FORT NOVOSEL, Ala.—The Fort Novosel community welcomed Maj. Gen. Clair A. Gill as U.S. Army Aviation Center of Excellence and Fort Novosel commander, and bid farewell to outgoing commander, Maj. Gen. Michael C. McCurry, during a Change of Command ceremony at Howze Field July 26, 2024.
In this role, Gill serves as installation’s senior commander, flight school commandant, and as the branch chief for Army Aviation.
Ceremony host Lt. Gen. Milford H. Beagle Jr., U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth commander, welcomed attendees, thanked family members for their support, and said the day was all about “leaders, legacy and likelihood.”
“We recognize and pay honor to two great leaders today, Mac McCurry, Clair Gill and their families,” Beagle said. “They have a ton of similarities–their commonality of calloused hands, bad backs, bad knees from spending over 50 years in a cockpit of an airframe in service to our nation. Thank you both for that.”
He said McCurry and Gill both have roots that run deep in Army aviation: McCurry’s father and father-in-law are both retired Army aviators, and Gill’s grandfather served as a B-17 pilot during World War II. Both leaders also met their spouses at then-Fort Rucker.
“Clair, your goal is not to create a new legacy but rather determine how you weave a different but complimentary legacy into an existing strong legacy fabric that already exists here at Fort Novosel,” Beagle said.
“The likelihood that you will succeed because of the great team that you have here, this tremendous community, the power of the aviation community, is the highest likelihood of them all,” Beagle. “Clair and Fran, enjoy the next chapter of this journey. It’s going to be awesome.”
Gill arrives at USAACE from his most recent duty position as J-3 deputy director for Regional Operations and Force Management for the Joint Staff at the Pentagon.
Among his previous assignments, he served as director of Army Aviation on the HQDA staff, as executive officer to the Under Secretary of the Army, and as Deputy Commanding General (Support), 101st Airborne Division.
Gill commanded the 10th Combat Aviation Brigade, simultaneously deploying the unit to Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Korea, and Europe.
He commanded 4th Battalion (Assault), 101st Aviation Regiment, 101st Airborne Division and deployed the battalion to FOB Shank (Logar, Afghanistan), supporting combat operations throughout Regional Command – East.
He previously served on the Joint Reconnaissance Task Force, Joint Special Operations Command, and also commanded an Assault Helicopter Company (Black Widows) in 9th Battalion, 101st Aviation Regiment.
Gill also completed a Senior Service College fellowship at the Central Intelligence Agency, and is a master Army aviator with more than four years in combat.
Gill welcomed and thanked attendees, family, Soldiers, and those who participated in the change of command ceremony and made it possible.
“It is so good to be back in the Wiregrass and to be home at Fort Novosel with so many teammates new and old, many with whom we have served and deployed over the course of our career,” Gill said.
I truly am looking forward to working with all of you to continue to deliver aviation to our Army,” he said.
In the 1990s, Gill’s wife Fran, an Army aviation veteran, was a company commander at Cairns, and he was aide-de-camp to the commanding general, Gill explained.
“I cut my teeth here in the Aviation Center, much like many of you here today. I learned a lot of technical skills that would serve me well, but nothing burned into my being more than the fact that we train army warfighters here who happen to fly complex machines that enhance and provide the decisive edge to the combined arms fight,” he said.
Gill said though critics may argue the relevance and survivability of Army aviation in the future, he feels confident about the branch.
“To that, I’d reference you to Teddy Roosevelt’s 1910 speech about the citizenship in a republic. This team is in the arena to win. We haven’t seen an adversary moderately comparable to the U.S. Army’s aviation. The world’s tyrants only wish they could fight at night and in the terrain like we do; our enemies wish they had the professional mechanics and crew members that we grow and train. They tremble at the integration of our technology with our selfless commitment to our mission,” Gill said.
“With a modernized U.S. Army aviation, I sleep well thinking about what our Army brings to the joint fight even in an era of global unrest,” he said. “We will be engaged, we will be ready when called. And we’ll answer with that ominous sound of rotors coming over the horizon.”
Beagle lauded the McCurrys’ service to the Army and Army Aviation as they prepare to transition.
“We could spend half a day discussing the impact Mac McCurry has had on Fort Novosel, on the aviation community, and our Army. Mac truly walks away having left a legacy,” Beagle said.
Beagle said McCurry has been a “good ancestor,” and his impact will be felt for years to come. His accomplishments include an impact on aviation simulations for the foreseeable future, refocused warrant officer professional military education prior to the point of need, set a vision for the branch that would make his predecessors proud, and provided valuable counsel to senior Army leaders.
“Your work is greatly appreciated and valued, and (Gen. Gary Brito) wanted me to relay the same thing this morning, especially by people like me who have had the opportunity to serve closely with you during my 20 plus months of command,” Beagle said.
McCurry gave a special shoutout to members of the Orange Hat class in the audience that reported to then Fort Rucker with him in 1989, whose bond remains strong, as he thanked attendees.
He reflected on his family’s history at Fort Novosel, including seeing his father’s flight school class flying in formation over Howze Field in the 1970s.
“Today we pile two more years of memories from here into our ruck sack and our family scrap book and we’ve given another generation of McCurrys roots in the Wiregrass,” McCurry said.
He thanked the Wiregrass community for their support, commended the team he has worked with while at USAACE, and said he is proud to hold the title of Army aviator.
“The world is a dangerous place, and Army aviation as a part of the combined arms team is committed to fight and win anytime, anywhere on behalf of our nation,” McCurry said.
McCurry said Army aviation exists for one reason—the Soldier on the ground.
“If that ground Soldier needs to know what’s over the next hill, we find out. If they need to be put in a position of relative advantage, we put them there. If they need beans, bullets or water, we deliver. And God forbid if that soldier is laying wounded on the field of battle, we are coming to get them. Remember that, and we will always uphold the sacred trust,” McCurry said.
McCurry will now move on to serve at Army Futures Command in Austin, Texas.
FORT WAINWRIGHT, Alaska – Soldiers assigned to Charlie Company, 1-52 General Support Aviation Battalion, recently performed an aeromedical evacuation of an injured Airman from the Yukon Training Area.
The Airman had fallen in a trench and was believed to have a back injury. Due to the severity of the injury, roughness of the unpaved road, and distance to the hospital, personnel on scene requested evacuation by air. The aeromedical evacuation unit, known as Arctic Dustoff, lifted off from Ladd Field at Fort Wainwright 15 minutes after receiving the notification for the mission.
Upon arrival in the training area, pilot Capt. Caleb Kifer made the decision to drop off paramedic Staff Sgt. Christopher Edwards to evaluate the Airman and then immediately lift off again while Edwards worked.
“Because the landing zone at the point of injury was small, we were not able to displace on the ground far enough to allow him to work clear of the rotor wash,” Kifer said. The terrain also inhibited communication for the air crew, so orbiting the area while Edwards worked enabled them to radio back to higher headquarters and air traffic control to provide updates.
