Oman:  2,500 troops and 24 tanks (under Joint Forces Command).

Pakistan:  10,000 troops (under Joint Forces Command).

Qatar:  4,000 troops (under Joint Forces Command).

Saudi Arabia:  95,000 troops, 550 tanks (under Joint Forces Command).

Senegal:  500 troops (under ENTCOM administrative command).

Syria:  20,000 troops (under Joint Forces Command).

United Arab Emirates:  4,000 troops (under Joint Forces Command).  See page 240, E., Ground Forces, Military Lessons of the Gulf War, by Bruce W. Watson; Bruce George, MP; Peter Tsouras and B.L. Cyr.

[13]  See pages 44, 45 and 54, by Major General Robert S. Frix and Major Ronald A. Carter, “Third Army View of Desert Shield/Storm,” Army Aviation, Vol. 52, No. 12, December 31, 2003.

[14]  See page 14, “AVSCOM:  A Desert Shield Overview,” Army Aviation, Vol. 40, Nos. 3 & 4, March-April 1991, by Major General Donald R. Williamson.

[15]  See page 14, Major General Donald R. Williamson.

[16]  See page 23, “DESERT SHIELD:  The Challenges,” Army Aviation, Vol. 39, No. 11, November 30, 1990, by Colonel Thomas W. Garrett.

[17]  See page 12, “Contingency Warfare:  Our Strong Suit,” Army Aviation, Vol. 39, No. 10, October 31, 1990, by Major General Rudolph Ostovich, III.

[18]  Major General Ostovich, with his wonderfully orchestrated effort of how America must prosecute its military requirements in the post-Soviet era, is also fortifying a reality that has existed since November 25-26, 1950, when 300,000 Chinese troops entered the Korean War, forcing a ceasefire on July 27, 1953, thereby insuring the survival of the North Korean regime; but which also put the finishing touches on Levee en Masse.  A period when Army doctrine saw to the destruction of the enemy forces so as to bring the opposing power to the conference table for the declaration of terms.  Such was highly successful in 1865, 1918 and 1945.

Of course, beginning with the Bomb, Levee en Masse, conscripting entire populations and economies for war came to a screeching halt, especially in the West, where many populations in the developed world most likely would not show up (just after 9/11 in the United States being an example) for a war.  The Great War, 1914-1922; 1931-1945, is largely responsible for this after the horrible harvest of humanity, upwards of some 75,000,000 souls, mostly on the European continent.

General Ostovich notes the necessity of destroying the enemy force, in particular since American troops will most likely field the smaller team.  The example here is Genghis Khan’s Mongol Army:  Mobility was the key to success, of what was arguably the most victorious army in the history of Man.  For upon the defeat of an opponent, his host was pursued and hounded until eradicated; in addition to a finishing stroke applied to the leader himself.  Certainly saves the distribution of forces to occupy a territory for the purposes of policing it for cleaning out pockets of resistance.

[19]  During Operation BARBAROSSA, Hitler’s overriding concern was the destruction of Stalin’s Red Army, in lieu of taking and holding territory.  The Fuhrer understood Napoleon’s failure to hold Moscow in 1812.  But this was the Soviet Union of 1941, not France of 1940.  The mammoth size of the Soviet colossus helped the Soviet Army survive the Nazi onslaught, as did Russia’s most faithful allies, General Winter and General Mud.  A grander analysis, though, is beyond the scope of this work; despite which the point as noted should be readily understood and well taken.

* * * * *

Bibliography

Cordesman, Anthony H., The Iran-Iraq War and Western Security, 1984-1987, Jane’s Publishing, Company, Ltd., London, 1987.

Friedman, Norman, Desert Victory:  The War for Kuwait, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 1991.

Fris, Major General Robert S. and Carter, Major Ronald A., “Third Army View of DESERT SHIELD/STORM,” Army Aviation, Vol. 52, No. 12, Army Aviation Publications, Inc., Monroe, Ct., December 31, 2003.

Garrett, Colonel Thomas W., “DESERT SHIELD:  The Challenges,” Army Aviation, Vol. 39, No. 11, Army Aviation Publications, Inc., Westport, Ct., November 30, 1990.