Sixteen minutes after delivering Edwards to begin treatment, the helicopter lifted off again for the flight to Fairbanks Memorial Hospital.
“The expertise and proficiency of the duty crew, namely our flight paramedic Staff Sgt. Edwards, as well as the Air Force medics on the ground, enabled a seamless and timely response to our sister service member in their time of need,” said Kifer.
The crew landed at Fairbanks Memorial Hospital at 4:36 p.m. and transferred the patient to the care of hospital staff before heading back to the hangar.
Based out of Fort Wainwright in central Alaska, the unit operates 24 hours a day, seven days a week, to provide aeromedical evacuation support for thousands of service members training at the installation each year. Additionally, the unit works with the Alaska Rescue Coordination Center and local emergency services to provide rescue coverage in northern Alaska’s remote wilderness areas for civilians as well.
This life-saving mission is a collaborative effort, and every member of the team is vital to its success. Along with Edwards and Kifer, the crew for this mission included Warrant Officer Walter Hastings and Spc. Blade Lee.
The District of Columbia Army Aviation Command provides spouse orientation flights during family day at Davison Army Airfield, Fort Belvoir, Va., on August 11, 2024. In addition to a capabilities brief presented by the State Aviation Officer and senior leaders, spouses and family members learned more about DCARNG assets to include rotary-wing and fixed-wing operational support airlifts, medical evacuation capabilities, and interagency partnerships. (U.S. Army National Guard photo by Ayan Sheikh)
U.S. Army National Guard and U.S. Navy flight crews visit with Vietnam veterans following a flyover of a memorial service honoring Capt. Allen Weseleskey Aug. 16, 2024, at Chambers Field in Norfolk, Virginia. Weseleskey, and many of the veterans who visited the air crews, were assigned to the Helicopter Light Attack Squadron 3, or HAL-3, nicknamed the Seawolves, a quick reaction, armed helicopter squadron during the Vietnam War. (U.S. Army National Guard photo by Sgt. 1st Class Terra C. Gatti)
In May or June after the Summit each year, the National Executive Group gathers at the Connecticut AAAA National Office to review and assess our organization’s posture and status, and to discuss and chart the next couple of years activities and initiatives.
The NEG consists of four elected officers: me as president, MG (Ret.) Wally Golden as senior vice president, BG (Ret.) Tim Edens as treasurer and MG (Ret.) Todd Royar as secretary. It also includes our two appointed vice presidents – CW4 (Ret.) Becki Chambers, VP for membership, and LTC (Ret.) Jan Drabczuk, VP for chapters.
This year after Becki and Jan briefed membership and chapter programs and initiatives, the four elected officers focused on the review and assessment of the AAAA national business model. Specifically, we reviewed the membership dues structure (which has not changed since 1998, in either corporate or individual member dues), AAAA national event topics, and our event/forum registration policies and fees for both exhibitors and individuals.
The good news is that the AAAA is in the strongest position it has ever been in terms of membership (which is at an all-time high of over 21,000) and fiscal position (currently have net assets financially at a record level). That said, questioning what our future organizational vulnerabilities could be, and discussing what efforts and programs were required to ensure we ‘survive and thrive’ organizationally, help bound our focus and energy during the review.
First, although our Annual Summit has grown substantially over the years, the inflation in vendor costs, especially since COVID, has outpaced our increased exhibit sales. Our smaller events (Aviation Survivability, Luther Jones, and Cribbins) are losing money; the positive Annual Summit net revenue each year is what solely underwrites all the other shortfalls in membership dues and smaller-event net revenues.
The vulnerability here is that if we must cancel another Summit (or two… as occurred during COVID), we have to ensure our Emergency Fund is robust enough to sustain the organization for two straight years, without any Summit income/revenue. We are currently at $4.6M on the way to the ceiling of $7.01M in the Emergency Fund that will be required to meet the two-year self-sustaining goal. And yes, we do in fact still have event cancellation Insurance (those policies yielded over $6M in total to AAAA for the cancelled 2020 and 2021 Summits), but now those policies going forward specifically exclude any ‘pandemic’ coverage, which is no longer available to any organization.
In a comparative analysis, we assessed like/similar military organizations and associations to determine how AAAA fit and compared; it did not take much to figure out that even just considering inflation since 1998, we had some further work and analysis to do. We certainly don’t have all the answers yet but are working them… and we will propose a plan to the full National Executive Board at the November meeting in Huntsville. Likewise, we assessed where we stood regarding exhibitor fees and policies, and we will be recommending some changes there as well.
Although we are enjoying record-setting metrics now, our assessment is that we have to pivot from our financial dependance on one positive revenue event, the AAAA Annual Summit. We must ensure that our great organization is protected long into the future, and to continue to provide world class support to you all, our Army Aviation Soldiers and Families, no matter what.
MG Walt Davis, U.S. Army Retired
36th President, AAAA
Looking Back, August 2024
By Mark Albertson
This month’s Looking Back is from the February 28, 2013 issue of Army Aviation.[1] It is rewritten as an extended version.
* * * * *
If we are successful, the Air Mobile Concept will be a dynamic advance for the Army.If we are not, we will go back to flying Piper Cubs.If we have that much left, and the Army and the country as a whole will lose one of the things that . . . can mean the difference between victory and defeat in future land combat. Colonel George P. “Phip” Seneff, Jr., 11th Aviation Group, 11th Air Assault Division (Test).[2]
* * * * *
On August 20, 1962, the Army’s Tactical Mobility Requirements Board, AKA the Howze Board, released its findings on what would come to be known as the Airmobility Concept.These findings were based on computer wargame simulations[3] and actual field exercises.[4]And the vehicle of choice to carry forward the concept . . . the helicopter.[5]And the living embodiment of the criteria set forth by the Howze Board . . . the 11th Air Assault Division (Test).
Lieutenant General Hamilton H. Howze urged the conversion of the 82nd Airborne into the air assault division projected by his committee.He was overruled by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, who instead authorized an expansion in Army personnel for fiscal year 1964, from 960,000 to 975,000.
This would enable the new unit to be organized from scratch.And the order for such a force came down on January 7, 1963. And the 11th Air Assault Division (Test) was activated at Fort Benning, Georgia on February 15, 1963, Brigadier Harry W.O. Kinnard in command.[6]
11th Air Assault Division (Test) has its unit roots in the 11th Airborne Division.The “Angels” were activated on February 25, 1943, seeing action in the Philippines at Leyte and Luzon.
With the cessation of hostilities, the 11th Airborne landed in Japan as part of the post-war army of occupation of the Home Islands. The “Angels” were deactivated on June 30, 1958; reactivated briefly on February 1, 1963, then re-designated 11th Air Assault Division (Test) on the 15th.
Among those units attached to the 11th AAD early on were those of the 3rd Battalion from the 187th Infantry Regiment.It “immediately began a series of training exercises to test new concepts and identify new tactical methods.The battalion was fortunate in that the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel J.J. Hennessey, had participated in the limited unit tests of the Howze Board while he was stationed at Fort Bragg.[7]
Hennessey’s battalion began their training in April 1963, with the division having been joined by an aviation battalion, the 227th Assault Helicopter Battalion.The battalion initially focused at the platoon level, gradually increasing in scope and size through the battalion level.[8]
In addition to the activation of the 11th AAD, a logistics support unit was organized in the name of the 10th Air Transport Brigade.[9]
Training focus was on air assault; drilling infantrymen on the new concepts of joining combat and engaging the enemy.Provisional supply bases of fuel and stores were made available and organized to keep pace with helicopter units on a fluid battlefield.
Hence the idea of FARP or the Forward Arming and Re-Fueling Point.[10]
Another innovation was artillery fire support for the landing zones.This included rocket-firing helicopters to support attacks by air-assault troops; bolstered, in part, by experience gleaned from Army Aviation support of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) units in Southeast Asia.[11]
In September 1963, Air Assault I exercises at Fort Stewart in Georgia, saw the Airmobility Concept put through its paces on the battalion level of operations.The following year, October 1964, Air Assault II was conducted and by comparison, an exercise on a far grander scale.
Air Assault II sprawled across two states, the Carolinas, taking in some 4,000,000 acres.Thirty-five thousand troops were committed, with the 11th AAD squaring off against the 82nd Airborne Division; the latter engaged in the role of an enemy conventional force as well as that of insurgent opposition.
The first four weeks slated for the exercise was conducted during a hurricane, Isabel.Flying conditions were abysmal; a swirling vortex of wind, rain and fog, leaving many aviators peering through windscreens opaque as a bucket of mud.
Yet 120 helicopters managed to shuttle an infantry brigade 100 miles through the ire of Mother Nature.
General Kinnard summed up the results of the Air Assault thus:
Beyond what I believe to be its capabilities to perform roles normal to other divisions, I am even more impressed by what I feel is its ability to perform in unique ways beyond the abilities of other divisions.
For example, in a low-scale war, I believe it can exert control over a much wider area and with much more speed and flexibility and with much less concern for the problems of interdicted ground communications or of difficult terrain.
In higher scales of war, I see this division an unparalleled reserve or screening force capable of operating over very large frontages.
By properly picking times, places and methods, I believe it can also operate with devastating effect against the rear of the enemy.
Faced with the threat or use of nuclear weapons, I believe it can widely disperse and yet, when required, quickly mass (even over irradiated ground, blown down forests or rubbled cities), strike an enemy, then disperse again.[12]
Kinnard’s men would have a chance to showcase their training in Southeast Asia.Up to 1965, airmobility consisted, for the most part, of Army aviators ferrying South Vietnamese troops into action against the Viet Cong.
But Hanoi was raising the ante.With the Gulf of Tonkin incident, it was certain as sunrise that first string American assault troops would be coming off the bench to spell ARVN’s second eleven.
On July 1, 1965, 11th Air Assault Division (Test) was re-flagged as the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and twenty-seven days later, later President Johnson ordered the airmobile division to Vietnam.[13]
In November, at Ia Drang, 1st Cavalry air assault forces took their peacetime training into action against North Vietnamese regulars, decisively defeating same in a game-changing demonstration of mobility not seen since Hitler’s panzers steamrollered Poland in September 1939.
A point worthy of remark here is the freshness of American troops, most of who went into action for the first time and against a tough and wily opponent.They came away with a victory, as opposed to similar initial efforts by American troops at places like Bull Run 1861, Kasserine in North Africa 1942 and Osan with Task Force Smith in Korea, 1950.
Despite the fact there was still much to learn, the transition of peacetime development to wartime employment of airmobility seemed on its way.
The advent of the 11th Air Assault Division (Test) was an important step in the evolution of airmobility.But more than that, it was the attestation of a factor that was not only a prerequisite, but without which the effort of Howze, Williams, Kinnard and Seneff would have come to naught.And that factor was that everyone was basically on the same page—from Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara to Secretary of the Army Elvis Stahr, to General Howze, to General Kinnard and so on down the food chain.Minus this, victory at Ia Drang would not have been possible.
Endnotes
[1]See pages 46-48, “50 Years Ago:11th Air Assault Division {Test},” Army Aviation, by Mark Albertson, February 28, 2013.
[2]See page 30, The Air Close to the Trees:Evolution and Innovation in U.S. Army Assault Helicopter Units During the Vietnam War, by Adam Thomas Givens,
[3]Computer wargame models for the Howze Board were conducted by Research Analysis Corporation and Technical Operations Incorporated.
[4]Four battle models were chosen to challenge Airmobility:A Warsaw Pact attack on Western Europe; versus Chinese Communist Forces in Asia (obviously the stalemate of the Korean War was still fresh); and, that of blunting threats to Africa as well as Central and South America.
[5]The Army’s attempt to base airmobility on the helicopter during the 1960s was not too unlike the transition of mobility from the horse to the truck and tank during the 1920s and ‘30s.
However an important factor to keep in mind here was that the United States was not the only power wrestling with mobility during the years leading up to the Second World War, sharing the stage with such kibitzers as the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, Britain, France, . . .Yet during the 1960s, American practitioners virtually wrote the book.
[6]General Kinnard was among those of the 101st Airborne Division who were encircled by General Baron Hasso von Manteuffel’s Fifth Panzer Army at Bastogne.He is popularly known to have urged General Anthony McAuliffe to respond to German entreaties for surrender with the eloquent yet steadfast rejection of “Nuts!”
[7]See page 13, “D Training LOMS,” Transforming the Force:The 11th AirAssault Division (Test), From 1963-1965, by Major Thomas C. Graves, USA.
[8]According to Major Thomas I. McMurray and Major Larry E. Scoggins in the History of the 227th for the Year of 1965, on February 11, 1963, “the 31st Transportation Company (Light Helicopter) was re-designated and activated as Company B, 227th Assault Helicopter Battalion, and brought to the battalion its twenty-two CH-34 helicopters.”Page 2, McMurray & Scoggins.“On February 15, 1963, Company A, 227th Assault Helicopter Battalion was activated as the second of the battalion’s units.Company A was designated the aerial weapons armed escort company; their UH-1Bs and armament systems arriving in late April 1963.”Page 2, Major McMurray & Major Scoggins.
[9]The 10th Air TransportBrigade was not organic to the 11th AAD; rather, a unit of logistics support.
[10]See page 20, Forward Arming and Refueling Points for Mechanized Infantry and Armor Units, Chapter 2, “Review of Literature,” by Captain Jarrold M. Reeves, Jr., USA.“The Vietnam War and its heavy reliance on the helicopter led to the FARE (Forward Area Refueling Equipment) study and caused the research and development of the Forward Area Refueling Point for helicopters, but also for ground equipment.The culmination of the original plan of action was the development of the Forward Arming and Refueling Point Doctrine explained in FM 1-104, Forward Arming and Refueling Points, published in 1985.”See page 3, Captain Jarrold M. Reeves, Jr.