Judis, John B., The Folly of Empire, A Lisa Drew Book/Scribner, New York, NY., 2004.

Karsh, Efraim, The Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988, Essential Histories, Osprey Publishing, Oxford, UK, 2002.

Lewis, Brenda Ralph, Hitler Youth:  The Hitler Jugend in War and Peace, 1933-1945, MBI Publishing, Company, Osceola, Wisconsin, copyright Amber Books, Ltd., 2000.

Ostovich, Major General Rudolph, III, “Contingency Warfare:  Our Strong Suit,” Army Aviation, Vol. 39, No. 10, Army Aviation Publications, Inc., Westport, Ct., October 31, 1990.

Rempel, Gerhard, Hitler’s Children:  The Hitler Youth and the SS, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill and London, 1989.

Rogan, Eugene, The Arabs:  A History, Basic Books, New York, NY., 2009.

Tackaberry. Colonel Burt S., “Part I:  24^th Aviation Brigade in DESERT STORM,” Army Aviation, Vol. 40. No. 6, Army Aviation Publications, Inc., Westport, Ct., June 30, 1991.

Vuono, General Carl E., “Training and Readiness:  Challenges for Army Aviation,” Army Aviation, Vol. 38, No. 5, Army Aviation Publications, Inc., Westport, Ct., May 31, 1989.

Watson, Bruce W.; George, Bruce, MP; Tsouras, Peter and Cyr, B.L., Military Lessons of the Gulf War, Greenhill Books, Presidio Press, Novato, California, 1991.

Williamson, Major General Donald R., “AVSCOM:  A Desert Shield Overview,” Army Aviation, Vol. 40, Nos 3 & 4, Army Aviation Publications, Inc., Westport, Ct., March-April 1991.

The decision authorizes the procurement of Block II aircraft in FY25 and FY26. Combined with previously approved Congressionally directed procurements, the Army will field CH-47F Block II helicopters to two Combat Aviation Brigades, modernizing the Army’s heavy-lift fleet for future large-scale combat operations.

The CH-47F Block II upgrades existing CH-47F Block I aircraft through a recapitalization process. The Block II significantly improves the CH-47F fleet, giving commanders increased payloads, extended range, and improved sustainability to create the standoff areas demanded by contested logistics environments. With an increased maximum gross weight of 54,000 pounds, the aircraft permits operational commanders to move more materiel, Soldiers, and fuel, farther and faster.

“With the Block II Chinook’s increased gross weight and increased torque available, we can carry more,” said Chief Warrant Officer 2 Jordan Brooks, Golf Company, 6-101 GSAB’s maintenance test pilot. “Imagining just a single serial of Block II Chinooks versus Block I Chinooks, (Block II Chinooks) can carry more Soldiers and equipment, and carry them further.” For example, missions that currently require two sorties with Block I can be completed with a single Block II sortie, reducing crew exposure and accelerating operational tempo.

The Block II Common Avionics Architecture System (CAAS) uses a Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA), ensuring that the platform can adapt to technological advances. This architecture allows the integration of degraded visual environment (DVE) sensors and the introduction of semi-autonomous flight capabilities with the potential for full autonomy in the future.

The commonality with the special operations MH-47G variant lets the Army and SOCOM leverage and build on each other’s modernization efforts and further enhances efficiency. By sharing major components, the Army reduces both production costs and long-term sustainment expenses, while simplifying logistics support for units in the field.

International interest in the CH-47F BLK II aircraft continues to grow. One partner nation has committed to 60 aircraft and several other partner nations have expressed interest in acquiring Block II to strengthen their own heavy-lift capabilities. This global demand underscores the platform’s reputation as a proven workhorse with cutting-edge upgrades tailored for 21st-century warfare.

“Block II is about more than incremental improvement—it’s about ensuring the Army and the Joint Force retain a heavy-lift advantage in contested environments,” said COL Jennie Conlon, the PM of Cargo Helicopters. “With added payload, range, and digital growth capacity, the Chinook will continue to deliver for Soldiers and evolve to remain ahead of future battlefield environments.”

As the Army prepares for the future fight, the CH-47F Block II represents both continuity and transformation: retaining the trusted reliability of the Chinook while enabling the modernization required to compete and win against peer adversaries.