[11] The use of rocket-firing UH-1s in support of air assault units at landing zones was much like the Luftwaffe’s employment of the Junkers Ju-87 dive bomber to support panzer units at the point of the Wehrmacht’s armored thrusts.
[12]The blackened portion of General Kinnard’s observations underlines the ambidextrous nature of airmobility, where the pliability of the concept allows air assault forces to operate as either regular or irregular troops.
General Kinnard’s affirmation, then, coincides with the following practitioners of regular and irregular warfare:“When the situation is serious, the guerrillas must move with the fluidity of water and the ease of blowing wind.Their tactics must deceive, tempt and confuse the enemy.They must lead the enemy to believe that they will attack him from the east and north, and they must then strike him from the west and south.
Guerrilla initiative is expressed in dispersion, concentration and the alert shifting of forces.”See pages 103 and 104, Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare. Translated by Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith, USMC (Ret.).
“Throughout the Resistance War . . . our strategic line was to extend guerrilla warfare everywhere . . . we chose the positions where the enemy is weak to concentrate our forces there and annihilate his manpower.” See page 139, People’s War, People’s Army, by General Vo Nguyen Giap.
“When the enemy is at ease, be able to weary him; when well fed, to starve him; when at rest, to make him move; appear at places to which he must hasten; move swiftly where he does not expect you.”See page 96, The Art of War, by Sun Tzu, translated by Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith, USMC (Ret.).
[13]See page 16, Lieutenant General Harold G. Moore (Ret.) and Joseph L. Galloway, We Were Soldiers Once . . . And Young.
Bibliography
Albertson, Mark, “50 Years Ago:11th Air Assault Division (Test), Army Aviation, Vol. 62, No. 2, Army Aviation Publications, Inc., Monroe, Ct., February 28, 2013.
Giap, General Vo Nguyen, People’s War, People’s Army: The Viet Cong Insurrection Manual for Underdeveloped Countries, A Bantum Book, Published by Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, NY., 1962.
Graves, Major Thomas C., United States Army, School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2000
Howze, Hamilton H., A Cavalryman’s Story:Memoirs of a Twentieth-Century General, Smithsonian Institution Press, Washington and London, 1990.
Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, Translated by Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith, USMNC (Ret.), Praeger Publishers, Inc., New York, NY., 1961.
McMurray, Major Thomas I. and Scoggins, Major Larry E., “Company A, 227th Assault Helicopter Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile),” Reprinted from an in-country document titled, “History of the 227th for the Year 1965,” and approved by Lieutenant Colonel Jack Cranford, Commanding.A227ahb.org/History227th1965.html
Moore, Lieutenant General Harold G., (Ret.) and Galloway, Joseph L., We Were Soldiers Once . . . And Young:Ia Drang—the Battle That Changed the War in Vietnam, a Presidio Press Book, Published by The Random House Publishing Group, Inc., New York, 1992.
Reeves, Captain Jarrold M., Jr., USA, “Forward Army and Refueling Points for Mechanized Infantry and Armor Units,” U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, June 1993.
Tzu, Sun, The Art of War, Translated by Samuel B. Griffith, Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 1963.
Williams, Dr. James W., A History of Army Aviation:From its Beginnings to the War on Terror, iUniverse, Inc., Lincoln, Nebraska, 2005.
CAMP RIPLEY, MINNESOTA, UNITED STATES
07.27.2024
Story by Spc. Armani Wilson
135th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment
CAMP RIPLEY, Minn. – Six AH-64 Apache helicopter crews from the 1st Attack Battalion, 151st Aviation Regiment, 59th Troop Command, South Carolina Army National Guard, traveled cross-country to Camp Ripley, Minnesota, to participate in the Iowa Army National Guard’s eXportable Combat Training Capabilities (XCTC) rotation from the beginning of July to August 2024.
The journey from South Carolina to Minnesota took two days, marking the first time Apaches have trained at Camp Ripley. The pilots and aircrew operated around the clock, supporting the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 34th Infantry Division ground forces.
“Working with the Apaches is a new experience for a lot of the [junior] enlisted Soldiers,” said Lt. Col. Kyle Obrecht, battalion commander of the 1st Battalion, 168th Infantry Regiment, 2/34th IBCT. “It’s just an amazing experience for them to understand how complicated it is, but also how rewarding it is to have all those assets working together.”
This joint training effort enabled aircrews to communicate and coordinate with real-world ground troops, offering Iowa Army National Guard Soldiers dynamic, practical aerial support training.
“We’ve been doing a lot of attack, reconnaissance and armed security. We can go into those areas and use the advanced optics that we have to confirm or deny the presence of the enemy,” said Chief Warrant Officer 2 Dale Addy, an AH-64E Apache pilot assigned to Company B, 1st Attack Battalion. “We don’t differentiate between training and real life. We train to do exactly what we would do in a real-life situation. Much preparation goes into having these aircraft ready to launch as soon as possible.”
Training missions at Camp Ripley included three to five flights a day, both during the day and at night. The exercises prepared aircrews for the unpredictability of actual combat and underscored the rewarding nature of their vital support roles.
“Showing these ground guys what they have available to them and seeing their excitement during live-fire exercises is very rewarding,” said Addy. “As an infantry guy on the ground, if you call for Apaches, you can expect a team to get there quickly with a lot of ordnance and highly motivated individuals.”
The South Carolina Army National Guard’s participation in the Iowa Army National Guard’s XCTC rotation at Camp Ripley showcases the importance of training partnerships and dedication to readiness vital to the National Guard’s mission.
Looking Back, August 2024
By Mark Albertson
It was Major Delbert Bristol from First Army who planned the Air Observation Post operations for OVERLORD. His primary task was to get his planes and pilots across the Channel and on to the Continent. He decided against the LST carrier as used at Sicily. The LST could launch but not recover aircraft; therefore was not conducive to continued air operations off shore. There was, of course, the escort carrier. A baby flattop could provide that platform for continued Air Observation Post operations, launching and receiving flivver planes for a long as necessary so as to provide on demand support of the Ground Forces ashore. An interesting concept, but one which will not come to fruition. For the Navy decided not to chance a flattop for such an operation so close to the invasion beachheads.[1]
Many unit air officers opted for their aircraft to enter the Continent loaded aboard 2.5 ton trucks once the landings had been effected. However some planes were piloted across the Channel. The L-5s boasted the fuel capacity to make the crossing; not so the L-4s. Here an oxygen tank pinch-hitting as a reserve fuel tank was strapped to the back seat, with a fuel line running to the main tank, giving the Cub twenty extra gallons of fuel.[2] One such aviator who flew a Cub across the Channel was Lieutenant Norm Goodwin. In an interview at the 2012 Army Aviation Association of America Convention, he told this writer, “I was wearing my Mae West, parachute and a .45. We were told that if we had to ditch, that the Brits would pick us up.” I replied, “Comforting to know that rescue was so close at hand.” He smiled and said with obvious pride at America’s potential as the world’s greatest industrial producer, “Mark, if I had to ditch I never would have hit the water. We had so many ships in the Channel I would have landed on an LST or a Liberty Ship.”
Larger and faster than the Piper L-4 Cub, it was used generally by the AAF in a variety of duties as a cooperation aircraft.
As Allied troops pushed inland, Air OPs flew operations from cow pastures. A hazard quickly manifest itself: Mines. At the same time that the Ground Forces were gaining experience in employing the Air OPs, the Germans were learning, too. And so they began to sow minefields across cow pastures. Aviators began to use pastures still occupied by grazing cows. This proved less hazardous than taking a chance on abandoned fields.
From June 7th to the 17th, the Allies busily secured their beachheads for advances east and south across France; and, west across the Cotentin Peninsula, AKA the Cherbourg Peninsula. This led the GIs into the Bocage or . . . the hellish hedgerows.
“The hedgerow country in the U.S. sector, started about ten miles inland from the Normandy beaches and extended in a wide swath from Caumont on the American left to the western coast of the Cotentin Peninsula. The hedgerows were sturdy embankments, half earth, half hedge. At their base, they resembled dirt parapets and varied in thickness from one to four feet. Growing out of this earthen wall was a hedge that consisted of small trees and tangles of vines and brush. This vegetation had a thickness of between one to three feet and varied in height from three to fifteen feet . . . the military features of the Bocage were obvious. The hedgerows divided the country into tiny compartments . . . provided excellent cover and concealment to the defender and presented a formidable obstacle to the attacker. Numerous adjoining fields could be organized to form a natural defensive position echeloned in depth. The thick vegetation provided excellent camouflage and limited the deployment of units. The hedgerows also restricted observation, making effective use of heavy caliber direct-fire weapons almost impossible and hampered adjustment of artillery fire.” And to add to the footslogger’s dilemma, ‘persistent rains during June and July hampered the efforts of the U.S. Army. The early summer of 1944 was the wettest since 1900.’”[3]
France, winter 1944, a Cub on skis.
Hedgerow combat ate up infantrymen like peanuts. “For the British, it was like fighting in the trenches of the Western Front; for some Americans it was like fighting in the jungles of the Pacific. Troops trained in England for open, mobile warfare had to rethink their tactics quickly.”[4] First Army, during July 1944, incurred 40,000 casualties, 90 percent of whom were infantrymen. “A rifle company after a week of combat often numbered less than one hundred men; sometimes it resembled a reinforced rifle platoon, Casualties among infantry officers in the line companies were particularly high in the hedgerow country, where small-unit initiative and individual, leadership figured so largely.”[5]
The checkered killing zone proved a bane for forward observers, as the endless weave of thickets played havoc with their ability to call in fire on German positions. Air OPs provided that high point to be able to glimpse what was on the other side of the next hedgerow. However, German flak and small arms proved more than just a nuisance. Flights made on the American side of the line had its hazards, too. Field Artillery taking German positions under fire actually shot down an L-4 piloted by 1st Lieutenant Alfred R. Howard of the 90th Infantry Division. Both Howard and his observer, Lieutenant William G. Windler, were killed.[6]
To avoid being shot down by friendly artillery, flights were made over the enemy side of the hedgerows, at altitudes of 1,500 feet, which opened up the L-4s to interception by prowling Luftwaffe fighters. As the campaign wore on, German fighters posed less of a threat. Yet despite the advantage posed by the Air OPs, flivver pilots could not decide the fighting on the ground. Accurate artillery fire notwithstanding, daily advances were sometimes measured in yards per day against the well-dug in Germans. And like their brothers-in-arms on the ground, the artillery pilots incurred losses as well.
According to Major Delbert L. Bristol, between June 1944 to May 1945 First Army field artillery Air OPs lost 176 aircraft, fifty-nine of which were lost during the June-August period, from the Normandy landings through the hedgerow campaign. He also noted that of 81 pilots lost between June 1944 to May 1945, 42 were killed during the first three months of the campaign.[7]
Major Bristol went on to explain that following the hedgerow campaign, “the Air OPs played a vital role in all phases of combat operations as a primary means of observation. In Europe alone, it may be said that Air OPs accounted for better than 75% of all observed fire adjustments conducted,[8] But according to Major Bristol, this was only 34.4% of the missions flown by Army aviators.
Following OVERLORD, artillery was assigned a new task. Close Air Support was becoming more and more important to the ground effort. And as the Luftwaffe lost control of French air space, German flak[9] units became cause for concern.
The Germans boasted one of the most extensive flak commands of the war. On September 1, 1939, Luftwaffe manpower strength approached upwards of a million. Some two-thirds served in flak units. By 1944, of 2,500,000 men and women in the Luftwaffe, half were attached to the flak arm.
The Army and Navy each had its own flak units. But combined, amounted to only 25 percent of the Luftwaffe capability.
Luftwaffe flak units exercised two responsibilities: 1) Defense of the Fatherland against the growing menace of the Allied bomber streams and 2) Provide anti-aircraft defense for the Army field units, and, when necessary, provide artillery support for same.
Allied advance into Germany, encirclement of the Ruhr, by March 1944.
The Luftwaffe’s flak arm fielded an impressive array of weapons, ranging from such smaller calibers such as the 20 mm and 37 mm to larger tubes such as the 105 mm and its largest caliber, 128 mm. And not to be forgotten was the famous or infamous “88.” This superlative weapon was not only used in the anti-aircraft role, but went on to become one of the most effective tank killers on the battlefield during the entire war.
Flak suppression actually began in Italy. L-4s trailing bomber flights, while flying their divisional patrol sectors, would report the coordinates of barking flak batteries to the field artillery. The beneficiaries here were medium bombers flying tactical missions for the ground forces. “Air OPs were successfully used to neutralize enemy flak installations during Air Force bombing attacks in the drive on Cherbourg. Air OPs flying “anti-flak” patrols were able to spot flashes from enemy antiaircraft artillery. It was then a routine matter for the Air OPs to adjust artillery fire which effectively silenced those installations.[10]
Army aviator Hughes Rudd provides a glimpse of flak suppression: “. . . German flak crews were very cautious in shooting at the L-4s but of course there were times when they thought the odds were in their favor and would let fly. Flak came in various calibers, from the big 88s on down to 20 mm rapid-fire cannon, often mounted on half-tracks or flat-bed trucks. The 88s usually fired a ‘ladder’ of six rounds, apparently hoping you’d fly into one of the three pairs, and people sometimes did. But the muzzle flash of the 88 was so large and bright that you couldn’t miss it. In the Vosges in France I was flying near Bitche when six brown bursts appeared off my right wing, not close enough to do any harm. However, I had seen the muzzle flashes from a village across the Rhine, and when I radioed the 93rd’s fire direction center and gave them the coordinates, they poured thirty-six rounds into the village; there were no more ‘ladders’ from that quarter.”[11]
Along the same lines was the “Horsefly” controllers of ground support aircraft. In northern Europe, these fliers were generally AAF pilots assigned to a corps. Observers were drawn from the Ground Forces and fluent with enemy tanks, trucks and other vehicles. Like Air OP operations, Horseflys operated in areas of local air superiority. “The Horsefly technique was used in the European Theater of Operations principally by units of XII Tactical Air Command in cooperation with units of Seventh Army and by XIX Tactical Air Command in cooperation with units of Third Army.”[12]
Germany 1945, Air OPs using a hard surfaced runway known as the autobahn.
Like Ninth Army, Third Army found Air OPs to be of inestimable value. As the campaign proceeded, many Cub pilots eschewed low altitude, flying patrols at 2,500 to 3,000 feet to obtain a broader view for potential targets. Some chose to fly miles inside enemy territory. Even a dawn to dusk presence was created, providing an opportunity for American gunners to not only pound targets of opportunity but to protect American positions from German battery fire.
Air OPs flying route column control for armored units were found to speed the advance. Patrolling several miles ahead of the lead tank, Cubs alerted the mailed fist to enemy strong points, conditions of impending villages, bridges and any road blocks. A rapid advance meant constantly changing landing strips to keep pace with the swiftly moving armor. This caused wear and tear on aircraft, including damage incurred by the use of landing strips not used previously.
When working with the Field Artillery, strips for the Air OPs were located some 500 yards or more from the guns or even nearby towns, villages or crossroads. Anything which presented itself as a target for enemy batteries was given a wide berth.
Showcasing the L-4 Cub with data.
Another problem with regards to airstrips was the terrain of northwest Europe itself, especially during the rainy season. L-4s could actually tear up the soil like a football team. L-5s, because of their greater weight, posed an even greater problem. The answer was the landing mat, especially during the rainy season. Some 900 feet long by twenty feet, the mats reduced the chances for accidents and damage and allowed for unimpeded operations.
According to Third Army findings, fuels and lubricants from motor vehicles did not provide long-term maintenance advantages. 80-octane fuel used for motor transport and used in Air OP aircraft caused noticeable increases in maintenance. Increased servicing and overhauls caused shortages of spare parts, such as spark plugs, valves and rings. . . 80-octane gasoline caused an engine overhaul every forty hours; as opposed to 73-octane aviation fuel, which saw overhauls average every 125 to 150 hours.[13]
* * * * *
Anvil/Dragoon
Operation ANVIL[14] is one of those operations of World War II given minimum regard, sandwiched as it was between the Italian campaign and Normandy. Yet its significance cannot be understated. Prime Minister Winston Churchill was hardly a proponent since he thought the effort drew attention away from the Italian campaign. British General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, thought the Allied effort would be best served by landing on the “Istrian Peninsula at the head of the Adriatic which was dominated by runs south from the Trieste, there would be attractive prospects of advancing through the Ljubljana Gap into Austria and Hungary and striking at the heart of Germany from another direction.”[15] This, of course, played to Churchill’s preference for the strategy known as the “Soft Underbelly” to get into Central Europe so as to blunt the western momentum of the massive steamroller known as the Red Army. Churchill’s strategy was rooted in the Balance-of-Power formula that had guided European politics and security concerns for centuries.
America, on the other hand, was not so inclined. American strategy did not countenance landings anywhere in the Adriatic nor did it accommodate the major effort to take place in Italy, where the logistics of crossing the Julian Alps certainly did not appeal to the U.S. Army’s preference for mobile warfare, politics notwithstanding. And this leads to one of the major attractions of ANVIL/DRAGOON, the capture of Marseilles, the largest port in France, important since stubborn German troops were still holding out in Antwerp. With its capture, Marseilles would go on “to satisfy over one-third of the Allied logistical needs in northern France.”[16]
ANVIL/DRAGOON provided Eisenhower with a third army group, thereby affording the Supreme Commander the luxury of not having to stretch out or thin his forces as he closed the German border. An additional army group therefore bolstered the Allied front in the face of the later German attack in December which resulted in the battle of the Bulge.
Operation: DRAGOON (ANVIL), the landings in southern France, August 1944.
August 15, 1944, the U.S. Seventh Army, General Alexander Patch in command, was composed of VI Corps (3rd, 36th and 45th Infantry Divisions), First Airborne Task Force plus five divisions of the Free French Army, assaulted the French coast in the area of St. Tropez and St. Raphael. Patch’s army advanced, reaching the Vosges Mountains by September 11, besides effecting the link up with Allied armies to the north. At the same time, Patton’s Third Army was speeding across France towards the German frontier.
The concerted Allied effort brought with it a wider field of opportunity for the Air OPs. Artillery pilots shuffled command officers; flew route column control for armored units; reconnaissance missions to discern German positions; dusk to dawn patrols along the line. L-4s were also employed to monitor the precious truck convoys feeding the lengthening supply lines for the rapidly advancing armies. Known as the Red Ball Express, these truck convoys wound their way through the French countryside, sometimes having to cope with bypassed German units. Air OPs flew top cover, warning of enemy troops or obstacles, reporting on accidents and dispatching mechanics to service disabled trucks.[17]
Wire laying duties were assigned as well. However the L-4 proved lacking here in comparison to the larger L-5. The former could lay some half mile of wire as opposed to the latter which could lay upwards of five miles at a time.[18]
Yet at this stage, it is important to bring the story of the Air OPs back to where they started, the aerial direction of artillery fire. For by late 1944, they were at the top of their game. And who better to tell this part of the story than William Wallace Ford.
“The light observation airplane (Air OP) as a component of the artillery organization now proved its worth for us, as it had many times before for other divisions. It was particularly effective in conjunction with a new system of fire direction developed at Fort Sill just prior to WWII. Under this procedure an artillery battalion going into position would run a quick but accurate survey locating the base pieces (guns) of several batteries with respect to one another, and at the same time giving a common reference direction for all. After that, the battalion fire direction center could compute, in a matter of seconds, accurate data (direction and range) for all batteries of the battalion.
“Not only that, but division artillery headquarters (my headquarters) would at the same time be running a similar survey to tie four battalions together. Finally, corps artillery supporting us with heavier cannon would tie into us with its survey. Thus, eventually, all artillery that could reach any selected target was tied together by survey, so that now, after any one battery has been adjusted, the whole works could fire for effect with great accuracy, without further expenditure of time and ammunition in adjustment.
It was murderous. It was worse, it was devastating. Fort Sill had also developed a thing called ‘Time on Target (TOT).’ The idea was to have the concerted fire of many batteries land simultaneously on an unsuspecting target, or on a nearby checkpoint from which a transfer of fire could accurately be made. Watches in all fire direction centers would be coordinated to the second. The order to fire and the transmission of firing data would be preceded by the words, ‘Time on Target (as an example) 1106.’ Each battery would be loaded and laid and would fire at 1106 minus the time of flight of projectile from gun position to the target. Thus the projectiles from all batteries participating would land on or near the target at almost exactly 1106. It was shattering to observe one of these, and I’m glad I never had to endure one. At this stage of the war we had several times as much ammunition to fire, as the Germans opposite us.”[19]
Endnotes
[1] See pages 66, 67 and 69, Chapter Fourteen, “D-Day and the Struggle for Normandy: 6th June 1944-24th July 1944,” The Fighting Grasshoppers, by Ken Wakefield. Major Bristol’s idea of using an escort carrier for Air Observation Post missions ashore was one of merit. Consider an escort carrier with 12 to 15 L-4s able to service naval gunfire operations ashore and later missions in support as the ground troops move inland from the beaches; or, supply Cubs for missions ashore once the beaches have been consolidated. Verification of Bristol’s concept at Normandy might have opened up use of same in the Pacific Theater of Operations. A caveat here would have been that such escort carriers could have been targets of the later kamikaze attacks.
[2] See page 93, Chapter Ten, “L-Bird Oddities,” Box Seat Over Hell, by Hardy D. Cannon.
[3] See pages 14 and 15, I. “Normandy: The Context of the Battle,” Busting the Bocage: American Combined Arms Operations in France, 6 June-31 July 1944, by Michael D. Doubler.
[4] See page 42, “The Battle of Normandy,” Normandy 1944, by Stephen Badsey.
[5] See page 175, “The Conclusions,” Breakout and Pursuit, United States Army in World War II, European Theater of Operations, by Martin Blumenson.
[6] See page 208, Chapter 6, “The European Theater of Operations, June 1944-September 1945,” Eyes of Artillery: Origins of Modern U.S. Army Aviation in World War II, by Edgar F. Raines, Jr.
[7] See page 586, “Air OP is Here to Stay,” The Field Artillery Journal, Vol. 36, No. 10, by Major Delbert L. Bristol, FA. Major Bristol provides a number of important figures pertaining to the performance of First Army field artillery Air OPs during the northern European campaign, from June 1944 to May 1945.
[8] See page 586, Major Delbert L. Bristol.
[9] “Flak was an abbreviation for Fliegererabwehrkanonen, or anti-aircraft guns.” See page 230, Chapter 19, “The Flak Arm,” The Luftwaffe Data Book, by Dr. Alfred Price.
[10] See page 12, Section 4, Chapter 1, “Tactical Operation and Control,” Study of Organic Field Artillery Air Observation, The General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, Study Number 66.
[11] See page 7, “When I Landed the War was Over,” American Heritage, Vol. 32, Issue 6, October/November, 1981, by Hughes Rudd.
[12] See page 14, Part Two, Horsefly Control of Fighter-Bombers, Chapter 1, “Employment of Horsefly Technique,” Section 1, The General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, Liaison Aircraft with Ground Forces Units, Study Number 20.
[13] See pages 588 and 589, “Air OP Operations in the Third U.S. Army,” The Field Artillery Journal, Vol. 36, No. 10, October 1946.
[14] Later changed to DRAGOON when it was thought the operation had been compromised.
[15] See page 61, Book 1, Chapter 4, “Attack on the South of France?” The Second World War: Triumph and Tragedy, Vol. 6, by Winston S. Churchill.
[16] See page 3, “Southern France, 15 August-14 September 1944,” Southern France, U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II, prepared by Jeffrey J. Clarke, United States Army Center of Military History.
[17] See page 90, Chapter 4, “Missions and Deployment,” The Development of Organic Light Aviation in the Army Ground Forces in World War II, by Major Robert S. Brown, USA.
[18] See pages 148 and 149, Chapter III, “The War Years: North Africa, Sicily and Italy,” The Army Aviation Story, by Richard K. Tierney with Fred Montgomery.
[19] See pages 135 and 136, Chapter IX, “In Combat,” Wagon Soldier, by William Wallace Ford.
Bibliography
Badsey, Stephen, Normandy 1944: Allied Landings and Breakout, Barnes & Noble Publishing, Inc., by arrangement with Osprey Publishing, Essex, England, 1990.
Blumenson, Martin, Breakout and Pursuit, United States Army in World War II: European Theater of Operations, CMH Pub 7-5-1, Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, D.C., 1993. Originally published 1961.
Bristol, Major Delbert L, F.A., “Air OP is Here to Stay,” The Field Artillery Journal, Vol. 36, No. 10, The Field Artillery Association, Washington, D.C., October 1946.
Brown, Major Robert S. Brown, USA, The Development of Organic Light Aviation in the Army Ground Forces in World War II, General Studies, Army Command and General Staff College, For Leavenworth, Kansas, 2000
Cannon, Hardy D., Box Seat Over Hell: The True Story of Pilots and America’s Liaison Their Light Planes in World War II, San Antonio, Texas, 1985.
Churchill, Winston S., Vol. 6, The Second World War: Triumph and Tragedy, Houghton Mifflin and Company, Boston, Massachusetts, 1953.
Clarke, Jeffrey J., Southern France, 15 August-14 September 1944, U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II, CMH Pub 72-31, Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, D.C., 2019.
Doubler, Captain Michael D., Busting the Bocage: American Combined Arms Operations in France, 6 June-31 July, 1944, Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1988
Ford, William Wallace, Wagon Soldier, Excelsior Printing Company, North Adams, Massachusetts, 1980.
Price, Dr. Alfred, The Luftwaffe Data Book, Greenhill Books, Pennsylvania, 1997
Raines, Edgar F., Jr., Eye of Artillery: The Origins of Modern U.S. Army Aviation in World War II, Army Historical Series, CMH Pub 70-31-1, Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, D.C., 2000.
Rudd, Hughes, “When I Landed the War was Over,” American Heritage, Vol. 32, No. 6, October/November 1981, www.americanheritage.co/content/when-i-landed-war-was-over
The General Board, “Liaison Aircraft with Ground Forces,” Study No. 20, United States Forces, European Theater, Office of the Chief of Military History, June 17, 1945. Property of U.S. Army, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Library, August 4, 1996.
The General Board, “Report on Study of Organic Field Artillery Air Observation,” Study No. 66, United States Forces, European Theater, June 17, 1945. Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Library, August 4, 1996.
Tierney, Richard K. with Montgomery, Fred, The Army Aviation Story, Colonial Press, Northport, Alabama, 1963.
Wakefield, Ken, The Fighting Grasshoppers: US Liaison Aircraft Operations in Europe, 1942-1945, Midland Counties Publications, Leicester, England, 1990.
HAWAII, UNITED STATES
Courtesy Story
U.S. Army Pacific Public Affairs Office
PACIFIC MISSILE RANGE FACILITY, KAUAI, HAWAII – 3d Multi-Domain Task Force (3d MDTF), partnered with 1st MDTF, 25th Combat Aviation Brigade (25th CAB), and the 5th Surface to Ship Field Artillery Regiment of the Japan Ground Self Defense Forces (JGSDF) Western Army participated in a sinking exercise (SINKEX) from July 11-12, 2024, as part of the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2024 exercise.
3d MDTF and the JGSDF provided tactical command and control of land-based fires during the SINKEX from a bilateral fire support coordination center (BFSCC) while 1st MDTF provided High Mobility Army Rocket System (HIMARS) launchers. The JGSDF participated with Type 12 Surface to Ship missiles (SSM).
The combined joint live fire also integrated AH-64 Apache attack helicopters from 25th CAB. In addition to U.S. Army and JGSDF ground based fires assets, joint and partner Air Force and Navy platforms, to include ships and aircraft, also delivered synchronized effects during the SINKEX. The SINKEX showcased the continuing development of combined and joint interoperability.
“Our network of partners and allies is an asymmetric advantage over rivals. Working side by side with our JGSDF counterparts during RIMPAC strengthens our interoperability, allows us to share best practices, and improves how we operate,” said COL Michael Rose, 3d MDTF Commander. “We both possess complementary capabilities and this exercise allowed us to integrate our assets together in support of the combined joint force during the SINKEX. Interoperability with our Japanese allies is a force multiplier.”
3d MDTF and the JGSDF conducted combined planning and rehearsals from the BFSCC the week prior to the SINKEX which provided the opportunity to deepen the relationship between the two units and to conduct detailed integrated planning. During execution, personnel within the BFSCC worked side by side to conduct targeting and fires delivery.
In addition to increasing combined and joint interoperability, RIMPAC also provided avenue to advance the interchangeability between MDTF’s. While 3d MDTF led the planning and executed the tactical command and control for the SINKEX, 1st MDTF provided the HIMARS launchers and crews. The scalable and tailorable design of MDTFs lends itself to the exchange of capabilities between units based on mission requirements.
Rose highlighted this ability stating, “1st and 3d MDTFs work closely together in training and throughout the Indo-Pacific during Operation Pathways events. RIMPAC gave us the opportunity to integrate assets to support the Combined, Joint Force in a realistic training environment.”
Exercises such as RIMPAC provide MDTFs the ability to contribute to the combined joint force in the INDOPACIFIC.
The theme of RIMPAC 2024 is “Partners: Integrated and Prepared.” To promote a free and open Indo-Pacific, RIMPAC is the world’s largest joint and combined maritime exercise, utilizing and preserving a world class training environment. With inclusivity at its core, RIMPAC fosters joint and multi-national cooperation and trust, leverages interoperability, and achieves respective national objectives to strengthen integrated and prepared coalition partners. “RIMPAC is a premier venue to showcase the Army’s landpower contribution to the Joint Force,” said Rose.
UNITED KINGDOM
Story by 1st Sgt. Justin A. Naylor
22nd Mobile Public Affairs Detachment
When his parents named him Tydal Wave Sugar, they had to know he was destined to make a splash. Now, a UH-60 Black Hawk crew chief serving with the 12th Combat Aviation Brigade, Spc. Tydal Sugar is part of a select group of 12th Combat Aviation Brigade Soldiers taking part in the Farnborough International Airshow in Farnborough, United Kingdom, July 22-26, 2024.
“It’s always been a dream of mine to go to the U.K.,” said Sugar, a Clearwater, Florida, native. “I was so excited. You can ask my pilots; for the past two weeks, I’ve been preparing the aircraft to come out here and look good and represent the 12th CAB.”
The FIA is one of the largest trade shows in Europe and focuses on space, defense, sustainability, innovation, future flight, and workforce development. This year, the FIA comprises more than 1,200 exhibitors from more than 40 countries worldwide. Attendance is expected to exceed 70,000 from more than 100 countries, including an expected 250 civil, military, and space delegations, along with more than 1,000 accredited media outlets.
For Sugar, this event is a chance to talk about what he loves: his Black Hawk.
“It’s a really neat experience,” he said. “I love talking about the Black Hawk. I can talk about it for hours.”
Already, Sugar has had the opportunity to talk to delegations from around the world and even showed off his Black Hawk to Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall.
“The reception from everyone has been that they really love it,” said Sugar. “We let them take pictures in the cockpit and cabin. It’s been nothing but smiles.”
Watching this junior Soldier interact with senior civilian and military leaders has been inspiring for the pilots working alongside Sugar during the FIA.
“He has represented the crew and 12th CAB very well,” said Chief Warrant Officer 2 Zachary Yllander, a UH-60 Black Hawk pilot. “He is our senior crew chief, so he is a wealth of knowledge. He’s been able to answer any questions the delegates have had.”
Yllander said that before the event, Sugar took charge of preparing the aircraft and equipment for the crew’s trip from Germany, where they are stationed, to the U.K.
“He is in charge of what happens in the back of the aircraft through and through,” said Yllander. “Getting troops on and off the aircraft is our bread and butter, and he does it without any issues. He knows the most about what happens in the back of the aircraft, where we make our money.”
For Sugar, the FIA is just one of many opportunities that 12th the CAB has provided to travel the world and share his love of Army aviation.
“Since I’ve been in the 12th CAB, they have allowed me to go to so many places,” said Sugar. “I’ve been to Scotland, Ghana, Greece, the Netherlands, Italy, and just really all around Europe. I’m forever grateful for it.”
As Sugar travels the world, he is reminded that he follows in the footsteps of great service members before him, including his grandparents, his father, and an uncle currently serving in the U.S. Space Force. Through his service, Sugar now has the chance to carve his path and follow his dreams.
“I really wanted to join the military to broaden my horizons and travel the world to see what there is to see,” he said. “I always loved helicopters and the feeling of flight. Being up in the air is just insane to me. I love aviation as a whole, but the stuff you can do in helicopters is just amazing.”
For those thinking of a career in Army aviation, Sugar has some thoughts.
“If someone I knew was considering joining the Army, I would definitely say to do it,” Sugar said. “It’s a huge turning point in your life and will definitely make you better. I appreciate the 12th CAB and everything I’ve been able to do in my Army career so far. Not many people even leave their hometown, and I’ve already gotten to travel the world.”
Throughout the remainder of the FIA, Sugar will serve as a subject matter expert on his aircraft alongside his fellow crew members and military members from the Air Force and Navy. Other equipment from the U.S. at this event includes an F-35 Lighting II, two F-16 Fighting Falcons, a P-8 Poseidon, an MQ-9A Reaper, and a C-130J Super Hercules. For the 12th CAB representatives here, the FIA is a chance to show what makes Army aviation unique to a global audience and to share their love of Army aviation with the world.